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Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL

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20 FEBRUARY 1987

WORLDWIDE REPORT

ARMS CONTROL

CONTENTS

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

Moscow on U.S. Plans To Deploy SDI in 1994 (Moscow TASS, 26 Jan 86; Moscow PRAVDA, 21 Jan 87)	1
TASS Report	1
PRAVDA on SDI Deployment, by Gennadiy Vasilyev	2
TASS: Weinberger Speech Notes Aims To Deploy SDI Early (Moscow TASS International Service, 23 Jan 87)	4
TASS on Basic Goals of SDI Plans (Moscow TASS, 22 Jan 87)	6
USSR's General Lebedev Cited on SDI, ABM Treaty (Yu. Lebedev; Moscow PRAVDA, 5 Jan 87)	8
Soviet Academy of Sciences Aide on Dangers of SDI (M. A. Markov; Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 12 Nov 86)	10
USSR: Role of U.S. Civilian Research in SDI (A. Avdulov; Moscow RABOCHAYA GAZETA, 11 Oct 86)	15
IZVESTIYA: Japanese Paper Ties Spacelab to SDI (S. Agafonov; Moscow IZVESTIYA, 18 Jan 87)	19

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

Moscow Reports New Round of Geneva NST Talks (Moscow Domestic Service, 17 Jan 87; Moscow PRAVDA, 25 Jan 87)	21
Geneva Talks 'Turning Point', by Vladimir Dmitriyev	21
Delegations Prepare Draft Documents	21

TASS: Bulgarian Minister Praises January 1986 Call (Moscow TASS, 13 Jan 87)	22
TASS Hits Kohl Comment on Gorbachev January 1986 Program (Moscow IZVESTIYA, 18 Jan 86)	23
TASS: Scientists in Geneva Plan Moscow Nuclear Talks (Moscow TASS International Service, 26 Jan 87)	24
USSR's Afanasyev on American, Canadian Views on SALT, SDI (V. Afanasyev; Moscow PRAVDA, 12, 19 Jan 87)	25
Part One: U.S. Visit,	25
Part Two: Canada Visit	28
Gorbachev Replies to U.S. Students on Nuclear-Free World (Moscow TASS, 11 Jan 87)	29
TASS: Reagan Radio Address 'In Spirit of Militarism' (Moscow TASS, 18 Jan 87)	30
Moscow TV on Weinberger Defense Budget Report (Vladimir Tsvetov; Moscow Television Service, 20 Jan 87)	31
TASS Urges U.S. To Drop 'Old Dogmas' for Negotiations (Moscow TASS, 19 Jan 87)	32
Moscow: U.S. Experts Cited on Disarmament Issues (Fedor Burlatskiy; Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 14 Jan 87)	33
Moscow: 'Top Priority' on Nuclear Issues, SDI (Radomir Bogdanov, Sergey Plekhanov; Moscow in English to North America, 17 Jan 87)	37
Moscow Roundtable on NST, Moratorium (Nikolay I. Yefimov, et al.; Moscow Domestic Service, 11 Jan 87)	41
Moscow: Talk Show on Moratorium, SALT, SDI (Sergey Pravdin; Moscow Domestic Service, 16 Jan 87)	46
USSR's Yeltsin Interviewed on INF, SDI, Disarmament (Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin Interview; Belgrade NIN, 26 Oct 86)	50

SALT/START ISSUES

TASS: U.S. SALT Policy 'Obstructionist' (Moscow TASS, 16 Jan 87)	53
TASS Cites U.S. Trident Missile Test Launch (Moscow TASS, 15 Jan 87; Moscow Television Service, 16 Jan 87)	55

TASS Report	55
Moscow TV on Launch	55
 Briefs	
USSR: SALT Violation Briefing	57
 CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS	
 Briefs	
TASS: Japanese CW Units	58
 EUROPEAN CONFERENCES	
TASS: Socialist Deputy Foreign Ministers Discuss CD (Moscow TASS International Service, 21 Jan 87)	59
Soviet General Tatarnikov Sums Up CDE Results (V. Tatarnikov; Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 28 Oct 86)	60
PRAVDA on Conclusion of Stockholm Meeting (M. Kostikov; Moscow PRAVDA, 23 Sep 86)	64
Soviet Book on MBFR Highlights Counting Dispute (A. L. Samoylov; Moscow OBSHCHESTVENNYE NAUKI V SSSR: SERIYA 1--PROBLEMY NAUCHNOGO KOMMUNIZMA, No 1, Jan- Feb 86)	66
Briefs	
TASS; Pact Working Group	69
 NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS	
TASS: Opening of Geneva Nuclear Test Talks (Moscow TASS, 20, 22 Jan 87)	70
Gerasimov Briefs Press	70
Talks Begin	70
TASS: Commission Working on Nordic NFZ Treaty (Moscow TASS, 20 Jan 87)	71
PRAVDA Cites Petrosyants on Verification (A. M. Petrosyants; Moscow PRAVDA, 17 Jan 87)	73
TASS Reports 16 January Fire at Test Monitoring Site (Moscow TASS, 22 Jan 87)	75
Soviet Daily Lauds Step Toward Nuclear-Free Zone in Scandinavia (Ivan Beydin; Moscow SELSKAYA GAZETA, 23 Sep 86)	76
Briefs	
TASS; Spanish NFZ Urged	78

RELATED ISSUES

USSR's Petrovskiy Paris Consultations on Disarmament (Moscow TASS, 8 Jan 87)	79
7 Jan News Conference	79
Consultations Reported	80
Moscow: KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on Disarmament Efforts in 1986 (Editorial; Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 15 Jan 87)	81
PRAVDA on Reykjavik Results, Pacific Security, NFZ (Vsevolod Ovchinnikov; Moscow PRAVDA, 4 Jan 87)	83
Moscow Assails U.S. SALT, Moratorium Stance (Valentin Zorin; Moscow Television Service, 9 Jan 87)	85
USSR's Sokolov on Nuclear Security, INF, Testing (Paris LE MONDE, 20 Jan 87; Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 23 Jan 87)	86
LE MONDE Account, by Sergey Sokolov	86
KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Account, by S. Sokolov	88
Soviet Marshal on Perils of Nuclear War, SDI, Moratorium (Yevgeniy Savitskiy; Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA, 25 Dec 86)	82
Moscow Panel Show on SDI, SALT, Moratorium (Andrey Ptashnikov, Moscow Domestic Service, 9 Jan 87)	96
Gorbachev Message to Perez De Cuellar on NST, CSCE, NFZ (Moscow PRAVDA, 11 Jan 87)	99
Gorbachev Indian Trip, Delhi Document Import to Asian Security (Ye. Primakov; Moscow PRAVDA, 5 Jan 87)	104
Moscow Radio on Moratorium Anniversary, SDI, Asian Security (Yuriy Nikolayevich Bandura, et al.; Moscow Domestic Service, 18 Jan 87)	107
PRAVDA Discusses Asian Security Problems (Vsevolod Ovchinnikov; Moscow PRAVDA, 13 Jan 86)	114
TASS: Honecker, Nakasone Discuss Arms Issues in Berlin (Moscow TASS, 13 Jan 87)	117
Militarization of Space	117
Asian Security	118
TASS; Norwegian Defense Minister on SDI, Testing, INF, NFZ (Moscow TASS, 9 Jan 87)	119

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

MOSCOW ON U.S. PLANS TO DEPLOY SDI IN 1994

TASS Report

LD261725 Moscow TASS in English 1717 GMT 26 Jan 87

[Washington's "Space Rubicon"--TASS Headline]

[Text] Moscow, 26 January (TASS)--TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev:

In the past few days the "star warriors" have grown dramatically more active in the United States, demanding a transition from research into space strike weapons to their deployment. At a seminar organized for the President in the White House, Pentagon officials tried hard to demonstrate that an "initial" system of "Star Wars" weapons could be deployed as early as 1994. Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger and his lieutenants claim "dramatic results" from the work already done on SDI so that the "first phase" weapons can be deployed within the next few years. Next March, as the newspaper THE BOSTON GLOBE has just reported, the White House chief will be given concrete recommendations on the development of two "tiers" of the system one space-based and other ground-based, between 1991 and 1994.

All this shows the fright of the "Star Wars" proponents over the fact that the Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik raised the cause of nuclear disarmament to an unprecedentedly high level and at the same time demonstrated the fallacy of the American SDI programme. That is why Washington is in such a hurry to put up the ultimate barrier to every effort to advance arms control. Administration officials are seeking to block compromises at the Soviet-American Geneva talks and to make President Reagan go back on his promise, given in Reykjavik, to honour the ABM Treaty for another 10 years.

SDI proponents would like to guarantee continued work on that dangerous programme regardless of the findings of further research. They want "to put their markers" in the space Klondike so that the Star Wars programme could not be scrapped by future U.S. Administrations, as Attorney-General Edward Meese [name as received] frankly stated. They also are in a hurry to tip strategic parity in favour of the U.S. as soon as possible and develop in addition to the nuclear first-strike potential any "shield," even a leaky one, behind which those given to armed ventures would feel themselves more confident or, in other words, more brazen.

It cannot be ruled out either that one of the purposes of the ongoing campaign is to break the resistance of at least some of those congressmen and senators who are opposed to SDI and to secure the appropriation of the funds needed by the military-industrial complex for the programme already in the immediate future. The "Star Wars" advocates seem to fear in all seriousness that, as the absurdity of SDI makes itself felt, less and less money will be appropriated for it. At the same time Washington is trying to make the American and world public believe that the fulfillment of SDI is "inevitable" and that for this reason it is late and useless to protest against it.

SDI, THE WASHINGTON POST wrote the other day, if for Ronald Reagan what the pyramids were to the Egyptian pharaohs: It should perpetuate the President's grandeur. But SDI leads to the dramatic escalation of the risk of nuclear war -- sanctioned, unsanctioned or accidental -- a war after which neither "space pyramids," nor the United States nor anything else will be left in the world. When SDI begins to be deployed, the ABM Treaty along with every hope of the peoples for the abolition of nuclear weapons will be buried, a race with space weapons will be launched and strategic arms arsenals will begin to be built up even speedier. That is why those who demand the deployment of SDI weapons actually want the presidential legacy in the form of rubble -- the rubble of treaties and agreements, the rubble of missed opportunities to build a safe world, the rubble of human civilization as a whole.

PRAVDA on SDI Deployment

PM221139 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Jan 87 First Edition p 5

[Gennadiy Vasilyev "Commentator's Column": "In A Hurry"]

[Text] New York -- Speaking at the National Press Club in Washington the other day, Defense Secretary C. Weinberger pressed for the speediest U.S. deployment of space weapons.

Earlier, THE WASHINGTON POST reports, the Pentagon head and his most zealous subordinates, including General J. Abrahamson, who is in charge of the SDI program, and Assistant Secretary R. Perle, had held an unusual seminar for President Reagan in the White House. Using plans and diagrams, they had demonstrated to the President that an "initial" space weapons system can be deployed by 1994.

The "Star Wars" supporters are clearly in a hurry. Pentagon officials, arms manufacturers, and ultrarightist organizations have launched a vigorous campaign to speedily "cross the Rubicon" -- passing from research and design work in the space weapons sphere to their actual deployment in near-earth space.

Why such a rush? The answer to this question is given by that pillar of the U.S. extreme right-wing forces Attorney General E. Meese. The SDI enthusiasts, he said, are in a hurry to switch to the practical implementation of their plans so that "future administrations are unable to demolish" this plan. That's putting it frankly.

They are also in a hurry because in the U.S. Congress, where there was already serious opposition to the most militarist aspects of administration policy, criticism of SDI has been mounting further since the recent midterm elections, which brought success to the Democrats. In fact, SDI, to quote Senator Albert Gore, is merely a formula for the path leading to an "even faster arms race and the end of any meaningful efforts in the arms control sphere."

It is difficult not to agree with this view. The start of the deployment of elements of space systems will undermine the ABM Treaty and destroy the peoples' hopes of strategic arms cuts. As is known, it was Washington's stubborn reluctance to confine SDI work to the laboratory which was one of the chief obstacles to the achievement of important decisions in Reykjavik paving the way to a nuclear-free world. The Washington hawks' efforts to impose on the United States plans for starting the deployment of space weapons soon can only be seen as an attempt by the Pentagon to deal a further body blow to the peoples' hopes.

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CSO: 5200/1246

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS: WEINBERGER SPEECH NOTES AIMS TO DEPLOY SDI EARLY

LD231025 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0921 GMT 23 Jan 87

[Text] Washington, 23 Jan (TASS) -- Speaking in Colorado Springs (Colorado), U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger stated the Reagan administration may soon take the decision on deployment [razvertyvaniye] of weapons of the first phase of the "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) by the start of the 1990s. According to the ABC television company, the Pentagon boss said these involve space-based kinetic weapons, and ground-based antimissile systems. He asserted "dramatic results" have been achieved in experiments connected with SDI.

The television company provides the following explanation for the speeches of the U.S. defense secretary in support of a speedy start to deployment of "Star Wars" weapons, which have recently sharply increased in frequency: "Weinberger considers that taking the decision on deployment of SDI will make it difficult for the subsequent administration to renounce it. According to what has been said by the secretary's assistants, his speech was previously approved by Frank Carlucci, the President's national security adviser. This assumes the White House is ready to start its latest big campaign in support of SDI".

Observers call attention to the administration's departure from its previous statements that all necessary research would be conducted before it made the decision on deploying [razvertyvaniye] SDI. Now, however, persistent calls are being heard from official Washington for a stage by stage deployment of the Star Wars system as soon as possible or in other words, they should not wait for the completion of research work on that program.

This was virtually confirmed by General James Abrahamson, director of the organization implementing the Strategic Defense Initiative. Commenting on reports which had appeared concerning the possibility of a stage by stage deployment of individual components of SDI as they are developed [razrabotka], he said, "We are carefully studying this concept." Admiral William Crowe, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, speaking to the Senate Armed Forces Committee, pointed out that to achieve the planned timetable for deploying SDI components it would be necessary within the next few months to take the decision which would aid movement towards this aim.

As the press remarks, one of the aims of this new propaganda campaign is to get the U.S. public used to the idea of the inevitability of the full-scale implementation of the Star Wars program.

Opposition is growing in the U.S. Congress to such dangerous plans of the administration. Congressmen Les Aspin, Charles Bennett, Marvin Leath and Nicholas Mavroules on Wednesday expressed themselves opposed to satisfying the request of the White House for the allocation in the 1987 financial year of additional appropriations for the "Star Wars" program. At a joint press conference they came out in favor of the United States' observance of the ABM Treaty. A day before a press conference was held by Senators William Proxmire and Bennett Johnston, at which they criticized plans for the deployment of the first components of the ABM space system already at the beginning of the nineties. As Johnston stated, "the U.S. Congress will not assign money" for these purposes.

"'Star Wars' for Reagan," writes THE WASHINGTON POST observer Mary McGrory "is the same as the pyramids were for the Pharaohs, or the colosseum for the Roman emperors. It is a monument which would perpetuate the grandeur of the President. However, scientists consider SDI an extremely unreliable and destabilizing invention, which is not a protective umbrella for 'the good guys,' but a game of chance for politickers with the aim of blocking the attainment of any serious agreement on arms control."

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS ON BASIC GOALS OF SDI PLANS

LD222024 Moscow TASS in English 2020 GMT 22 Jan 87

["Mad Hopes of "Star Wars" Protagonists" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow January 22 TASS -- TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev:

In the less than four years since President Ronald Reagan announced his "Strategic Defense Initiative," the scope and character of that program and the timeframe for the deployment of first strike weapons in outer space have been revised several times.

Washington no longer recalls the promise made by Ronald Reagan on March 23, 1983, to make nuclear weapons "impotent and outdated." Intensive work on the development of space strike weapons is going hand in hand in the U.S. with a strenuous buildup of nuclear systems, both ground-based and submarine-launched. Plans are being made, too, for fitting out space systems with nuclear warheads. The recognition of the destabilizing character of the buildup of both offensive and ABM systems in the U.S., made by the President himself, has been forgotten as well.

Americans are no longer promised a "dependable shield" against retaliation. The Pentagon now allows for the possibility that hundreds and even thousands of devastating warheads will penetrate the American ABM defenses. Emphasis has been shifted to the protection of American command centres, nuclear arms depots, missile silos, atomic reactors and similar targets.

In December 1986, President Reagan was presented with another version of the "Star Wars" program, which envisioned the deployment of the "first echelon" of large-scale ABM defenses as early as 1994. The goal of that plan is to expedite transition from research into extensive ABM defenses to the practical deployment of space systems so that, as U.S. Attorney General Edwin Meese put it, the program could not be harmed by succeeding administrations.

In spite of all those revisions, however, the basic goals of the U.S. "Star Wars" program remain unchanged. Some American specialists note that the "fundamental goal" of the SDI program is to tip the existing balance of forces and achieve military superiority for the U.S.

Another goal of the program is to offer unprecedented profits to the tycoons of the U.S. military-industrial complex.

Last but not least, the "Star Wars" protagonists in Washington hope to drag the Soviet Union into a race with costly and senseless ABM weapons and thus thwart the program for the renovation and reorganization of the Soviet economy. An adviser to the U.S. President and one of the more zealous proponents of the militarization of space, Edward Teller, hopes that SDI will make the Soviet Union dramatically increase its defense spending. If the USSR begins to deploy an ABM system of its own, Teller says, SDI can be considered justified.

Only one of those three goals can be considered realistic: The current U.S. Administration really can enrich American arms merchants -- but even that on the condition the U.S. population offers no serious resistance to these plans.

As for the White House's hopes to achieve military superiority or bleed the Soviet Union white in a race with space weapons, they are built on sand.

The Soviet Union will effectively counter the development of extensive ABM defenses in the U.S., but in ensuring its security, the Soviet Union, naturally, will not follow the mad scenarios drawn up in the Pentagon. It has been pointed out on more than one occasion that the Soviet Union's reply will be efficient, timely and far less costly than the American "Star Wars" program.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR'S GENERAL LEBEDEV CITED ON SDI, ABM TREATY

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Jan 87 p 5

[Article by Major General Yu. Lebedev: "SDI--The Locomotive of the Arms Race"]

[Text] It will be 4 years this year since the U.S. president announced the development of the "Star Wars" program, which he euphoriously called the "Strategic Defense Initiative." Since that time it has not ceased to alarm the world. This program, which was advertized by its adherents as "a deliverer from nuclear ballistic missiles" heaps impassable obstructions in the path to a nuclear-free world. SDI was the main cause for the frustration of possible agreements in Reykjavik on reducing and in the final analysis even eliminating nuclear weapons. Aimed at deploying space strike weapons -- components of a broad scale ABM system, this program is torpedoing the limitless Soviet-American Treaty on Limiting Anti-Missile Defense Systems.

Ignoring historical experience, the real correlation of forces, and inevitable fateful consequences for the American people themselves, in Washington they believe that with the aid of space weapons they can devalue the Soviet nuclear potential for retaliation, make themselves "invulnerable" in a nuclear conflict. Counting on victory in a nuclear war and on satisfying their global pretensions -- herein lies the real threat of "Star Wars" for all mankind.

The SDI program is part of the U.S. military plans based on offensive nuclear strategy and aimed at achieving military superiority over the USSR. It, this part, is called upon to implement an offensive strategic program which most fully meets the Pentagon's requirments for a first strike weapon. This weapon includes the latest intercontinental ballistic missile, the MX, and the planned Midgetman, the qualitatively new seabased Trident II missile, new types of strategic bombers, and an entire generation of cruise missiles with increased range and precision. Let us point out that all these systems of nuclear weaons exceed existing models in their effectiveness many times over.

In their characteristics space weapons created within the SDI framework cannot but be classed as offensive. They can be used for the suprise destruction of key space apparatuses of the opposite side (warning, communication and other

satellites), for "taking it unawares," thus depriving it of the possibility of retaliation against nuclear aggression. Some strike space weapons with a range of 4,000-5,000 km can destroy various ground facilities in several seconds.

Another thing is obvious too. The control over the complex of space armaments in the U.S. anti-ballistic missile system will in practice be taken over by computers. Thus, the very existence of humanity will become a hostage of machines. Even the most perfect automatic systems are not immune to failures, malfunctioning, and just errors. In other words, in case of the realization of SDI the world military-strategic relations will depend on most complicated space robots hanging over the earth."

Leaders in the White House deceive themselves when they hope that with the help of "Star Wars," and a technological spurt they can achieve a breakthrough in the military sphere and impose their will on others, including the Soviet Union. Yet Washington's attempts are doomed to failure. The USSR has at its disposal all that it needs for dashing these adventurist hopes.

However, in the new year, while space is still free from weapons, there remains the prospect of achieving a political settlement of the problem. The Soviet Union reaffirms that the proposals put forward by it in Reykjavik remain on the negotiating table, that we are ready for reaching mutually acceptable agreements, including on the consolidation of the regime of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and on the non-admittance of weapons to outer space. This would pave the way for scrapping nuclear weapons. In 1987 this country will continue to work for it with redoubled energy.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

SOVIET ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AIDE ON DANGERS OF SDI

Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 12 Nov 86 p 3

[Article by Academician M. A. Markov, Hero of Socialist Labor, member of the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and chairman of the Soviet Pugwash Committee, under the rubric "Echoes of Reykjavik": "SDI: Conspiracy Against Peace"]

[Text] Nearly 30 years ago, when the bulging nuclear arsenals had already sharply raised the problem of scientists' responsibility for the fate of civilization, the famous Russell-Einstein Manifesto was issued in which it was probably stated for the first time that with the appearance of nuclear weapons people should learn to think in a new way. For many years now I have studied this extremely urgent problem--the development of a new political thinking which in our day has become an urgent necessity and a command of the times. In particular, nine years ago the magazine VOPROSY FILOSOFII carried my article "Have We Learned to Think in a New Way?" in which I attempted to analyze why such thinking was vitally necessary to humanity.

Indeed, before the appearance of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction it was believed that war was a continuation of politics. But people created nuclear weapons, and their use in the event of war threatens the destruction of all humanity. War can no longer be a continuation of politics, since politics will simply cease to exist after a nuclear war. A world war must be avoided at any cost, and in order to do so a new political thinking is necessary.

How can war be avoided? In general this is part of a broader problem--the problem of the peaceful coexistence of the two opposing social systems. U.S. President Reagan put forward the idea of a global solution of this problem: the technical solutions known by the name "Strategic Defense Initiative" or the "star wars" program. In the opinion of President Reagan and his closest advisers, it is perfectly feasible to create a military technical system that would make nuclear disaster impossible.

In my view, this is an attempt to solve the problem of coexistence in a one-sided fashion that takes only the United States' interests into account. The Soviet Union continues to be regarded as the source of all evil on the planet (a kind of "evil empire," to use the expression of the American president

himself), and the task is set of protecting the United States from it with a palisade of missile and space systems. We'll protect ourselves, they say, and you do as you like.

By its very nature the Strategic Defense Initiative, or SDI for short, does not presuppose negotiations on arms reductions. Negotiations are admissible, but merely pro forma and fruitless negotiations that camouflage the United States' military preparations.

Apologists for SDI claim that SDI is a purely technical concept that has nothing to do with politics. This is not the case. After all, SDI is at the center of serious political problems that fundamentally contradict the idea of peaceful coexistence and detente.

Judge for yourself. The implementation of SDI will require huge monetary outlays. How can the money be gotten from the taxpayers? By the tried and true method of frightening them with the danger of communism, the "Soviet threat." This is already a political reality. Furthermore, it is believed in the United States that the Soviet Union, if it undertakes to create an analogous system, will also have to spend huge sums. Washington politicians link with this the hope of exhausting our country economically in an arms race. But this is also a political factor.

In the urge to attain military superiority, the United States is, naturally, attempting to make scientific and technological progress more difficult in the countries that are its potential adversaries. Hence the policy of embargoes, trade restrictions and curtailment of scientific ties.

And the main thing: SDI is not a matter of the near future. It is a program geared to many years. And what happens in the meantime? In the meantime there is a race in traditional nuclear arms, and it is developing exceptionally widely. Let me cite just the main U.S. strategic programs: the MX, the Midgetman, the Trident, the Stealth, etc. Thus, SDI is a political concept that is, to all intents and purposes, the global antithesis to detente and proves to be a unique variety of the cold war.

Yet another argument of supporters of SDI is that SDI is an exclusively defensive program. Incidentally, using such arguments they have succeeded in finding a good many supporters. But a question arises: Does a tank's armor serve defensive or offensive purposes? And what about the invisible airplane on the creation of which the United States is working? The fact that it cannot be detected with radar--is that for the purposes of defense or aggression? At one time mines were made of metal and could be found with a mine detector, but then they started to be made in wooden and plastic cases. Incidentally, during the war I worked on an instrument that would find nonmetallic mines.

SDI is of the same nature. Let's suppose that the space weapon has been created and deployed. Under cover of the "space shield" a large number of the adversary's missile units are destroyed. Not all of them will be destroyed; moreover, the more there were in the first place, the more will remain unharmed. So if you begin the full-scale development of SDI, there can be no

consideration of any reduction in the number of missiles. And the converse is also true: The fewer missiles the adversary has, the more likely they are to be destroyed with a nuclear strike. This is precisely why, in arguing insistently for a radical reduction of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union considers the restriction of SDI to laboratory research to be an essential condition for such a reduction.

History shows that for every type of weapon a counterweapon is always found. And a response to SDI, if necessary, will also be found; moreover it will not necessarily entail the creation of an analogous system. This has been stated repeatedly by the leaders of our country. But there is one other danger that SDI entails--the movement of the arms race to a new area that has never before been used for military purposes, i.e., to space. In order to create fundamentally new weapons systems, tests are needed. This is the reason for the United States' stubborn refusal to cease underground nuclear explosions, which are required for perfecting the components of space weapons. They are the energy source for the devices involved. Under the influence of public opinion, voices were starting to ring out in the U.S. Congress proposing to limit the power of explosions. And at the Pugwash Conference some American scientists tried to persuade us that explosions of less than one kiloton in power were harmless, that they would not make it possible to perfect elements of SDI. But one wonders: why, then, are they needed at all? The ending of underground nuclear explosions is a pledge that not only the realization of SDI but the perfection of ordinary nuclear weapons will be made substantially more difficult.

The greatest danger of the arms race lies in the qualitative development of weapons. It is precisely the appearance of qualitatively new types of weapons that has proved a powerful destabilizing factor every time in international relations. Recall how multiple independently targeted missile warheads once complicated the international situation and how the appearance of tactical nuclear weapons made negotiations more difficult. And what about the neutron bomb? If SDI is carried out, the arms race threatens to get completely out of control.

There is one more serious danger. I won't get into the technical details, but I shall say that with the implementation of SDI the risk of an unsanctioned, accidental nuclear war would increase. In order to deploy space weapons it would be necessary to create computers of unprecedented power that would survey extremely complex space and earth observation systems in lightening speed and identify the nature of thousands of objects. On the other hand, the qualitative improvement of military technology is leading to the fact that the time left for taking a counter decision is growing smaller and smaller. Therefore, man is compelled to entrust the right to decide and instantaneously carry out the decisions that are taken to a machine. But there is a physical law according to which the number of misfires and erroneous solutions made by a computer initially declines as the systems used grow more complex but then increases as the tasks set for the computer grow more complex. In other words, the future destiny of man, according to the SDI variant, is supposed to be decided not by human reason but by a soulless robot, a "mechanical" construction that science knows, in principle, cannot be absolutely reliable. So SDI represents the possibility of destroying humanity with a robot created by man himself.

In opposition to this very complex, costly and, most important, unreliable program, the Soviet Union puts forward a simple idea: if there are no nuclear weapons, there won't be a nuclear war.

This is the essence of our peace policy and the Soviet leadership's comprehensive peace proposals. The summit meeting in Reykjavik gave humanity the most realistic chance, in contrast to the fantastic and dangerous idea of SDI, to do away forever with the Damoclean Sword of the threat of universal nuclear destruction. Despite the fact that agreements were not reached in Reykjavik, the historical significance of the meeting is extraordinarily great: The Soviet proposals withstood rigorous examination in the discussions that took place and proved "on the verge of the adoption of major historic decisions." The package of Soviet peace proposals that were advanced in Reykjavik has had a great influence on the international antiwar movement and has shown the planet once again who really wants peace. The world public has also drawn its own conclusions from the fact that the negotiations "got stuck" precisely on the American Strategic Defense Initiative plan. This is of great importance, since Washington has so far managed to enlist its closest allies in work on SDI. But if the colossal money that it is planned to spend on carrying out SDI were allocated to civilian branches and the development of the fundamental sciences, the effect from the development of new technologies would be no less. I know this from the experience of the development of new technologies in basic research on the properties of matter.

Of course, the idea of SDI also has powerful support on the part of the corporations that earn fabulous profits in the production of military hardware. The monopolies need new orders. Understandably, they will not let the possibilities connected with the production of equipment for "star wars" get away. After all, the undertaking is bound up with trillions in profits! This is why the U.S. administration will not so readily agree to disarmament and the abandonment of SDI. Pressure, the most serious pressure of public opinion, is needed here.

The foreword to the book "Security for All," written by Olof Palme, the late prime minister of Sweden, has a sentence that indisputably contains a certain truth: "Disarmament will scarcely ever come about," Palme writes, "if peoples wait for initiatives on the part of governments and experts. It can become a reality only as a result of the expression of the political will of people in many parts of the globe."

Recall what a widespread movement developed throughout the whole world in defense of heroic Vietnam, which was struggling against American aggression. If it had not been for the demand of world and American public opinion, the United States would not have ended that war.

The following opinion also exists: Don't we sometimes overestimate the role of the antiwar movement? For example, three years ago, when the question of the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Europe was raised, the .pa movement of the supporters of peace reached a grand scale, yet the European parliaments voted for the missiles all the same.

No, the antiwar movement has tremendous power. It simply proved insufficiently powerful that time. It was partially extinguished by Europeans' hope of success at the negotiations in Geneva, and President Reagan cleverly took advantage of that. I have repeatedly stated at Pugwash Conferences, and I still repeat that negotiations are good if they lead to concrete results. But negotiations are an evil when they drag on endlessly and reach an impasse, while nonetheless leaving people with the hope of a favorable outcome. It is distressing, but that situation seems to be repeating itself at the present time. What is required of Reagan and his advisers? That very new thinking that is so essential to humanity today.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR: ROLE OF U.S. CIVILIAN RESEARCH IN SDI

Moscow RABOCHAYA GAZETA in Russian 11 Oct 86 p 3

[Article by Candidate of Technical Sciences A. Awdulov, winner of USSR State Prize: "A Space Frankenstein"]

[Text] The "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) program is spreading like a malignant tumor through the scientific research establishments of the United States. The leaders of SDI are encountering sharp resistance of scientists, who do not wish to participate in this peace-threatening adventure in universities and in other nongovernmental organizations. The pressure is even greater on governmental laboratories and research centers, the employees of which can simply be ordered to participate. They are financed by the government and are forced to adapt to its requirements. In the words of the Washington-based journal SCIENCE, "a kind of strategic defense, achieved by government employees who have survived more than one whim of the administration and who desire to survive this time as well, is unfolding." This is the state of affairs, for example, with the scientific organizations of the U.S. Department of Energy.

After supporting President Reagan's "Stars Wars" program, the civilian nuclear energy programs were pushed into the background and military space projects were advanced as the main tasks. One of the leading colleagues of the aforesaid department states directly: "The bright hopes of many managers of research programs are related to how they can connect their own work to SDI, since they will then be protected against budget reductions."

What do the organizers of SDI require of the power engineers? They primarily require sources of power for all types of military space stations. These stations will consume much more power than the artificial earth satellites or interplanetary spacecraft that have been launched into space orbits up until now. According to rather conservative estimates, generators with unit electric capacity of at least several hundred kilowatts are required for military space platforms. This is just to support functional capabilities, let us say, for housekeeping needs, without regard to the energy required to "fire" laser, beam and other weapons. And much greater capacity--from 100 to 300 megawatts--is required for military actions! This is approximately the power of a small modern power plant.

How then can such large-scale needs be supported? The modern artificial earth satellites and near-earth stations mainly use the power of solar cells. The

largest American spacecraft operating on these sources was the Skylab station and its cells produced approximately 15 kW. Onboard power sources with capacity of 60 kW are planned for the new station, which the United States is now developing and plans to launch in the mid-1990's. All this is much less than the power required for military purposes. Moreover, solar cells have large dimensions, they can be maneuvered, they are an easy target and they are not yet very reliable. For this reason, specialists generally feel that the given type of sources are unsuitable for military platforms. Another prospect, which was considered within SDI, was the use of chemical generators. They are capable of producing large power, but they are very cumbersome and heavy at the current level of technology. They simply cannot be launched into space. Moreover, they would release vapors which would affect the efficiency of laser emitters.

There remain radioactive sources, of which two versions are possible. First, there are the so-called radioisotope thermionic generators (RTG). They are widely used to supply power to the equipment of automatic stations, launched into deep space toward the distant planets of the Solar System and beyond. Radioisotope thermionic generators are not nuclear reactors, but are a set of metal capsules in which a radioactive element, for example, plutonium-238, is located. Heat is released during decay, being converted to electricity by semiconductor thermocouples. These generators have been installed on American interplanetary stations Voyager-1 and Voyager-2 and have been traveling in space for more than 10 years, and are installed on the Ulysses and Galileo stations, which were developed jointly by West European countries and the United States, and so on. Incidentally, Ulysses and Galileo stations were supposed to be launched this year by the Space Shuttle, but the catastrophe of one of them--the Challenger--resulted in that both stations are lying in the warehouse as dead cargo and it is unknown when they will be launched. Isotope generators are reliable and long-lived, but have low efficiency (approximately 93 percent of the released heat is wasted) and their power is insufficient for military purposes. The largest radioisotope thermionic generators produced up to 300 watts. An increase of power requires considerable quantities of plutonium and difficulties are arising with launch of generators into space on manned spacecraft due to the radiation hazard to the crew. There is of course another path--to supplement the radioisotope generators with a cooling system and turbogenerator. The U.S. Department of Energy is developing this project. A total of 16 million dollars was spent on it last year. But the expected power will be no more than 10 kW.

A second version of radioactive sources are nuclear reactors. The leaders of SDI are placing their main bet on them. A minimum of two models is planned. One is for the "fundamental needs" of military stations and the other is for total support, including power supply to weapons. We are talking about the second model, a multimewatt model, only in the future tense, and development of it may require 10 to 20 years. But the first model--the SP-100--is planned for development by 1993. The chief of the Innovative Science and Technology Office for "Organization of SDI Implementation" J. Ionsen regards this development as the cornerstone of power engineering of the entire "Star Wars" program. Approximately 20 million dollars was allocated to this project in 1986 and 72 million will be allocated for 1987. It has been proposed that another 23 million be expended on modernization of the laboratory building at Richland (Washington state), where ground tests of the reactor should begin in 1990. The cost of the ground tests themselves is estimated at 450 million dollars, while space flight tests are

estimated at 500 million dollars. The Organization for SDF Implementation gives out approximately half the enumerated sums, while the Department of Energy almost fully pays for the second half from its own funds. NASA receives the greatest share. This is a clear example of how "Star Wars" is absorbing much larger funds than Congress is officially allocating for it.

A number of government laboratories--in California, Idaho, Illinois, New Mexico, Ohio and Tennessee, and the already mentioned laboratory in Washington state and possibly in New York, will work on the project. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena will participate from NASA. How then should a space reactor look? Its main indicator is power. The task of producing 300 kW is posed. The preliminary design was oriented toward 100 kW by the end of operation in 1991, hence the name of the model--SP-100. But the requirements were reviewed last year and the deadline has been postponed somewhat.

The reactor should occupy half the volume of the payload compartment of the Space Shuttle. This compartment is 18.3 m long and 4.6 m in diameter in the standard version. It is desirable to retain the given dimensions, since both a military platform and space tug are to be placed in the spacecraft simultaneously with the reactor. After all, the Shuttle flies only in low near-earth orbits (on the order of 300-400 km at apogee), while the stations should be lifted much higher, up to geostationary orbits (36,000 km). The space tug--a one- or two-stage auxiliary rocket--is also designed to do this. It is possible that the combination of reactor, station and tug cannot be placed in the Shuttle. "We will then," says Vincent Truscello, the director of the SP-100 project at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, "have to deliver each structure separately and assemble them in orbit."

Although no essentially new, still completely untried ideas have been placed in the reactor diagram, many problems must still be solved for the first time at the engineering level. This will be the "hottest" of any reactors in existence and its operating temperature is equal to 1,350°C. Uranium nitride, highly enriched by the uranium-235 isotope, will be used as fuel for the first time in a reactor designed for space and the coolant of the primary circuit will be liquid lithium, which will be in a solid state at the time of launch of the reactor. The coolant for the secondary circuit will circulate without a pump by a "heat pipe" radiator for the first time under conditions of weightlessness. Two independent, redundant circuits are supposed to be used for reliability for the first time in the reactor control system. The semiconductor electronic components will operate for the first time at these high temperatures, with these sharp temperature drops and with this high level of radiation. At the same time, despite unusually rigid operating requirements, the reactor is supposed to function without maintenance for no less than 7 years.

Although there are many difficulties, the reality of development raises no doubts among these specialists. There are differences in analysis of the possible deadlines of execution, but these are insignificant. Essentials are another thing.

Nuclear reactors, even those simply constructed on Earth with all the measures of safety, are always dangerous. A reactor which is supposed to be launched into space is even more hazardous. Everyone remembers the explosion of the Challenger

spacecraft on 28 January 1986. And what would have happened if there had been a nuclear reactor in its payload? What would have been the scales of the catastrophe then?

Neither NASA nor the Department of Energy has conducted experiments which would answer these questions. There are some data related to radioisotope thermionic generators rather than reactors and they give reason for caution. The generators were tested on special benches, where pressures similar to those which occur during an explosion were simulated. The pressure reached 75 kg/cm² and the radioisotope thermionic generator housing tolerated it without damage. It is designed for a pressure up to 154 kg/cm². But investigators conducted an experiment in 1983 under real conditions. According to calculations, the pressure was supposed to reach about 90 kg/cm², but it apparently was much higher, since the measuring apparatus went off the scale and failed. Specialists at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, using a computer model, calculated that the maximum pressure could reach 126 kg/cm², that is, still less than the calculated strength of radioisotope generators. However, the experimental results were catastrophic--the generator flew to pieces over an entire area measuring 75 x 200 m. The fuel elements (fortunately, they contained no real radioactive plutonium but only its replacement) were pulverized into such small fragments that not all of them could be completely assembled. Despite all attempts, only 70 percent of the mass of these elements was collected while 30 percent was scattered without a trace. This then was the cost of the calculated data and conditional tests.

Naturally, when NASA now states that the probability of an accident of the radioisotope generator or reactor is very low, on the order of 1 in 10 million, many people do not believe these words. After all, the same administration has given detailed figures for the Space Shuttle. "They were justified," wrote SCIENCE in March 1986, "until 2 months ago when the Shuttle exploded on the 25th launch."

Perhaps it is difficult not to agree with the chairman of one of the subcommittees of the House of Representatives E. Markey, who accused the Secretary of the Department of Energy J. Harrington that his agency "in attempting to militarize the programs for peaceful investigations of nuclear energy is creating a Frankenstein." (Footnote) (Frankenstein was the personage of the novel of an English writer of the last century, M. Shelley. A monster created by scientists to help people, in the end was transformed to a murderer and destroys his own creator) Both the project of a space nuclear reactor for military purposes and the entire American "Star Wars" program pose a lethal hazard to its creators.

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CSO: 5200/70

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

IZVESTIYA: JAPANESE PAPER TIES SPACELAB TO SDI

PM201259 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Jan 87 Morning Editor p 4

[Report by own correspondent S. Agafonov under the rubric "Backstage of Events":
"'Spacelab': Makeweight for SDI?"]

[Text] Tokyo -- The Japanese newspaper TOKYO SHIMBUN has front-paged an article about the widely billed U.S. program to create a space orbital station for peaceful purposes by the end of the nineties. But the question arises: Has this project been conceived for peaceful purposes?

Considering its declared civilian purpose, the West European countries, Canada, and Japan have eagerly associated themselves to the "Spacelab" project. There have already been several rounds of talks to specify their respective degree of participation in developing and operating the "space house" whose construction will cost 1.2 trillion yen. According to the preliminary agreement, Japan will be responsible for about one-third of this astronomical sum. In the budget for the next fiscal year Nakasone's cabinet has provided appropriations of 6.7 billion yen for this project.

It now emerges that upon verification the plan's "peaceful aims" have proved to be no more than a screen for enlisting partners. TOKYO SHIMBUN writes that facts have emerged recently attesting to the fact that it is the Pentagon which is most interested in the international project and which intends to take a direct part in the work of the space laboratory.

How serious these facts are is borne out by the official request which the Japanese Embassy in the United States has made to NASA. According to TOKYO SHIMBUN in the request the Japanese diplomats tried to ascertain whether that U.S. department would be involved in the "Spacelab" program. NASA's reply was highly characteristic: This question is being examined right now by U.S. government organs and the situation so far remains unclear. If we discard this fog of "lack of clarity" and put it more simply, NASA essentially confirmed that the Pentagon intends to occupy a key position in the program.

The Japanese mass media are writing of official Tokyo's mounting alarm over the "Spacelab" problem. The concern is understandable if you consider the acuteness of the negative reaction in Japan generated by the Nakasone cabinet's decision to associate itself to SDI. If it turns out that in addition to "Star Wars" Tokyo is taking part in another Pentagon space venture, then a political storm could erupt in the country against which even the conservative majority in the Japanese parliament will be unable to offer protection.

DO WE NEED TO SHARE "SPACELAB" WITH THE U.S. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT? TOKYO SHIMBUN ASKS.

It is difficult to make a forecast in this case and better to await the development of events. It is already worth noting that Washington is not very sincere, to put it mildly, with its allies, and takes little account of them. One more conclusion is self-evident: In America today civilian projects are not held in honor. Only the Pentagon's blessing can lend them respectability.

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CSO: 5200/1246

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW REPORTS NEW ROUND OF GENEVA NST TALKS

Geneva Talks 'Turning Point'

LD171835 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1730 GMT 17 Jan 87

[Report by station correspondent Vladimir Dmitriyev]

[Excerpt] The latest round of Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons has started in Geneva. Our correspondent Vladimir Dmitriyev reports:

[Dmitriyev] The Soviet side submitted all-embracing proposals on November last year during the previous session. These follow from the large-scale disarmament program submitted by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbavhev and rely on the positive virtues of the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Reykjavik. These proposals are now on the negotiating table. The belief of the Soviet delegation, headed by First Deputy Foreign Minister Yuliy Mikhavlovich Vorontsov, is that the round which has just begun should be a turning point in resolving the set tasks. At a press conference, held at the Soviet Mission, representatives of the USSR have stressed the need for a very rapid achievement of accords and for work to be carried out in a constructive spirit. They expressed the hope that the U.S. delegation would take the same approach. [passage omitted]

Delegations Prepare Draft Documents

PM261403 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Jan 87 First Edition p 4

[TASS report: "The Geneva Talks"]

[Text] Geneva, 24 Jan -- Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons continue in Geneva.

A number of working meetings took place last week within the framework of the groups on space, strategic offensive weapons, and medium-range nuclear means, which began work on the preparation of joint draft documents.

Detailed conversations are being held between delegation heads and group leaders.

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CSO: 5200/1256

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

TASS: BULGARIAN MINISTER PRAISES JANUARY 1986 CALL

LD131449 Moscow TASS in English 1405 GMT 13 Jan 87

[Text] Sofia, 13 January (TASS)--The statement made by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on 15 January last year is a document of immense historical importance and a concrete programme for the solution of the outstanding problems of our time by the year 2000, Lyuben Gotsev, a deputy minister of foreign affairs of Bulgaria, said in a TASS interview. It is a manifestation of new political thinking, called for by socialism.

The Soviet proposal for the elimination of nuclear and chemical weapons by the end of the current century led to a series of concrete initiatives produced by the USSR and the other Warsaw Treaty countries in the political, military, economic and humanitarian fields. They resounded openly and clearly in Geneva, Stockholm, Reykjavik, Berne, Vienna, and also at the United Nations.

Lyuben Gotsev expressed his regrets over the fact that some Western countries, including the U.S., had not yet embraced positions of realism in their political thinking. The Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik and developments since that time have supplied a graphic example of two different approaches to world affairs. A hide-bound political thinking and anti-communism of the American neoconservatives and the mercenary interests of the military-industrial complex have sent the "hawks" in the U.S. and some individual West European countries into a counteroffensive. They have set out to distort, subvert and revise the agreements that have been achieved. All those efforts have been made to block the implementation of the ideas formulated in Reykjavik and to dismantle the basis for progress that began to be built at that meeting.

That is why the main goal of the USSR, Bulgaria and other socialist countries is the implementation of the long-term objectives formulated in the Soviet statement of 15 January 1986. That document will remain a concrete foreign policy programme for socialism, a programme of common sense in our nuclear age, Lyuben Gotsev said in conclusion.

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CSO: 5200/1251

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

TASS HITS KOHL COMMENT ON GORBACHEV JANUARY 1986 PROGRAM

PM201103 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Jan 86 p 4

[TASS report under the "Rejoinder" rubric: "Behind the Screen of Demagoguery"]

[Text] Bonn, 17 Jan -- How does FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl assess the wide-scale disarmament program put forward in the statement by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on 15 January last year and providing for the elimination of all nuclear weapons on the planet by the year 2000?

The answer to this question, put to the chancellor by a Soviet correspondent at a Bonn press conference, was naturally of very great interest to the numerous journalists assembled at the Bonn press center.

After all, the FRG is a state at the meetingpoint of the two antagonistic military-political groupings, has the world's highest density of deployment of nuclear weapons, is stuffed to bursting with chemical and other types of armaments, and has the continent's most powerful NATO land army. It would seem that Bonn should display special interest in liberating Europe from the nuclear weapons which hang like the sword of Damocles over the West Europeans and make them, and above all the FRG population, Washington's "nuclear hostages."

But the chancellor's reaction disappointed the journalists present in the hall. Instead of a specific reply to the question, Kohl launched into general, hackneyed discourses about how his government's aim remains "the safeguarding of peace with the least quantity of weapons," how Bonn is "the champion of the policy of small steps and a gradual approach to its aim," and how he is allegedly seeking "progress in the matter of disarmament." Here Kohl did not say a word about how it is precisely the leading figures of the notorious "steel helmet faction," that set the tone in his party, and who have openly ganged up against the specific accord, outlined at the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik, on the total elimination of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe.

Speaking of this meeting, Kohl sought to paint a deliberately rosy picture, keeping quiet about how the attainment of specific agreements there was hampered by the stance of the U.S. side, which was obstinate in its reluctance to abandon its "Star Wars" program. And, of course, the chancellor kept quiet about how it was Bonn which actively supported this program and is taking part in its implementation.

It remains to be hoped that after the political passions connected with preparation for the elections have abated in the FRG, the federal government may still return to a reconsideration of its attitude toward the disarmament problem and of the constructive peace proposals put forward by the USSR.

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CSO: 5200/1251

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

TASS: SCIENTISTS IN GENEVA PLAN MOSCOW NUCLEAR TALKS

LD261942 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1150 GMT 26 Jan 87

[Text] Geneva, 26 Jan (TASS) -- A meeting of an international organizing group of scientists, devoted to preparing for the Moscow forum of scientists on the problem of the radical reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons, ended here on Sunday. The agenda and main presenters were determined, and organizational matters were examined.

The Moscow forum, in which it is expected that 250 specialists from various countries will take part, will be held from 14-16 February. The scientific and technical aspects of the various stages of a reduction in nuclear weapons up to their complete elimination, the role of nuclear disarmament for European security, the importance of the ABM Treaty in providing the conditions for nuclear disarmament, and ways of achieving agreement on a universal and complete ban on nuclear tests, will be discussed.

Prominent scientists from the USSR, the United States, Japan, Italy, Great Britain, Argentina and other countries took part in the organizing group meeting.

The USSR was represented by Ye.P. Velikhov, vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and Doctor of Historical Sciences A.A. Kokoshin, deputy chairman of the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace, Against the Nuclear Threat.

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CSO: 5200/1251

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR'S AFANASYEV ON AMERICAN, CANADIAN VIEWS ON SALT, SDI

Part One: U.S. Visit

PM141810 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Jan 87 First Edition p 6

[Part one of article by V. Afanasyev: "Eleven Days Across the Ocean"]

[Excerpts] 1. In the United States of America [subhead]

A USSR Supreme Soviet delegation was in the United States and Canada for 11 days. The makeup of the delegation, remarked on in both countries, was somewhat unusual. In addition to the author of these notes, it included I. Blokhin, an academician of the Academy of Medical Sciences, and K. Lavrov, a USSR people's artiste. Why should this attract attention? If only for the reason that 80-90 percent of actors in the United States and Canada are unemployed, as well as a considerable number of medics. Here were a doctor and an actor -- both members of the Soviet parliament.

Four beautiful colors adorned America at Christmas: green, white, red, and blue.

At the same time two more colors -- black and flaming orange -- cry out on the map of the United States. The blackness of death and the orange of nuclear explosions. Throughout our unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions, which has already lasted well over 500 days, the United States has exploded 24 nuclear devices in the Nevada desert. We have extended this moratorium five times now. We will not explode any nuclear bomb before the United States does.

The USSR Supreme Soviet delegation arrived in the United States at not a very good time. It is a time of an extremely stormy outburst of militarism, anti-Sovietism, and anticommunism. As well as nationalism, racism, and anti-Russicism.

The United States is implementing unprecedented military programs. The first batch of 50 MX first-strike nuclear missiles is being followed up by preparations to install a second batch of the same number. They are mobile, mounted on flat beds. Another strategic missile -- "Midgetmen" -- is also being built; it too is mobile and hard to hit. First the 131st, then the 132d, and soon the 133d B-52 bomber with cruise missiles on board will take up its position at the Sawyer airbase. These bombers and missiles are above the limit stipulated by the SALT II treaty.

The SDI program -- the program appropriately christened "Star Wars" by the world public -- is in full swing and moving ahead at a really furious pace, again in violation of a treaty -- the ABM Treaty this time.

The White House has decided to request a further 500 million dollars in the current fiscal year in addition to the 3.5 billion already allocated by Congress. Between 5 and 5.5 billion dollars will be requested in the next fiscal year.

This program is defensive in name only. In reality, however, it is extremely militarist and globalist. The real aim of SDI is to carry out a first nuclear strike, knock out the enemy's strike means, and avoid nuclear retaliation. We will be frank, this aim is illusory in the extreme. Retaliation would come, inevitable retaliation.

The SDI program has become an obstacle in the way of radically reducing nuclear arms, an accord which was achieved in Reykjavik.

By going ahead with SDI the White House is pursuing a whole series of aims.

First: to guarantee the military-industrial complex high profits, as the cost of SDI is estimated at trillions of dollars.

Second: to exhaust the Soviet Union economically by drawing it into a new spiral of the arms race and prevent it from implementing its scientific, technical, and socioeconomic programs.

Third: to gain military superiority over the Soviet Union and upset the military and strategic balance -- an important restraining factor -- in its favor.

Fourth: to make a powerful leap in the sphere of science, equipment, and technology. Whether there will be SDI or not is highly problematic. To gather the best minds from all over the world under the dubious banner of SDI, use the latest scientific, technical, and technological discoveries, derive the greatest possible benefits for the United States from this, and beat competitors with their own help -- this is one of the cherished aims of the U.S. leaders. The "brain drain" across the ocean has already begun.

...But let us return to SDI. We will not comment on the first and the fourth points. They are self-evident and need no further explanation.

With regard to attempts to economically exhaust the Soviet Union and gain military and strategic superiority over it, this is just illusion. History has more than once subjected us to far more serious ordeals -- military, economic, and political. We came out of these ordeals with honor. We Soviet people can forgo a great deal, including material wellbeing. We will never forgo our country's security or its independence. As is well known, there is an antidote to every poison, an answer to every question. We will also find an answer to SDI. It will not be the same as SDI and by no means as expensive. There should be no doubts on this score.

Wright, the speaker of the House of Representatives mentioned above who took possession of the conductor's baton for this House only in January, told us the following. A clear-cut continuity between the Republicans and the Democrats has become established in the sphere of U.S. foreign policy. He backed up this idea quite graphically. We take different roads to the river bank, he said. Upon reaching the bank we throw ourselves into the water together.

He frankly told us there will be no fundamental changes in U.S. foreign policy as a result of the Democrats winning a majority in Senate (the Democrats have long held a

majority in the House of Representatives). But, he said, we are now in charge of the "purse strings" (the U.S. budget), which will allow us to put pressure on the President in the sense of limiting his military longings.

This is actually happening. The 100th U.S. Congress began work on 6 January. Three resolutions were submitted on the very first day of the Congress' work. One of them envisages discontinuing finance for the American nuclear test program when the yield exceeds 1 kiloton as long as the Soviet Union continues to observe its unilateral moratorium. The second contains a ban in the 1988 fiscal year on testing American antisatellite weapon systems on real targets in space.

The third demands that the administration fulfill the conditions of the SALT II treaty.

A day later a draft joint resolution from the House of Representatives and Senate on observing and strengthening the ABM Treaty was submitted to the U.S. Congress.

Each day of work by Congress is bringing more and more new draft resolutions.

These resolutions will be discussed. The fact that the Democrats are tripping up the president and his militarist aspirations is beyond doubt, in our opinion. We will be giving this our attention.

While we were in the United States we were not aware of any noticeable movement in favor of Reykjavik and its updated rerun. Official circles were swamped by "Irangate." But then, on our return to Moscow, we found out from the press the first stirrings in this direction had begun. There is now talk of a new summit meeting and developing what was achieved in Reykjavik. Aware that Moscow will not take part in a summit meeting without being sure that specific agreements will be reached, possible versions of these agreements are being outlined. McGovern, a prominent political figure in the United States, recently wrote in THE NEW YORK TIMES that the president must consider the following possibilities: to stop nuclear tests, as the Soviet Union has done on a unilateral basis since 6 August 1985; to take a decision on scrapping some old arms so as to thereby stay within the limits set by the SALT II treaty, as Moscow is now doing; to reach accord on limiting research for the "star wars" program for the next 10 years in exchange for Soviet agreement to reach an accord on a 50 percent reduction in strategic nuclear arms over the next 5 years and the elimination of medium-range nuclear missiles.

It can in no way be said that these possibilities are the same as the Reykjavik accords. But even this would be a big step forward in the problem of nuclear disarmament.

The President's popularity and prestige have noticeably waned since "Irangate." It is felt he can only maintain his prestige by reaching agreements with the USSR. "He cannot subdue Capitol Hill," the British newspaper THE GUARDIAN writes, for example, "but he can sign an agreement with the Soviet Union and make his last 2 years as President memorable ones."

We cannot judge just how memorable the last 2 years of the Reagan presidency will be. We have spoken powerfully in favor of a nuclear-free, violence-free world. We have spoken on this subject many times. Including in the Delhi declaration. Now it is up to the White House.

Part Two: Canada Visit

PM201711 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Jan 87 First Edition p 6

[Second part of report by V. Afanasyev: "Eleven Days on the Other Side of the Atlantic"]

[Excerpts] 2. Canada [subhead]

[passage omitted] Our relations with Canada have traditionally been good. The (1983) visit by M.S. Gorbachev gave a big boost to their favorable development. He is known and remembered here. We came across quite a few people of the most diverse sort who met with him on Canadian soil in some circumstance, for some reason or another. Some people obviously had not met him but wanted in some way to express their positive attitude toward the Soviet people and their leader.

We had many meetings, conversations, and discussions with parliamentarians, diplomats, academics, and journalists in Canada. Questions of international relations, the preservation of peace, and disarmament occupied a central place in these talks. There was particularly animated discussion of the gamut of problems connected with the results of the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Reykjavik.

The overwhelming majority of our interlocutors approved the Soviet initiatives to preserve peace and mankind. They persistently stressed the need for real agreements on disarmament and on improving the international situation. Senate Speaker Guy Charbonneau, for example, stated that "it is important to make every possible effort to lessen international tension and preserve and strengthen peace." He spoke highly of the Reykjavik meeting and expressed Canadians' desire to promote the process of moving toward reducing and ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons on earth.

I think that Canadians, and this was said to them, could promote this process more actively and exert a restraining influence on the United States to moderate its militarist aspirations.

Canada's attitude to the U.S. SDI program can scarcely be considered consistent. As is well known, it has refused to take part in the program at a governmental level. However, private companies are preparing to do this. Moreover, the Canadian National Defense Ministry has been allowed to spend 47 million dollars on research work and testing of a space-based radar system. [passage omitted]

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CSO: 5200/1251

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

GORBACHEV REPLIES TO U.S. STUDENTS ON NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD

LD110734 Moscow TASS in English 0658 GMT 11 Jan 87

[Text] San Francisco January 11 TASS -- A group of high school pupils from Sacramento, California, in a letter to Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, have expressed profound concern over the present-day international situation and the continuing nuclear arms race.

The schoolchildren called on the Soviet leader to do everything possible to prevent nuclear catastrophe, to develop and consolidate Soviet-American relations.

Gorbachev asked to tell the pupils that he realized full well their concern for the future of the world, for the future of life on earth and their desire that reason and the ability to trust one another serve the attainment of the supreme goal, that of peace.

The Soviet Union's efforts were directed at establishing a nuclear-free world, a world without violence and wars.

The reply was conveyed to the American pupils on the Soviet leadership's instructions by the Soviet consul-general in San Francisco, Valentin Kamenev.

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CSO: 5200/1251

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

TASS: REAGAN RADIO ADDRESS 'IN SPIRIT OF MILITARISM'

LD181334 Moscow TASS in English 1307 GMT 18 Jan 87

[Text] Washington January 18 TASS -- President Reagan has made a new radio address imbued with the spirit of militarism. He contended that the United States could conduct affairs with the Soviet Union from positions of strength and recalled with satisfaction that since the coming of his administration into office there had been a massive buildup of American military potential.

For instance, four battleships were modernised and 124 new ships purchased for the Navy, including two aircraft carriers and about two dozen modern cruisers and destroyers. The Air Force got about 2500 tactical fighter planes. The head of the administration said that the whole world had witnessed the strengthening by the United States of its role of "defender of freedom" and cited as an example the "liberation" of Grenada.

It is well known that the tiny island state fell victim to a brutal and totally unprovoked invasion by the United States. Throughout the world this action was branded as a brazen aggression.

The head of the administration intimated that he intended to spiral military expenditures further. He stated that Congress should not "undermine" America's might and allocate "sufficient" money for military spending. President Reagan reminded Congress that in 1985 and 1986 it had trimmed the military budget and expressed hope that this would not happen again.

The administration's interpretation of the word "sufficient" is well known. In its draft budget for the 1988 fiscal year the White House demanded the astronomical sum of 312 billion dollars for military aims. More than that, it is intended to spend a total of some 630 billion dollars for military purposes in the two fiscal years of 1988 and 1989.

The President did not conceal that the purpose of these massive military preparations and the buildup of nuclear and conventional armaments is to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union.

The United States doggedly continues to pursue this aim despite numerous evidence that this is illusory and unattainable.

Reagan chose also to sidestep the social and economic consequences of these military preparations for the United States. Thus, during the present administration's stay in office the state debt of the United States will have grown from 1.5 to 2.5 trillion dollars.

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CSO: 5200/1251

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW TV ON WEINBERGER DEFENSE BUDGET REPORT

LD210047 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2010 GMT 20 Jan 87

[From the "World Today" program presented by Vladimir Tsvetov]

[Text] Balzac said every theme demands its own particular form. The "World Today" is far from being a literary program, and of course I recalled Balzac's words in connection with an episode in international life. U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger has presented his annual report to Congress concerning the military budget and defense programs. The theme of this work, 353 pages long, is not merely misanthropic, but fairytale-like, and it naturally required an appropriate forum.

It speaks of the directions of the U.S. arms race in the language of an inventory compiled by the medieval Dominican Order, which devised the most refined methods to destroy dissidents. It tells of this policy of the USSR, which dares to think differently from Weinberger, in the manner of a horror story.

Judge for yourselves: Our strategic nuclear power, says the U.S. Defense Secretary in his report, must have the combat capability to attack those military targets and command centers to which, in our view, the Soviet leadership attaches the greatest importance. A nuclear bonfire for the dissenting Soviet Union must be built by a variety of types of armaments, including SDI, the most important of our programs, said Weinberger, this is expensive firewood for the inquisitor's fire. Lest the congressmen take it into their heads to reduce their number, Weinberger set about telling a fairy-tale which ought to horrify the legislators.

In every corner of the globe, ever-growing Soviet military might poses a threat to the vital interests of the United States, Weinberger threatens. Terrorism and the drug trade is also a threat to U.S. national interests. In each case there are elements of utilization of this phenomenon by the Russians and their stooges, Weinberger sounds the alarm. If this were read to Chatskiy, he would no doubt repeat the expression which has become proverbial: Lie if you must, but within limits!

However, the U.S. Defense Secretary's woe is not from wit, but from hatred of socialism, and hatred can cause a man to lose his sense of proportion. In the gloomy performance being acted out by Weinberger, there is no place for Chatskiy, so I shall take upon myself the role of interpreter of Weinberger.

The report has two purposes: First, to convince congressmen of the need to continue paying for the arms race, above all the nuclear arms race. The second purpose is as follows: January is the month when multilateral and bilateral Soviet-U.S. negotiations on the most varied aspects of the problems of disarmament open or resume. Weinberger had to defame the Soviet Union, in case success in any of these negotiations -- if success should prove possible -- led any of the mortally frightened congressmen to doubt the expediency of over-arming. This is where another purpose of the report is concealed, the part which has assumed the form of a ghastly anti-Soviet fairytale.

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CSO: 5200/1251

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

TASS URGES U.S. TO DROP 'OLD DOGMAS' FOR NEGOTIATIONS

LD192018 Moscow TASS in English 1940 GMT 19 Jan 87

[Text] Moscow January 19 TASS — TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev:

The old refrain keeps coming up in statements of senior U.S. Administration officials: The United States should deal with the Soviet Union "from positions of strength". The President claims that it was American strength that brought the USSR to the negotiating table in Geneva and to the Soviet-American summits in Geneva and Reykjavik. The USSR can understand and respect only the language of strength, Kenneth Adelman, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, echoes Ronald Reagan in a recent article in THE NEW YORK TIMES. The main task of the U.S. in Geneva is to "be patient" and try to "outwait" the Soviet Union in the negotiations, that is, to make it eventually capitulate and agree to the terms dictated by the United States. According to Adelman, the American interest would better be served by no concession to the Russians on space weapons.

What is most amazing in all such declarations is that Washington does not see in them glaring contradictions and a total lack of elementary logic. The whole world has realized that it was the attempts to stick to "positions of strength" and the blind commitment to SDI that made it impossible to capitalize on the very important accords reached in Reykjavik and blocked progress at the Geneva talks and an advance towards a non-nuclear world.

The Reagan administration ignores the lessons of history as well. It was only when the U.S. leadership woke up to the need to reckon with realities and grew aware of the futility of an approach from strength to international relations that conditions were created for mutually acceptable accords. On June 10, 1963, for instance, John Kennedy talked in a speech about genuine peace rather than the peace of the grave, and the incumbent Washington officials should remember his words.

When the Kennedy administration understood that weapons did not offer ultimate security and embraced more realistic positions, it became possible to take practical steps to improve Soviet-American relations, in particular, to conclude a treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in three media. The detente of the 1970's was only made possible when Washington had woken up to the fact, in Richard Nixon's words, that the time was past when America had considered it to be her duty to tell the peoples of other countries how they should settle their problems.

It is all the more important today, in the nuclear-space age and under conditions of strategic parity, to renounce old dogmas and the long-defunct principle of "big stick", let alone wielding it at the negotiating table. It is by being aware of realities, relying on the principle of equality and equal security and respecting the lawful security interests of one's partner that one can guarantee one's own security and provide conditions for progress at the Geneva talks on nuclear and space weapons.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW: U.S. EXPERTS CITED ON DISARMAMENT ISSUES

PM140922 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Jan 87 p 14

[Fedor Burlatskiy article under the rubric "A Year of Hopes and Struggle":
"What Does America Want, Anyway?"]

[Excerpts] For us, for Soviet people, 1986 was a year of struggle for the practical implementation of the new way of thinking. Reykjavik was the culmination of this process. Although it did not prove possible to adopt concrete decisions there, the positions of the USSR and the United States converged more than ever before, as is well known.

What kind of a year was it for the United States? What kind of year will next year, 1987, be for Soviet-U.S. relations? May we hope for accords with the present administration on questions of reducing nuclear missiles and other arms, or must we wait for a new administration to come to power, which will happen only 2 years from now? Those are the questions which interested me during my trip to the United States. I should point out that I was granted good opportunities to discuss these questions at various levels.

In Washington I met with many U.S. establishment figures: J. Matlock, special assistant to the President for European and Soviet affairs (he is spoken of as a future U.S. ambassador to the USSR); A. Hartman, the current U.S. ambassador to our country; L. Aspin, chairman of the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee; M. Stafford, special assistant to P. Milze; B. Burton, State Department assistant for disarmament control [kontrol nad razoruzheniyem]; Profesor P. (Raddauey), secretary of the Kennan Institute; (D.) Billington, director of the Wilsonian Scientific Center, and others.

So what is the position of American official circles at the moment? In the main they assessed positively the results of Reykjavik. They agreed that an unprecedented convergence of the USSR and U.S. positions on key arms reduction issues was achieved there. They did not conceal the fact that in Reykjavik the President was not prepared for the new proposals from the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and therefore reacted spontaneously to many proposals. This put him in a difficult position after his return to Washington. The White House representatives came out in favor of the continuation of direct diplomacy between the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the U.S. President. Moreover, they claimed that if M.S. Gorbachev came to the United States, if only for a week, it would be possible to resolve major questions of disarmament and the development of Soviet-U.S. relations.

The representatives of the administration expressed the opinion that the "Iran affair" will prompt the President to seek effective compensation in the international arena to help restore his prestige in public opinion. They see one possibility here — the conclusion of an agreement on arms limitation questions with the USSR. When I asked whether all this means that the President is really prepared to be flexible on SDI and the reduction of the military budget, the answer was usually evasive: Some kind of compromise in this regard is possible, although, of course, the President has pinned his entire reputation on the SDI program.

People from the President's entourage spoke in terms of seeing 1987 as a unique opportunity to conclude an arms limitation agreement. Why? Because this suits the President's own mood, on the one hand, and on the other he will certainly find support from U.S. public opinion. [paragraph continues]

They claim that if this chance is lost, no new opportunity could arise before 1990. This is explained by the following aspects: The whole of 1988 will be spent on the election campaign. A new president will need at least 2 years to form an administration, find his feet, enlist the support of Congress, and begin energetic activity in the international arena.

As for the future presidential elections, the official representatives of the administration asserted that regardless of who wins — a Republican or a Democrat — he will take a position somewhat to the right of center, since R. Reagan's policy, especially in the sphere of the economy and arms, has had a great influence on U.S. public opinion. And for these reasons they believe that 1987 is the most favorable year for the continuation of Soviet-American dialogue.

I gained the impression that the problem of "linkage" ["linkidzh"], which we call "uvyazka," remains the most significant in U.S. policy with regard to the USSR. Many American officials, including relatively senior ones, told me in confidence that U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle links the entire process of talks with the USSR on disarmament questions exclusively with the problem of emigration from the Soviet Union; until there are radical changes in this sphere, no agreements with the USSR on disarmament should be entered into — that is Perle's stance, according to his colleagues.

Why this inconsistency in U.S. policy? Why does the U.S. so eagerly and thoughtlessly use "linkage" against us and protest so vigorously against the problem of the "package" put forward by the Soviet Union? After all, the "package" does not concern changes of any kind within the United States itself. It does not link the problem of disarmament with economic and humanitarian relations. No, the "package" concerns security alone, and reflects the USSR's concern that this package be resolved in the interests of both sides and on the basis of parity.

Is that not logical? But what I was told by U.S. officials about the linkage of economic and humanitarian relations with internal developments in the USSR can hardly be deemed logical.

As is well known, at the recent elections to the U.S. Senate the Democrats prevailed, and now they control both houses. In Washington I met with Congressman L. Aspin, Democrat from Wisconsin.

L. Aspin said that in the next few years Congress will come out in favor of the development of Soviet-U.S. dialogue on arms limitation questions. In his opinion Congress will now resolutely oppose the administration's desire to abandon the SALT II treaty, especially if the Soviet Union publicly acknowledges its own few violations. The congressman is distrustful of all the Soviet Union's objections here, and believes that the great publicity and openness [otkrytost] of the United States should become the norm for the Soviet Union too, especially since in fact the two sides already know all about each other.

I asked about the possibility of a cut in the U.S. military budget, on the basis, naturally, of parity with the Soviet Union. L. Aspin expressed a skeptical view on this question since talks and agreements have not hitherto led to an equivalent reduction in the military budget. He does not believe major changes are possible here. Even if substantial reductions in nuclear missile arms take place, the problem of the balance and modernization of conventional arms will remain. Only the resolution of this problem could seriously affect the U.S. military budget.

My interlocutor, like other representatives of the Democratic Party, incidentally, is optimistic about the prospects for the future presidential elections. The Democrats have virtually no doubt of victory. In L. Aspin's opinion, at the first stage the possible candidates for the two parties will be George Bush and Gary Hart. But he does not exclude the possibility that new figures may emerge at the next stage.

The same view was expressed by the well known American historian Arthur Schlesinger, former staffer of John Kennedy's administration, who received me in his three-story house on 64th Avenue in New York.

Schlesinger is an active supporter of the disarmament program. His position is similar to that of McNamara, Bundy, Sorensen, and other former John Kennedy aides. McNamara recently expressed the view that to begin with, it would be a good idea to return to the concept of "mutual deterrence," formulated back in the sixties, and that for the purposes of such deterrence it is sufficient for each side to have no more than 100 nuclear warheads. As for total nuclear disarmament, even the most liberal representatives of the Democratic Party are not yet ready to support this position. They link this process with parity in conventional arms, and also with real monitoring of [kontrol za] other states capable of creating nuclear weapons.

After my return to Moscow I was invited to meet with Senator Gary Hart. G. Hart assessed highly the profound, frank, and realistic ideas and proposals put forward by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on questions of Soviet-U.S. relations and the USSR's domestic and foreign policy.

He also expressed the view that the Soviet Union should continue its active efforts in talks with the present U.S. Administration on questions of disarmament; even if this yields no practical results now, it will provide a basis for future agreements. G. Hart said that if any agreements were concluded with Reagan, that would give the Republicans certain advantages in the future elections. But in G. Hart's opinion, the problems of arms limitation come before party problems, and the Democrats will in all circumstances support the present Republican administration if it shows readiness to make compromises with the Soviet Union.

Things are still difficult in America when it comes to the new way of thinking on questions of world politics. Of course, elements of the new approach can be discovered in various milieus, especially among American professors and politicians from former administrations. They can be found to a lesser extent among journalists, and are utterly negligible among representatives of the country's present leadership.

Naturally, none of my interviewees was such a madman as to say that he wants or tolerates the idea of nuclear war. The view that such a war would be catastrophic has become axiomatic for all Americans, especially since the conclusions drawn by Carl Sagan and other major American scientists on the inevitability of the onset of a "nuclear winter" in the event of the simultaneous explosion of the stockpiled nuclear weapons.

But the question is what conclusions are drawn from this extremely important premise? As for the Soviet leaders, the most important conclusion, which they constantly speak of to representatives of Western countries, including the United States, is quite simple: We cannot, we have no right to regard each other as enemies unless we want to disappear forever from the face of our planet, along with all mankind.

This means that first of all the "concept of the enemy" must be discarded. Of course, we represent different social systems. The Soviet and American peoples believe in different values, although in much — and West Europeans are particularly insistent about this — we are close to each other.

So what was my general impression from my meetings and conversations in the United States? What does America want, anyway? First, it seemed to me that the majority of my interlocutors, including Washington officials, understand that 1986 was a year of lost opportunities for them. They look back with regret at Reykjavik, where major, important agreements could have been reached. Second, Americans have hopes that 1987 will yield real progress in arms limitation talks, although they are far from entertaining any illusions about R. Reagan's stance on SDI.

And last, the concept of the "enemy" and even "enemy number one" in the Americans' public awareness about the Soviet Union still prevails today. This too must be reckoned with, as a real fact. Tremendous efforts will be needed on our part and, probably, important and radical agreements between the USSR and the United States and some activeness on the part of the most progressive section of the American elite in order to bring about a breakthrough in public awareness in that country.

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CSO: 5200/1251

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW: 'TOP PRIORITY' ON NUCLEAR ISSUES, SDI

LD171641 Moscow in English to North America 0000 GMT 17 Jan 87

["Top Priority" program with Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov of the Moscow-based Institute for United States of America and Canada Studies; introduced by Pavel Kuznetsov]

[Excerpts] [Kuznetsov] A year ago, on January 15, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev made a statement outlining a Soviet plan for a nonnuclear world by the year 2000. In fact I think it's not only a plan, it's a program of action to guide our foreign policy in the years to come. So we want a nuclear world [as heard] and, naturally, not only for ourselves, that would be impossible; it is our principal line. How realistic is it?

[Bogdanov] Yes, it's a very good question because now you hear from practically any political quarter some different shades of opinions about nonnuclear world, beginning from absolute no it's impossible, coming to some middle way, you know, position and to some too high expectations, you know. [passage omitted]

[Bogdanov] Just have a look at some offices, I wouldn't mention, I wouldn't like to mention them. But just look at some offices, at some people. They were making, if you like, money on that; they were living on nuclear factors. In what sense? Because first of all they were making a nuclear strategy beginning from 1945. They were making different weapons systems, they were, after all their importance in their own society was defined by the nuclear factor. [as heard] If you deprive them of nuclear weapons tomorrow they will be good for nothing. You know, they defend themselves. You may say that it's a minor factor. No, Pavel, I believe it's a very, very major factor, psychological factor. But let me come back to our program. I like very much your definition. It's really a program. It's not just a slogan, it's not just what we call wishful thinking. If you — I believe that our American counterparts, our American, you know, friends, colleagues they are no doubt also for a nonnuclear world. The American President has stated many times himself that that is his goal.

What is the difference? The difference is that you have a program on the table, very realistic program, stage by stage. Why by stage? Because of those difficulties — psychological, security worries and all that, you know. That's why we have divided that period of 15 years into three stages, to make it really digestible, if you like, digestible.

Now let me come back to Reykjavik. If you like, in a sense, we have already tried our program in very, in a very serious circumstance, and I dare say to some extent, to a very major circumstance, and I dare to say to some extent, to a very major extent, they have succeeded. They have succeeded; they have come to an agreement on very major part of the nonnuclear world confidence, if you like.

[Kuznetsov] Yes, like deep cuts in nuclear weapons, elimination, the subsequent elimination of them in the next decade.

[Bogdanov] Only but for, just because of SDI, we could not move ahead because the American side was so eager to keep that in their hands, in their pockets that we couldn't go ahead. So my last word on that is it's very realistic and it is very much alive and it is very much on the table.

[Kuznetsov] [passage omitted] We have over 50,000, perhaps even more, nuclear arms of all kinds and I don't think this amount is a deterrent. I mean it's overkill, it's playing with suicide and it's about time we started to reduce and perhaps this, this is obvious to very many politicians round the world. [passage omitted]

[Plekhanov] You see there are two approaches to nuclear weapons. One approach is that they are a very special kind of weapon in the sense that you can't really fight and win a war with them like you could do with weapons which existed before nuclear weapons came into being. That's a traditional military approach according to which the appearance of nuclear weapons really hasn't changed anything in a major way. The other approach is that, well you know, they are a very special kind of weapon in the sense that you can only use them, or threaten to use them to deter a nuclear attack on you. In other words, nuclear weapons are a means of suicide, of mutual suicide, and the danger of mutual suicide is what prevents each side from attacking the other. Now, if, if that is the only, ah, if that, that is the only way you can use nuclear weapons for suicide then it is logical to assume that you can have a very minimal amount of nuclear weapons. [passage omitted]

Until there is a real change in the thinking of the strategists in Washington, military or civilian, I don't think that we will be able to achieve real reductions, much less nuclear disarmament with the United States. It really requires and I don't know what it will take them to change their view, to finally come to grips with reality and say that well, you know, if they're ever used it's curtains for everybody.

[Kuznetsov] I may be wrong, but I personally have the impression that our proposals are always described in Washington, the White House, as even excessive and therefore unrealistic, like Gorbachev's, Mikhail Gorbachev's plan for a nonnuclear world, or as insufficient. As a result the ball seems to be always in our court. Is (?such) White House tactics a trick or perhaps our proposals are such that they don't take into account the legitimate security concerns of the other side?

[Bogdanov] My impression is that this administration, at least some people in this administration, they're using very dirty tricks. I'm sorry to say that. They are, you know, leaning on, may I say so, on uninformed public opinion. You still hear that song about verification. You still hear some, you know, tunes on conventional Soviet superiority. You still hear something like that. But at the same time this administration is very well informed that we have suggested to them at different forums, including Stockholm, some very efficient ways of verification, including on-site inspections, including international inspections, and of course national means of verification. If you are at the American end and you hear all that you may come to the conclusion that the Soviet Union is still on the same level as it was before. They just hide from their own people, from their own public opinion, that there is an immense step forward from the Soviet Union which takes into account all Western, you know, worries about, about, legitimate worries about verification. That problem is no more on the [word indistinct].

[Kuznetsov] At least those are worries that we know about. Every time there is some new worry coming up, you know.

[Bogdanov] And you know what happens, what happens. For instance now America, the President, sent the message, sent a signal to the Senate that he would like two threshold treaties to be ratified; provided, provided the Soviet Union agrees to some additional measures of verification. And mind you they don't mention from the White House side what kind of measures they mean. I read it like that. Suppose, suppose the Congress will ratify then they will put to the Soviet Union such measures that will be from the very beginning not acceptable to us because it would not be, you know, verification business, it would be a spying business, something like that. So maybe I'm pessimistic, I'm very sorry. Maybe Sergey is more optimistic, but I believe that these people are just not able to think in cooperative terms. They're rather busy with building up obstacles on the very difficult way of disarmament.

[Kuznetsov] My question to you Sergey. Why don't they want to put to test our sincerity, like there's been a lot of talk about verification, why not opening up laboratories to check whether we have a similar research effort in, in space defenses, so on and so forth? Why don't they put it to test our sincerity, to test? It's easy to check whether we're cheating or not. Are they afraid that we may be serious after all?

[Plekhanov] Yes, of course. They don't want to test our sincerity because they know that we are sincere. Ah, you test the other side's sincerity, (?then) OK let's, let's sign an agreement and the other side says OK let's do it. And then you have to sign an agreement and in fact this is exactly or very much like what happened at Reykjavik, when I think President Reagan went beyond his own expectations, down the road of agreement, and had to stop at the very last moment, when he...

[Kuznetsov interrupts] Did he expect to know or what? Did he expect to know?

[Plekhanov] You see, I think, I think he didn't expect the amount of concessions on our side and the amount of active willingness to reach an agreement, to find a common ground.

He didn't really expect that. He thought that well, you know, it could be just talks about something, or probably some limited agreement and then when he sat down at the table with Mikhail Gorbachev he saw that, my goodness, there's a real possibility of a major agreement on the reduction of nuclear weapons and then the whole crowd around him starting getting scared, and what's, what's going on, are we really moving in that direction in which we do not want to move? [passage omitted]

[Kuznetsov] My final question, as time is running out on us. There are several concepts of a nonnuclear world. We know about American concept, President Reagan's concept of a nonnuclear world which boils down to the phasing out of nuclear weapons through space defenses. And there is a Soviet concept, a nonnuclear world is at the same time a world with a nonmilitarized space. Now we have these two contradictory, opposing concepts. Do you see any room, for, for compromise, or are they incompatible head on?

[Bogdanov] Yes, I see room for compromise based on common sense. That's my point.

[Kuznetsov] Common sense, what do you mean by common sense? Perhaps, you, Sergey?

[Plekhanov] Well, I think if the other side I think if the other side -- common sense for the United States to build space defenses, I mean for President Reagan. [as heard]

[Kuznetsov] Our common sense tells us...

[Plekhanov interrupts] Pavel, it's nobody's common sense to build space defenses, that's why I used that as common sense, as human common sense.

[Kuznetsov] Oh, I see.

[Plekhanov] Yes. There must be some kind of a consensus between both sides and if there is a lack of consensus at this point I think both sides should behave in such a manner that we respect each other's differences, like it was done at Reykjavik. If President Reagan believes in SDI so much, OK he can continue the research program, but please don't violate the ABM treaty because that will impinge on our interests. So if there is that give and take -- and also let's see what happens within the next 10 or 15 years. If there is a willingness to grant that the other side, to give the benefit of the doubt to the other side to some extent, at the same time adherence to the existing arms control treaties. I think that's the kind of balance that could, that we could live with for a while, before things become clear. But I'm convinced that time will show that the SDI is a great mistake, that's a very dangerous thing. But let the facts come out, let the people think and make judgments.

[Kuznetsov] Thank you very much. Our time is up. Thanks again for coming to our studio and sharing your views on Top Priority. I'm Pavel Kuznetsov, your host, signing off till next week at the same time and on the same wavelength. Goodbye.

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CSO: 5200/1251

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW ROUNDTABLE ON NST, MORATORIUM

LD112104 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 11 Jan 87

["International Observers Roundtable" program with Nikolay I. Yefimov, first deputy editor-in-chief of IZVESTIYA; Georgiy A. Kuznetsov, deputy editor-in-chief of ZA RUBEZHOM; and Vitaliy S. Sobolev, All-Union radio commentator]

[Excerpts] [Sobolev] Hello, comrades. This is our first roundtable meeting this year, and that puts us under the obligation not to confine ourselves to the latest events, but to also try to look ahead, to the extent that that may be possible.

Peace Year is over, but the problem of war and peace is as acute as ever. In the analyses of the international situation, and in the forecasts made by politicians and the press of various countries, pessimistic and optimistic notes can be discerned. The optimists point out, for instance, how much was agreed on in Reykjavik. The pessimists stress the desire of the United States to gain one-sided concessions from the USSR, the absence of any constructive proposals from Washington, its multifarious military preparations, and so on. But whoever's arguments may appear to carry most weight, it is clear that we cannot cease, for one moment, to struggle against the arms race. That much is clear to millions of people, and Washington cannot shrug off their demands.

On 15 January, the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons resume in Geneva. That day is also the first anniversary of the submission of the Soviet disarmament program, which, if implemented, would enable mankind to enter the 3d millenium without the nuclear threat.

[Yefimov] I think there are three events that distinguish the past year from those that preceded it: They are, in my view, the bold initiative of the Soviet Union in proposing the abolition of nuclear weapons by the year 2000; the accident at Chernobyl; and the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik. The philosophers, wise and perspicacious men, understood long ago that human consciousness lags behind human life. Just as in astronomy, it takes years and even millenia for the light to reach us. Just 30-35 years ago, we were intoxicated by the power of man. We thought ourselves equal to every task. We could turn bačk rivers, dam gulfs, disembowel mountains and valleys, and build gigantic factories. But that power has led to an ecological problem on a global scale. Another power — nuclear — has posed a still more serious, still more urgent problem: The problem of human survival. The essence of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's speech of 15 January last year, and the essence of the new thinking which

he so persistently urges on the Soviet Union, is precisely that we should not only be aware of the real threat that hangs over us, but that we should lose no time in totally averting it, casting aside all group interests, narrow class interests, and so on. The danger is monstrously great.

If we were to take all the explosives used in World War II as a unit, then the nuclear weapons already stockpiled would be the equivalent -- translated into terms of conventional explosives -- of 6,000 units. Just imagine that: We've stockpiled 6,000 World War II's, that is how much is now being stored in the depots. All that is capable of turning our planet into a dead, cold globe in 30 minutes. World War II cost 55 million lives. Multiply that by 6,000 units, and you get a fantastic figure: 330 billion. It's not even all that fantastic: nuclear might would destroy not only the living, but also those yet unborn, those who should have come after us to continue our race and preserve our memory. The accident at Chernobyl, and its radioactive fallout, which was bad enough, really cannot be compared in any way at all, not only with 6,000 World War II's, but even with one nuclear warhead. That accident, which so worried and frightened millions of people living many thousands of kilometers from the reactor that went out of control, ought to have provided much food for thought, both to ordinary people, statesmen and political leaders.

Alas, many of them have still not got the message. It has not sunk in, either in Washington or in London or in Paris. Yet we should not look at all we tried to do last year just in the light of our disappointment. In Reykavik, despite everything, both the Soviet Union and the United States for the first time got within striking distance of historic decisions. Does this mean then that agreement is, in principle, possible? Yes, it is possible.

However much they may back away from this reality in certain Western capitals; however great our disappointment -- and it has been great for the very reason that we were so close to an agreement -- the fact remains that accords are possible. The beginning of last year gave us a comprehensive program for the abolition of nuclear weapons, and the end of the year confirmed its feasibility. I don't think any previous year brought us anything like that. Therefore, in my view, we must look to the future with a sense of optimism.

[Sobolev] The International Peace Year, as Comrade Gorbachev noted in his message to Perez de Cuellar, is a spur to practical action toward ridding mankind of the threat of nuclear war and laying the foundations for a comprehensive security system. The Soviet Union intends to strive to achieve that aim, so that we may have lasting peace. That is an optimistic view of the future.

[Kuznetsov] Yes, we can be optimistic. I'd like to stress particularly the significance of the International Peace Year, which began with the statement of 15 January, and which has been a kind of litmus test for judging the policies of the various governments. I should say that our Soviet initiatives and declarations, and many others [as heard], as well as our practical actions, in the form of the moratorium which was extended several times, have created a particular political climate on our planet that has enabled many governments, many parties and public organizations to make their contribution to strengthening international security.

[Yefimov] For example, one should mention the initiative of the Nonaligned Movement and of the Delhi Six. One must note the role of the neutral states of Europe in bringing the Stockholm Conference to a successful conclusion, with Finland being an example. Comrade Ryzhkov's visit to that country, which has just ended, has again shown the kind of relations that can and should exist between states with different social systems.

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

TASS: SHEVARDNADZE-UK OFFICIAL ON NUCLEAR MENACE, ARMS CURB

LD151903 Moscow TASS in English 1847 GMT 15 Jan 87

[Text] Moscow January 15 TASS -- Member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze today received Timothy Renton, minister of state, Foreign and Commonwealth Office of Great Britain, now in Moscow for the participation in the Soviet-British political consultations arranged by the Soviet Foreign Ministry and the British Foreign Office.

During an open businesslike conversation Eduard Shevardnadze and Timothy Renton assessed the international situation that has developed after Mikhail Gorbachev advanced exactly a year ago a large-scale initiative aimed at ridding humanity of the burden of nuclear and other arms. [Moscow TASS English 151842, in a brief report on Shevardnadze meeting Renton, refers to their "frank and business-like talk."] A fundamental talk was held on how the sides, in the light of the Soviet-U.S. Reykjavik meeting, view the role and place of European states in the world-wide struggle against the nuclear menace, in the drastic restructuring of international relations on an all-embracing basis of equal and reliable security for all and equitable peaceful cooperation.

The Soviet side emphasized that the policy of those Western circles that in their dangerous delusion still hope to achieve unilateral advantages by the use of force to the detriment of the interests of other peoples has no future and can only doom civilisation to an impasse of confrontation and mutual deterrence that is fraught with catastrophe. The Soviet side expressed the hope that Great Britain, to a dialogue with which the Soviet Union attaches much importance, will be equal to the responsibility of a great power, will show genuine striving to help curb the arms race, improve the climate in relations among states and peoples.

The sides declared for a more dynamic and steady development of bilateral ties in various spheres, for manifesting cooperation in fresh important deeds.

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CSO: 5200/1237

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR'S KARPOV WRITES ON 'NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD,' INF, SDI

AU122042 Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 9 Jan 87 pp 1, 4

[Article specially dispatched through the NOVOSTI news agency for the daily NARODNA ARMIYA, by Viktor Karpov, head of the USSR Foreign Affairs Ministry administration on problems of limitation of armaments and on disarmament and leader of the Soviet delegation to the Geneva negotiations on nuclear and space weapons; entitled: "Breakthrough Toward a Nuclear-free World")]

[Text] The Reykjavik agreements could have opened opportunities for rescue from nuclear weapons, were it not for the stubbornness of the American side. Soviet as well and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe could have been eliminated; in the long run shorter range weapons could also have been eliminated, while U.S. and Soviet offensive strategic weapons could have been reduced by 50 percent within the next 5 years, and fully eliminated by 1996.

The limiting of U.S. and USSR strategic offensive weapons should at the same time obviously have opened the path toward the nuclear disarmament process being joined by other nuclear states, including France and the UK. Naturally, this would have meant direct progress toward a Europe free of nuclear weapons.

Unfortunately none of this happened because of the position adopted by Washington. The strange factor in all this, however, is that certain leading European political figures were frightened by the prospect, and acted dynamically to prevent this opportunity for Europe's nuclear disarmament. There is no other way of interpreting the statement that a 50-percent limitation on offensive strategic armaments is dangerous for the future of Western strategy, and that such a limit threatens to undermine the unity of the NATO member-countries and their security.

A rather strange metamorphosis also affected the question of medium-range missiles deployed in Europe. The European leaders used to assure us in the past that they are supporters of the "zero option", namely, that they are ready to agree to the full elimination of American and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe. Today they are obviously frightened by the prospect of the elimination of medium-range missiles opened at the Reykjavik negotiations, since they concoct additional obstacles along the path of implementing this decision. It is by no means accidental that other questions are being raised today on a priority basis, questions which have no direct connection with medium-range missiles.

Nevertheless, there are convincing answers to such questions as well. They are contained in the Soviet Nuclear Disarmament Program which envisages a full and comprehensive elimination of tactical nuclear arms. The Soviet Union proposes to settle this question as well. However, as the saying goes, there is a time for everything.

Let us not forget the fact that it is not a question of the small nuclear resources belonging to the UK and France remaining on European territory but the continued stationing of forward based U.S. nuclear weapons. They will be preserved for a certain time -- and perhaps for a more prolonged period -- following the elimination of U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe. Therefore, it is absolutely meaningless to talk about NATO allegedly being defenseless as a result of the elimination of USSR and U.S. medium-range missiles.

As to conventional weapons, the Soviet Union is ready for negotiations about drastic limitations of these armaments throughout the entire territory of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals. We do not pose any preliminary conditions for this, whereas NATO, under different pretexts, is avoiding such negotiations. It is even trying to invent arguments about the alleged superiority of the Warsaw Pact member-countries in conventional weapons to sabotage nuclear disarmament in Europe.

Other attempts are also made to cast a shadow upon Reykjavik. People say the Soviet Union allegedly claims everything or nothing, and is unwilling to make any concessions whatsoever, being aware of the U.S. stand on SDI. This is by no means true. The Soviet Union does not ask anything from the United States but that it fulfill the statement made by the American side on the highest level. The official American stand claims that SDI is nothing but a research project. What is the proposal of the Soviet Union in this respect? It is precisely the proposal that the United States should restrict itself to laboratory tests within the next 10 years, and not perform any tests in space.

If the declaration made by the U.S. President and by other officials corresponds to reality, then there are no obstacles to the acceptance of the Soviet proposals.

However, the U.S. officials, as the saying goes, say something and have something else in mind in their striving to preserve the opportunity of fully implementing their SDI program, including the 10-year period in question, during which the program for the elimination of offensive, strategic weapons could be implemented.

Reykjavik represents a real breakthrough toward a nuclear-free world, a breakthrough toward a drastic increase in European security and, last but not least, a breakthrough toward excluding the opportunity of a nuclear or conventional war being unleashed on the European continent.

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CSO: 5200/1237

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

TASS: PERLE DISCUSSES SDI PROGRAM, B-52 MODERNIZATION

LD080922 Moscow TASS in English 0751 GMT 8 Jan 87

[Text] Washington January 8 TASS -- U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle said that the United States planned totally to modernize its fleet of B-52 strategic bombers by re-equipping them to carry cruise missiles with nuclear warheads.

The United States is known to have violated the 1979 Soviet-U.S. SALT-2 treaty when it re-equipped the 131st B-52 bomber to carry cruise missiles last November. Responding to newsmen's request to comment on a bill which has just been submitted to the 100th U.S. Congress for consideration and demanding that the administration comply with the SALT-2 treaty terms, Perle stated that the President would veto any bill to which the similar amendment would be adopted.

Perle also stressed that the White House did not intend under any circumstances to abandon its "Star Wars" programme.

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CSO: 5200/1237

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

PRAVDA POLLS WESTERN NEWSMEN ON SUPERPOWER ARMS POLICIES

PMO21350 [Editorial Report] Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 31 December 1986 First Edition carries on page 4 under the headline "What People in the West Think" a 2,900-word feature comprising PRAVDA correspondent interviews with seven "prominent bourgeois commentators and publicists": Strobe Talbott, TIME magazine's diplomatic correspondent; Paul Warnke, former leader of the U.S. delegation at the Soviet-U.S. SALT II talks; Shozo Komoto, deputy chief of TOKYO SHIMBUN's foreign department; Yasuo Suzuki, deputy chief of YOMIURI's international department; Jonathan Steele, THE GUARDIAN's diplomatic commentator; Heiner Bremer, chief editor of the Hamburg weekly STERN; and Claudio Farcassi, chief editor of PAESE SERA. The reply to these two questions: "Whose foreign policy activity -- the USSR's or the United States' -- has been more in keeping with the aims and tasks of Peace Year?" And "What would you like from the two powers next year?" The interviews are followed by this commentary by Yevgeniy Grigoryev:

"We have before us seven interviews from five of the major Western countries. First of all, I wish to thank their authors for participating in PRAVDA's New Year's questionnaire. In my view, the replies make interesting reading. They are quite representative as a kind of cross section of the opinions and sentiments, as well as the omissions and assertions, that are encountered today in the West's 'big press.' Along with elements of the new political thinking, the influence of the old is also noticeable in them. For all this, I believe the published statements contain common denominator. This is concern at the situation in the world and awareness of the need to end the arms race.

"On comparing the replies, the reader will easily detect a substantial discrepancy in the assessment of the outgoing year, the events, and the problems. The majority acknowledge the significance and weight of the efforts the Soviet Union has made to improve the international situation and turn toward disarmament. For all mankind knows of M.S. Gorbachev's statement of 15 January 1986, which formulated the program for eliminating nuclear weapons on the planet. It was the basis of the USSR's innovative proposals at Reykjavik, which made the prospect of a nuclear-free world really tangible. The silence on the Soviet nuclear test sites has been not only a hymn to Peace Year but also a concrete action in the interests of nuclear disarmament.

"It is hard to say why certain replies ignore this, as well as Moscow's many other practical steps in the spirit of the ideas and aims of Peace Year. But this is what is curious. Certain authors rebuke the USSR and the United States equally for the lack of fundamental progress in the matter of disarmament. This is 'usual' and 'the done thing.' However, even they recognize directly or indirectly the great significance of Reykjavik and urge people to push off from its results and go further. But those results, like the meeting in the Icelandic capital itself, were a consequence of the initiative and the proposals of precisely the Soviet Union. That is a universally recognized fact.

"As though to 'balance' the too glaring U.S. 'omissions,' the people who answered the PRAVDA questionnaire and their colleagues in Western capitals allude to Afghanistan. This is more than dubious allusion, for it is precisely Washington that has preferred the dangerous chimera of SDI and blocked a shift toward the cardinal reduction and elimination of nuclear arms. The continuation of the undeclared war against the DRA is also primarily an American 'service.' In connection with that regional problem, too, the Soviet Union has exerted and is exerting persistent efforts and goodwill for the speediest political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan. Here words are not at variance with deeds. I would mention, for example, the return home of six regiments."

"The contradictory judgments have evidently been caused by the complexity of the situation and the juxtaposition of hopes and disappointments associated with Reykjavik, or by a lack of information. We are urged, for example, to be ready for talks on short-range missiles, although precisely the Soviet side had already enshrined that in one of the Reykjavik accords. There is a similar appeal with regard to conventional arms in Europe, as though there had not been the corresponding Budapest appeal of the Warsaw Pact states, to which precisely the NATO countries have still not made a businesslike response.

"The thoughts of J. Steele and H. Bremer clearly reveal a desire to 'eviscerate' the Reykjavik package of USSR proposals and break it up into separate parts. Look, they say, there is no connection between medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe and strategic weapons. But, with regard to us, U.S. medium-range missiles are strategic weapons, since they can reach our territory. There is also an obvious connection between medium-range missiles and SDI. On a military-technical plane there is the so-called Euro-SDI, but above all there is the participation of a number of West European NATO countries in implementing the 'Star Wars' program. On the political plane SDI is the concentrated expression of a reluctance to remove the nuclear threat hanging over mankind. For it is clear even to a number of the questionnaire participants that, by extending the arms race into space, SDI blocks the entire nuclear disarmament process.

"This and this alone is the snag today, not the Soviet package. Everything in it is precisely balanced: both the concessions and the specific steps toward nuclear disarmament. Some people in the West would like to take from it the concessions alone. Of course, none of us will agree to that, because it would violate the principles of equality and mutual security.

"Certain ideas expressed in the replies are not quite intelligible. While quite rightly pointing out that the ABM Treaty specifically prohibits the testing and development [razrabotka] of space-based systems and their components, P. Warnke proposes that the sides exchange their plans in the sphere of such tests. But if this is prohibited, why have test plans? Would it not be better simply not to make plans and to observe the ABM Treaty?

"As can be seen from the interviews, masses of complex problems also await the world in 1987. There are differing opinions as to how to reveal them. But it follows from all the published statements that no time must be lost in solving these problems. In this sense the questionnaire participants obviously reflect the strengthening realistic sentiments in their countries and in the West in general.

"The future belongs to the idea of a nuclear-free world and to actions leading to this great goal and dream of concerned mankind."

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CSO: 5200/1237

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW: U.S. 'IDIOSYNCRATIC' ARMS STANCE ASSAILED

LD072344 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 7 Jan 87

[Vitaliy Sobolev commentary]

[Text] Positive response throughout the entire world, including the United States, regarding the Soviet stage-by-stage program for nuclear disarmament is found to be very annoying by official Washington. In order to overcome the attraction of this program, U.S. propaganda puts forward quite idiosyncratic ideas. For example, the newspaper THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR is trying to convince its readers: At present, the main danger is that the Soviets have managed to stretch U.S. power all over the world to such an extent, that at any point of possible confrontation, the United States must almost immediately pull the nuclear trigger. Over to commentator Vitaliy Sobolev:

Well, if the Soviets are guilty of this, then their vice is truly great. They have stretched U.S. power over more or less 114 countries, and although more than half a million U.S. soldiers serve away from their homeland, considering such geographical scope, how many of them occupy each point, as THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR states? Besides, many of their military bases are found near Soviet borders. The readers of the newspaper can sympathize with the U.S. soldiers who try to understand why on these bases they have seized hold of 12,000 nuclear triggers.

Whether it is the main danger or not, as the newspaper writes, the danger is obvious. It is obvious to the people of those countries where the bases with nuclear triggers are situated. It is no accident that the slogan "Yankee, go home" has become so popular in no less than 114 countries. The paper does not pay any attention to this, nor to the repeated Soviet proposals to liquidate the foreign military bases and to reduce military activity of states beyond their borders. However, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR underlines the importance of, and I quote: The Soviets receive an enormous political and psychological advantage by placing responsibility of being first to use nuclear weapons exclusively on the United States.

Therefore, the readers of this newspaper are given convincing evidence for the necessity of having nuclear weapons, as well as the nobility of the United States, which has not stretched Soviet power over 114 countries.

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CSO: 5200/1237

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

TASS CONTRASTS U.S.-USSR DISARMAMENT STANCES

LD131643 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1557 GMT 13 Jan 87

[Text] Moscow, 13 Jan (TASS) -- Military affairs observer Vladimir Bogachev writes:

U.S. President Ronald Reagan is continuing to insist that any accord at the Geneva negotiations on nuclear and space weapons must provide for the right of the United States to deploy [razvernut] at the end of 1996 a widescale space-based antimissile defense.

It emerges from his statement in connection with the next round of Soviet-U.S. negotiations which begin on 15 January that the President is in effect making the possibility of any progress at this forum dependent upon the Soviet side agreeing to revoke the 1972 treaty on restricting antimissile defense systems. In other words, the President is evidently fostering the hope of attaining military superiority over the Soviet Union by taking the race in strike weapons out into space. These plans are, despite all their illusory nature, extremely dangerous. The United States' attempts to justify militarization of space by the aspiration to make nuclear weapons "powerless and obsolete" just do not stand up to criticism.

The Soviet Union has not only "frozen" the number of its medium-range missiles, but has also reduced them in number, in particular dismantling the launch facilities for such missiles on the Kola Peninsula and a large proportion of such launch facilities in the rest of the territory of the Leningrad and Baltic Military Districts. During this period the United States has increased to 364 the number of U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe.

In 6 years, the Reagan administration has literally undertaken not a single practical measure to reduce its arsenal which it could itself describe as a gesture of good will.

The President frequently speaks of his intentions to remove the deadlock from progress at the Geneva negotiations in the future. One would like to hope for his sincerity. If Washington's intentions are genuinely serious, Washington should confirm it by practical deeds.

Against the background of the United States, practical activities in the military field, Reagan's flimsy phrases about his desire for "achieving significant, fair and effectively verifiable [poddayushchiyesya effektivnoy proverke] reductions in U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals" are surprisingly reminiscent of his own rhetoric over "Irangate."

"Soviet actions undertaken to achieve advances in the field of arms control [kontrol nad vooruzheniyami]," the President said, "have been in no way equitable with our efforts." Here are a few points to illustrate that allegation made by Reagan.

For over 17 months now, the Soviet Union has been observing a unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions. Over the same period the United States has carried out 24 nuclear tests.

The USSR has announced its intention not to exceed for the time being the limits set by the Soviet-U.S. SALT-II treaty. The United States has ostentatiously exceeded those limits by deploying further bombers with cruise missiles and MX-ICBM's with multiple warheads.

It is pointless to reduce weapons on the comparatively limited area of the earth's surface while at the same time opening the "green channel" for the deployment of even more dangerous systems for the destruction of people in the truly endless outer space. However, to date Washington has had no desire to be governed by common sense. In practice, the United States in the past 6 years has demonstrated not the slightest desire to halt the growth of offensive weapons or to take account of the provisions of the accords on their inflation.

The service record of the present U.S. Administration in the field of so-called arms control in the last 6 years places in doubt Washington's readiness to observe not only future agreements, but also existing treaties. From 1981 through 1987 it has not signed a single agreement on the genuine reduction of armed forces or armaments. Instead it has derailed the SALT-II treaty, the 1974 agreement on the limitation of the yield of underground nuclear tests, the 1976 agreement on nuclear blasts with peaceful objectives, and the 1972 provisional agreement, and has broken off a whole series of talks on disarmament. Washington's reputation as a partner in an agreement has fallen sharply.

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CSO: 5200/1237

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW: U.S. VIEW OF USSR ECONOMY IMPEDES DISARMAMENT

LD141446 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0350 GMT 14 Jan 87

[Text] Will Gorbachev succeed with the reforms? Articles under this, or similar, titles can be found just now in virtually every newspaper and magazine. Our correspondent, Vladimir Dunayev reports from Washington:

[Dunayev] There is barely any reporting of our foreign policy, our initiatives or disarmament. That is sparse, but there is plentiful and generous reporting on internal affairs, openness and restructuring: There is no way of overcoming the bureaucracy, to try is futile. The Soviet economy is doomed -- the more it is reformed, the worse things will become.

What is the cause of this interest in our internal affairs, and particularly the changes in the economy? The author of an article that has just appeared in the very influential FOREIGN AFFAIRS magazine under the title "'Does Failure Await Gorbachev?'" answers the question candidly. There is little interest in the West in the truth about the Soviet Union. People are afraid of the Soviet threat. What threat is it that the author of the article -- the well-known capitalist journalist Robert Kaiser, considered an expert on the Soviet Union and for 4 years a correspondent in Moscow -- is talking about? He was talking about this threat: The one and only real threat that emanates from the Soviet Union, writes Kaiser, is the threat that the whole world will be shown it is possible to organize society better than under capitalism. Such a society produces more, is more efficient and thus more attractive to the broad masses of the population of the earth than the Western model.

That was the original Bolshevik threat which stemmed from the young Soviet Russia, the threat when the first satellite headed into space from a socialist country. The reforms, restructuring and openness, Kaiser concludes, have alarmed the West, reviving fears which had died down that in the global historic rivalry of the two systems of society, the victory might not be our Western model. Kaiser then placates his readers, predicting that the Soviet economy could not pick up sufficient speed, that the Western model, however harsh it might be, is still more efficient.

Here he is not original. They all want the book of historical problems to contain Washington's answers. I was attracted to the recently published Kaiser article because the fears of the U.S. ruling class are formulated frankly and honestly in it. It is not the military threat, but the social, historical challenge which stems from our country, from our community. That is what has always frightened them and what particularly scares them today.

Incidentally, Washington does not want to tackle disarmament because it recognizes just how dynamically our economy and the social sphere would develop in a non-nuclear, non-missile world. They study and write so much about our changes because they are afraid of them. After all, whatever hindered us, whatever (?shielded) socialism and whatever perverted it was to their advantage, because it made us weaker, more complacent, more inert, and also because it deterred from the new world those who were prepared to search for other models, who could not fit in with the old world and who felt unhappy in it. That is why they write here about our bureaucracy, which the Soviet Union is not supposed to be able to cope with, with such respect, nay reverence.

We know bureaucracy is not a gift, whatever the model of society. True enough, it is extremely far from simple to root out bureaucracy. That is true. But, all the same, in vain do the Western theoreticians hope to win the historic competition of the two systems with the assistance of Soviet bureaucracy. We shall not give them that satisfaction.

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CSO: 5200/1237

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW ON RELATIONS WITH U.S., CANADA, COMMON NUCLEAR DANGER

LD031839 Moscow in English to North America 0000 GMT 3 Jan 87

["Top Priority" program presented by Pavel Kuznetsov, with Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov of the United States of America and Canada Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences]

[Excerpt] [Kuznetsov] This is our first program in 1987, a special year for us, because in November we're going to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the socialist revolution in Russia. It's quite an occasion for us, a people of some 280 million, to take a serious look back at both our achievements and mistakes — and I say mistakes because as the trailblazers we were the only socialist country, and while rebuilding our society on entirely new economic and social principles we had nobody to turn to for advice. As far as Soviet-American relations are concerned, we all knew that it took the United States 16 years to recognize us — the recognition was granted in 1933 — and several years later we found ourselves, we became partners in the glorious anti-Hitler coalition, together with Canada, France, Great Britain and some other countries. But unfortunately right after the war we again (found) ourselves, but this time on the different sides of the barricade [sentence as heard]. My question to you: Was it a zigzag of history or just because we had a common foe? Now, in the absence of a common foe, are we going to be permanently on the different sides of the barricade? Are there the ways to dismantle this barricade or at least to lower it down so that we could do some things together?

In other words, what is this common enemy now?

[Bogdanov] Yes, and I, I just mean to, I mean that, that nowadays — note when I say nowadays I mean a longer historical period — we have a common enemy, maybe a more dangerous and more ominous than we ever came across in the history of our relations. Who is this enemy; what is this danger? It's a nuclear war, the danger of nuclear war. And what, what really worries me, is not the theory, or it's not the theoretical, you know, reflections or ideas, we are moving unfortunately to that brink, to that brink and the, the upper, you know, super task, if you like, is just to stop that moving to the brink. And there is only one way out — common efforts, common efforts of USSR and USA, to stop first of all arms race, bringing us closer and closer to the nuclear brink, and to cooperate. Do you agree with me, Sergey?

[Plekhanov] Yes, I do agree with that, but I would like to touch upon another side of the problem. People sometimes say: Okay, there is a common danger — nuclear war and other global problems which are overpowering. But what about the differences? If the differences are so great, then maybe after we've done away with nuclear danger then we will be back to fighting each other ideologically, politically, and even maybe militarily.

[Plekhanov] I think that there is that age-old tradition of viewing differences as reasons for hostility and reasons for war. But we must view differences in a constructive manner. I think both sides should learn something from each other and concentrate their minds on what unites them, on what is common among them, and think more about the real needs and interests of common people, of citizens. They're not interested in a nuclear war; they're not interested in the nuclear arms race or any kind of arms race, they're interested in increasing contacts between each other, in improving their living standards and so on.

[Kuznetsov] I recall that in our final program last year we said something about making predictions, certain predictions for this year in Soviet-American relations. You know that our country has turned down an exchange of New Year's greetings between the leaders of our two countries; and as a Foreign Ministry spokesman said at the end of the year, such an exchange would create illusions about the current state of Soviet-American relations, which he described as being rather poor and unsatisfactory.

So where do we go from here, as I'm about to ask you about your predictions for this year?

[Bogdanov] You know, Pavel, to be frank with you, when I came to know about that news I was a little bit reluctant, you know, whether we were right or not, turning down this American offer, you know. But now I come to the conclusion that maybe we were right, because now what's going on in USA. These people sitting in the chairs of powers in Washington, they're trying to create an impression among their citizens, among their allies, that there's another fine stage in the Soviet-American relations, that nothing's happened, that after Reykjavik things are moving smoothly. And there is not a bit of truth in that; and maybe that was the real, you know, the real and very efficient step to signal to everybody that there is something wrong in the Soviet-American relations. And we have all the reasons to, you know, blame the American side for that, you know, another downgrading the level, you know, of the Soviet-American relations after Reykjavik. So now I believe, you know, it was a very, very right step, though as I told you I had my own doubts about it. Now, I'm sorry, now we -- about predictions, you know -- I hate to predict because I am.... [incomplete sentence as heard]

[Kuznetsov] Yes, my question, my next question was supposed to be: Can we see a more visible role for the United States Congress -- the new Congress, the 100th, actually, Congress -- in running foreign policy...

[Bogdanov, interrupting] You know, Sergey has been in that business for a number of years than I am, and I would like him to comment on the Congress role; he knows that much better than I do. But, you know, I believe that is American domestic business, Congress. Congress, American. [as heard] But, you know, I hate to predict, because I'm almost afraid to be fired if you have made wrong prediction. But we should not forget, you know, we should not forget that the common danger is there, and unfortunately it is growing; it is not diminishing, it's growing.

[Kuznetsov] So, Sergey, a few words about what we can expect or perhaps not expect from the new Congress.

[Plekhanov] Well, I would agree with Dr Bogdanov that this is a domestic affair, and commenting on relations between the Presidency and the U.S. Congress may not be an appropriate thing to do; but I think you've asked a very good question, because what the problem boils down to as far as we're concerned is: Is there anybody on the other side who is prepared to listen to what we're offering? Is there anybody on the other side who is prepared to think in a new way, as we are urging them to do, because, you know...

[Kuznetsov, interrupting] (?Do you mean) violation of SALT II treaty, refusal to join the (?moratorium)?

[Plekhanov] Not only that. You know, on our side there has been a very dynamic evolution of our approach to the whole fabric of foreign policy, and a key element of that has been very persistent attempt, very persistent attempts, efforts to find areas of agreement with the United States. To find mutually acceptable compromises. We've made concessions, we've made very far-reaching proposals. We've been very frustrating [as heard]; we were not provoked. We've done all and even more than we could do. Nobody expected, most people didn't expect from us to do things that we did. And yet there is virtually no practical response on the other side. There has been some maneuvering, there's been some rhetoric, but in practical terms the American -- the further we, the closer we move to the American position, the further away.

[Kuznetsov] I've brought some letters from our listeners with me to the studio, and I would like to quote from one of them sent in from Mr Vince Waterfield, who makes his home in Halifax, Canada, and I quote: If the panel members on "Top Priority" are from USA and Canada Studies Institute, then why do they only discuss the USA? There are probably many Canadian listeners who are wondering why we are never mentioned. Perhaps you should change the name from North American Service to the Service for the United States. What would you say to that?

[Bogdanov] Well, I would. I agree with our listener.

[Plekhanov] Yes, that's, that's a well deserved barb, I would say.

[Bogdanov] Yes, and I feel a little bit even ashamed that he pointed out to us very rightly that we, we miss his, his very lovely, really great country from our [incomplete sentence as heard] But I don't know how to solve this problem; do you, Pavel? You are the bosses here, not we; we are invited here.

[Kuznetsov] I'm still -- so far I'm the boss -- I'm running this North American service, and I think that much of the blame rests on me; but, well, I'd like to assure listeners in Canada that their country was not totally absent from our programs. We have many examples when Canada featured in them rather prominently; but what about Canada and its role in international relations, Sergey? Perhaps you can give us a couple of examples of what Canada did in such areas as SDI, or some other related problems.

[Bogdanov] You have visited this country?

[Plekhanov] Yes, I visited Canada I think three times, and I'm very much impressed with that country. I think it's a beautiful country with very friendly and hard-working people, and I always enjoy visiting Canada. As far as Canada's role in foreign relations is concerned, I think that there has been, there's been quite an active debate inside Canada, in Canadian public opinion among the political circles in Canada concerning its relations with the United States. That's a touchy question. Canada is, of course, an ally of the United States. On the other hand, when the United States asks them to do things which clearly create serious problems for the Canadians, and asks them to take steps the wisdom of which is at least questionable, then there are....[incomplete sentence as heard]

[Kuznetsov] What do you mean? Do you mean this refusal, Canadian refusal to take part in SDI, when Mr. Mulroney said that Canada won't be calling the shots and therefore there is no role for Canada in this program? And then at the same time, you remember they allowed the United States to test long-range cruise missiles.

[Plekhanov] That's right. They tried, they tried to, to be on both sides of the fence, because there's clearly a great concern among the Canadians, among the masses of Canadians, that Canada may be supporting policies which are very, very detrimental to Canadian security, like testing cruise missiles. There's been a lot of discussions about that. [passage omitted]

/9738

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

PRAVDA COUNTERS WARNKE PROPOSAL ON ARMS REDUCTION

PM090955 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Jan 87 First Edition p 5

[PRAVDA Political Observer Yuriy Zhukov article under the rubric "Our Debates": "Questions to Paul Warnke"]

[Text] I read with interest the replies from a number of Western figures and journalists to a PRAVDA questionnaire that were published on New Year's Eve. The respondents included such an expert on disarmament problems as Paul Warnke, former leader of the U.S. delegation at the Soviet-American SALT II talks. I have known him a long time -- I made his acquaintance even before the start of those talks -- and I can attest that there is no doubt about his sincere desire to help end the arms race.

In a quest for a way out of the impasse that arose after Reykjavik because of the U.S. stance, Paul Warnke puts forward certain ideas (see PRAVDA for 31 December 1986) that seem to me to require clarification and further discussion.

First, Warnke proposes that the USSR and the United States implement this year the preliminary agreement reached in Reykjavik on reducing U.S. and USSR strategic nuclear arms by 50 percent over the first 5 years. In his opinion, this "would mean a reduction of approximately 10 percent per year in both sides' strategic offensive arms in all categories," although my understanding is that matters have not yet reached the point of such details. Nevertheless, proceeding from this assumption, Warnke believes that the USSR and the United States "could" start annual 10-percent reductions in their strategic offensive arms, leaving aside the question of space weapons.

Of course, Warnke realizes what a risk this would entail for the USSR -- after all, Washington is openly speaking of its intention to place its weapons in space as swiftly as possible. So he adds that the Soviet Union could issue a statement indicating that it would implement these 10-percent reductions until such time as it became dangerous to carry them out because of continuing research within the framework of the U.S. "Strategic Defense Initiative" program. In other words, if the United States began swiftly to "forge ahead with intensive tests of the SDI, the USSR would be forced to cancel the 10-percent reductions in its systems."

But the following point cannot help arising here: How can a state concerned for its own security destroy its own strategic arms, which constitute the foundation of that security, without obtaining guarantees that the opposite side will abandon the creation [sozdaniye] of new, still more dangerous arms systems? Another thing: How is the danger point in SDI work at which the 10-percent annual reduction must be stopped to be determined? How would the Soviet Union look in the eyes of the world public if it first agreed on reductions, but then stopped them?

I sought the opinion of our authoritative military circles on this score and received a clear answer: The USSR is prepared to begin the process of eliminating nuclear weapons, but only on condition that, as was clearly said in Reykjavik, a clear and unconditional agreement is reached that both sides state that they will not withdraw from the ABM Treaty for at least the next decade. This would mean that the United States could continue its researches in the SDI sphere within the laboratory framework but tests of its elements in space would be categorically excluded.

So I have a question for Paul Warnke: Does he support that realistic formulation?
[paragraph continues]

After all, strategic arms reduction is possible only if both sides remain true to the ABM Treaty, Article Four of which [as published], as he rightly notes, "prohibits the testing and development [razrabotka] of space-based systems and their components" (not only space-based systems, incidentally, but also ground-based ABM systems except for one Soviet system and one U.S. system).

It would be quite another matter if an agreement on not withdrawing from the ABM Treaty for the next decade were reached and tests of SDI elements in space were ruled out. Then it would clearly not be all that difficult to agree the purely technical question of the percentage by which the sides would reduce their strategic arms each year.

I think that the question of the unbreakable connection between the solution of the problem of eliminating nuclear arms and the abandonment of the SDI, a question that is vitally important to the success of the Geneva talks, and also the equally important question of banning tests of space weapon as envisaged by Article Four [as published] of the ABM Treaty merit further discussion. So I would be grateful if Paul Warnke would answer the questions I have asked.

/9738

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW: 'TOP PRIORITY' PROGRAM VIEWS SDI, ARMS TREATIES

LD110436 Moscow in English to North America 0000 GMT 10 Jan 87

["Top Priority" program, presented by Pavel Kuznetsov; with Professors Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov of the United States of America and Canada Institute of Moscow]

[Text] [Kuznetsov] Hello, this is Top Priority. I am Pavel Kuznetsov, your host. In the studio with me are our usual panel: Professors Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov of the Moscow-based Institute for USA and Canada Studies. After last year, the Reagan administration violated the SALT II treaty; the only remaining, and I would say major, accord still in force is the Soviet-American ABM Treaty of 1972. However, now we've seen many attempts to erode it through either what has become known as a broad interpretation or a loose interpretation of the treaty, two pledges to abandon the ABM Treaty in 7 and 1/2 years. In the meantime, Article 15 of the ABM Treaty says, and I quote: Each party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from this treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. Each shall give notice of its decision to the other party 6 months prior to withdrawal from the treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary event the notifying party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. So my question to either of you is: What are those extraordinary events perceived in Washington that have pushed the Reagan administration to this decision -- at least we heard last year a number of times the decision to withdraw from the treaty in 7 and 1/2 years?

[Bogdanov] Yes, Pavel, it's a very good question because it's a basic question: First of all, what do national interests mean nowadays, number one. Number two: What can jeopardize the national interests nowadays, and do we -- I mean we and the Americans -- we have the same notion of national interests and the event jeopardizing the national interests? So the supreme national interests nowadays is just to survive, just to survive in case that there is a nuclear holocaust, well, whatever you call it, and how to survive, just to avoid the nuclear conflict, that's the supreme national interest. So if you'd agree with my logic, then what is the highest danger, what is really jeopardizing the national interests? Americans, to my mind, and Americans have circumstances which may push both countries to the nuclear...

[Kuznetsov, interrupting] You mean a major crisis?

[Bogdanov] Yes, a major crisis which may push the parties to the nuclear conflict, that's number one. Number two...

[Kuznetsov, interrupting] But, excuses me, but such a major crisis, actually its appearance depends on what the United States or the Soviet Union does; I mean it depends on them whatever there is such a crisis or not.

[Bogdanov] Ah yes, of course I agree with you -- any crisis, any crisis. It cannot emerge just like that, you know. You have, if you like to have a proper environment for the emergency [as heard] of the major crisis -- and by the environment I mean such actions from the America or Soviet side which just leads us to, to, to that, you know. What I mean by that, that's a, a party to that treaty, and we are talking about ABM 72, may find out due to extensive research work some feasible, you know, means for a new [word indistinct] or something, you know -- which in just a moment, I mean by moment, you know, not in seconds or minutes...

[Kuznetsov, interrupting] Five to 10 years?

[Bogdanov] Five to 10 years may find out such means, you know, that the next morning you will wake up and you will find out that your counterpart a hundred times more stronger than you are.

[Kuznetsov] Are you alluding to this SDI concept, the program under way in the United States? Are you talking about a technological breakthrough?

[Bogdanov] Yes, I am alluding to SDI program, which is, you know, a very funny combination of both, of crisis, political crisis, environment, and technological breakthrough. And if you'll allow me to quote the President, who said that he would prefer to rely more upon American military technology than on treaties with the Soviet Union, then you have an answer what the USA SDI is.

[Kuznetsov] We've had no crises on the horizon, or so I think. We've already had two summits: In Geneva in 1985 and in Reykjavik 1986. We also had and still have the Soviet moratorium, and still the United States is talking about leaving the ABM Treaty. And as we've found out from Radomir Bogdanov, the SDI program emerges as a motivation, so to say, for the United States Administration to abandon the ABM Treaty. In other words, would you equate the SDI with something extraordinary mentioned in that treaty that stipulates, that allows one country to abandon it? Is SDI (?all the same part way of) an extraordinary event, or what?

[Plekhanov] Well, you know I wouldn't really concentrate too much on that article in trying to find out why the United States is so anxious to abrogate the ABM Treaty. I think that the main reason for this change of U.S. policy away from constraint of the ABM Treaty is the fact that the current administration, and the political coalition which supports it, have a different approach to the matter of nuclear weapons, to the matter of usability of military force, than the administrations which existed in Washington in the 1970s. The basis of the ABM Treaty in 1972, which was signed in 1972, was the recognition by both the Soviet Union and the United States that the continuation of the nuclear arms race had become meaningless, because there is no such thing as a meaningful nuclear superiority, that nuclear war cannot really be won; and as a result one should recognize limitations on offensive nuclear weapons. And in combination with that one should strictly limit and reduce to the minimum the antiballistic missiles, the antiballistic missile systems. You see, the emergence of those ABM weapons was linked to the idea that you can really fight and win a nuclear war. Once you recognize that you can't do that you will be prepared to constrain both the offensive and defensive weapons. Now, when this administration, the Reagan administration, came to power in 1980 it brought with it a different, a different view

of what you can do with nuclear weapons. These people do believe in military superiority. These people do believe in having a capability to fight and win a nuclear war because they think that if you have such a capability, then that strengthens your hand in all international affairs.

[Kuznetsov] Yes, but hold it. But President Reagan has said a number of times that nuclear war is unwinnable and should not be fought.

[Plekhanov] Well, you know, if we analyze what American politicians do and say on the basis of written documents I think that's, that's, you can cite hundreds of instances where people say one thing and do another. There is such a thing as a credibility gap.

[Kuznetsov] The reason why I quoted Article 15 of the ABM Treaty is this: Remember how the United States violated the SALT II treaty and why? It stood in the way of the long-term program of rearming America, so they swept it away. SDI is still in the stage of research; it is not a weapon system yet, but they hope that in about 7 and 1/2 years to 10 years SDI will become a weapons system. As some supporters of the project say, for 30 billion dollars they can have in 7 and 1/2 years three layers of SDI weapons.

[Plekhanov] Well, that's that's baloney. I mean, no serious person really believes in that. I mean these people want a lot of money to go along with their program and they see the ABM Treaty as an obstacle to both the increase in funds and to the political underpinnings of such a system. That's why they push all those scenarios, there's a lot of (?tricking) in it.

[Kuznetsov] You say that SDI cannot be done?

[Plekhanov] No. In the, in the variant put forward by President Reagan in 1983 as a three-layered defense system which would protect the United States from missile attack, I think there is a solid consensus among serious researchers that it cannot be done. The problem is that other things can be done. You see the SDI could be sold to the American people only as such a comprehensive unpenetrable nuclear shield, because then you have a support — well, this is just a defensive thing. But actually, under the umbrella of this quote defensive unquote idea, other things are being developed, like systems to fight wars in space, ABM systems to protect the missile-launching pads in the United States, or even systems which would be, would be good for operational fighting.

[Kuznetsov] I was about to ask you a question. Now, SDI in the current situation is a far cry from what it was described, say, 3 years ago, 4 years ago, when President Reagan first came up publicly with his announcement concerning Star Wars. First, then, what I mean is this. Very few people believe that SDI can be 100 percent leak proof.

[Plekhanov] Or even 90 percent.

[Kuznetsov] Even 90, perhaps, percent leak proof. Nobody is already talking about SDI being a protective cover for the population of the United States. Experts and specialists in the military are saying that SDI weapons are good for defending selected military targets and still they are pushing ahead with it.

[Bogdanov] Let me, let me make a few remarks about all that. I would not agree with my friend Sergey when he says that the serious researchers and serious people in USA do not believe in, in SDI. Maybe they don't. How is that concern us? We, as a serious people, in that case as a serious people, of course we listen [to] what they say, but first of all you should take into account what the people in power say because they have, number one, real power; number two, money; and they have brains which they are operating to produce those weapons. So I would not very much, you know, emphasize that point; we as a serious people, we should just take into account the serious part of that story and to get ready for an answer to that, and we have an answer to that, you know.

[Kuznetsov] Before we continue with discussing SDI, I would like to play to you two segments, two recordings made by SDI supporters. They are Congressman Jim Courter, Republican, New Jersey; and (Daniel Graham), a lieutenant general, retired SDI is his baby and both of them, and both of them appeared some time ago on a major American radio talk show, [title indistinct], so let's listen to what they say about SDI:

[Begin recording] [First voice, presumably that of Courter] The words star wars does trivialize the effort. It's a sincere effort to save human beings, it's a sincere effort to move from a doctrine of retaliation and revenge to one that's designed to save human life.

[Second voice, presumably Graham] We can put up defenses that cannot harm the hair on a Russian's head, or anybody else's. All they can do is stop weapons when they once have been fired and they're on their way to slaughter millions of people. So how anybody can call that an offensive weapon. [end recording]

[Bogdanov] Here exactly, you have exactly that what I have already mentioned. What they're talking about means what Sergey mentioned -- that they are (?staking) in terms of creating a cover, you know, comprehensive cover which will protect America as a whole, and American people from nuclear danger. That's the case when I can state with the fullest (?sensitivity), it's impossible. [laughter] Even the President -- (?he) has shifted now very much away from that concept -- knows (?that).

[Kuznetsov] What do you mean by shifted away from [word indistinct]?

[Bogdanov] From the comprehensive [words indistinct] shield of America. Then you hear another gentleman, Mr (Graham), who says that Russians will be spared. It's another -- you know, when I hear this kind of talk I'm always thinking: What for they are taking us? For fools, for naive?

Maybe that's for American consumption, not for our consumption, but let me explain to our American listeners that they should not trust all that because the other side has quite a different, you know, understanding and notion of SDI. We look at that as a first strike capability which is aimed (?at) disarming us, depriving, denying us retaliation capability.

[Kuznetsov] The Pentagon's budget proposal for 1988 provides for a massive hike for heavy spending on both nuclear arms and missile defenses. Now how does it tally with this formula advanced by the White House that while building up space defenses we're going to get rid of the nukes? This is something that was discussed in Reykjavik.

[Plekhanov] Right, it was discussed in Reykjavik; but after Reykjavik, in the United States, I think there has been a ground swell of support for, for nuclear weapons. I mean a lot of people in Washington are talking in the sense that, well, no we can't do away with nuclear weapons, and in fact the reason why the United States refuses to join our moratorium on nuclear testing is exactly that they want to continue to improve, to upgrade, to increase their nuclear offensive arsenal and we have to view that in conjunction with their effort on, on Star Wars. What they're doing, as we see it from Moscow, what they're doing is increasing their offensive potential; building new, more accurate and more deadly offensive nuclear weapons. And they are trying to back it up with a program of ABM, of antiballistic missile defense, which would be effective against a retaliatory strike in case they choose to strike first. And this is actually -- we are on record refusing to ever use nuclear weapons first. We made our pledge and that's a serious pledge, and it has entailed changes in our strategy. The United States and its allies in NATO are the only ones who incorporated the first use of nuclear weapons in their official doctrine. They haven't backed away from it. So we are confronted with that. A pledge to use nuclear weapons first, if and when they find it expedient, and a whole set of military technology designed to give the West a capability to prevail in a nuclear conflict. The madness of it all is that, actually, there is no way that anybody can prevail in nuclear conflict. So it all boils down to really a triumph of madness or reason.

[Kuznetsov] As time is running out on us, I would like to ask perhaps my final question. In defending his budget proposals for 1988, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger said that it would be premature to cut spending on nuclear weapons until there is an agreement with the Soviet Union. What can you say about that?

[Plekhanov] The whole history of the arms race and arms control gives enough evidence to the opposite proposition, namely that if you want to continue the arms race you will build more nuclear weapons. If you want to stop it, you will sign treaties. So you can't really put a cart before a horse. What the United States is doing now is running away from an agreement, from an agreement which was so close at Reykjavik, and the administration is just running scared from that.

[Bogdanov] There is no (?guarantee) and there is no accord.

[Kuznetsov] Yes. What is kind of sinister, occurs to me, is that SDI is one of the fastest growing segments of the military budget.

[Plekhanov] Yes, in fact it is the fastest, according to the budget proposal that has been put forward by the Reagan administration.

[Kuznetsov] This brings us to the end of today's edition of Top Priority. I am Pavel Kuznetsov, your host, signing off. Goodbye till next week at the same time and on the same wavelength.

/9738

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW TV: U.S. 'STUNNED' BY SOVIET ARMS INITIATIVE

LD112254 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1500 GMT 11 Jan 87

[From the "International Panorama" program, presented by Vsevolod Ovchinnikov]

[Excerpts] Our country has entered the year during which the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution will be marked, and that means the 70th anniversary of Lenin's decree on peace. It would be worth reminding Western politicians of this. They complain of the unpredictability of Moscow's surprises. A year ago Washington was literally stunned by our 15 January statement. Indeed, all Kremlinologists, all the special services were as one in asserting that nothing could be expected from the Soviet side by way of major initiatives before the end of February; that is, before the party congress. But then, despite all the forecasts, the USSR put forward the idea of completely eliminating nuclear weapons before the end of the current decade.

Reykjavik again repeated something similar. The U.S. side was again stunned and thrown into disarray by the boldness of the Soviet proposals which enable mankind, as it were, to look across the horizon and see the contours of a nuclear-free world. But to be sure the Soviet package which was revealed in the Icelandic capital could hardly be considered a surprise. Its main points were predefined in the 15 January statement, and the 27th CPSU Congress declared the implementation of this program to be the central trend of USSR foreign policy for the years ahead. So then, if our opponents listened more attentively to the voice of Moscow they would need to be less astounded by what they pretend is a surprise.

Examples of this were provided recently by the visits by Comrade Ryzhkov to Finland and by Comrades Shevardnadze and Dobrynin to Afghanistan. Given the variety of local individual problems, political life everywhere, in the final analysis, revolves around these general cardinal questions: Will Moscow and Washington be able to move further from the lines established by Reykjavik? What will become of the Soviet moratorium? Will the Star Wars program remain a stumbling block along the path toward a nuclear free world? There is no getting away from such questions, especially in countries which are on the threshold of elections, for example the FRG.

/9738

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

CPSU'S ZAGLADIN INTERVIEWED ON ARMS INITIATIVES

LD082345 Budapest Television Service in Hungarian 2005 GMT 8 Jan 87

[From the "Panorama" program; interview with Vadim Zagladin, "deputy chief" of the CPSU Central Committee's International Department, by unidentified correspondent in Moscow; date of interview not given -- recorded; Zagladin's remarks in Russian with superimposed Hungarian translation; no video available]

[Text] [Announcer] The Soviet leadership often deals with a new outlook which asserts itself in foreign policy, and in the period after Reykjavik as well it has invariably pervaded the Moscow initiatives. Vadim Zagladin, deputy chief [as heard] of the CPSU International Department, spoke to "Panorama."

[Correspondent] How far can the Soviet Union go in the sphere of unilateral measures, demonstrating its own readiness for compromise?

[Zagladin] Of course, there is a limit to the unilateral measures, but the limit of the possibilities extends so far as our own security and that of our allies are not endangered. However, there is no limit to the readiness to take the initiative, and in my opinion there cannot be. It is precisely the contrary: the more complex the situation is, a policy that takes all the more initiative is necessary. A new approach, new solutions, new paths leading to the goal must be found, because the goal must not be relinquished. Indeed, it would be a crime to do so.

After Reykjavik we have had the feeling that in Washington they are simply afraid of an improvement in the situation; they are afraid of an improvement in our bilateral relations and of an improvement in the international atmosphere in general, or that maybe the arms race may cease. There is demagogic talk of striving for an improvement in relations and for a change in the international atmosphere, but they back down immediately as soon as there is a possibility of realistic progress. [passage indistinct] I would say, rather, that it would be more suitable for Washington if we were not to adopt any kind of measure, or if in response to its moves we were to strike the table with our fists. Their striving is to provoke us, but we must not raise these two [as heard], because it would be dangerous.

Another response must be found. It would be a mistake to leave the provocations without responding to them. However, the response must serve constructive progress. That is now most important, also because it is desired by great forces not only in our countries but also in the nonaligned countries -- let me refer to the Delhi declaration -- and elsewhere, for example, in the NATO countries, indeed, in the United States itself, too.

[Correspondent] A statement was recently made in Moscow to the effect that the bridge with the United States must be built from both sides. Can this bridge be built with an administration that is as extremely conservative as the Reagan administration?

[Zagladin] I would be curious about your opinion, too, because the point is whether they are building the bridge and because they are not building it. However, that is a different issue.

First, Comrade Gorbachev has met twice with the President. That has proved that it is possible to talk with him, and that relations can be established with him.

However, it is another issue that in some cases even if the President has the purest intentions, he also has an environment, those who work with him and who profess entirely different views. That can be assumed. It is a fact that after Reykjavik precisely this environment started to backtrack, furthermore, very quickly.

Second, what does it mean not to talk with this administration? Let us speculate that we decide to wait for the next president. There will be elections in 2 years' time. Experience shows that a new president, especially if he is a new person, needs at least 1 year in order to become accustomed to his new post, to master it, so at the least it would be 2.5-3 years. However, at the present rate of technical-scientific progress 2.5-3 years is a very long time. In that time it is possible to develop such weapons that there is no point in dialogue. Therefore we must continue to work with the administration that is in power. This is determined by the U.S. people, the U.S. voters. We have no other choice, there is no other possibility. So we will continue to work with this administration, although this is no easy task.

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CSO: 5200/1237

SALT/START ISSUES

PRAVDA: MAKSIMOV REFUTES PERLE CLAIM OF NEW 'HEAVY' ICBM

PM121747 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Jan 87 First Edition p 5

[Article by Army General Yu.P. Maksimov: "Mr Perle Is Fantasizing--With Malice"]

[Text] Addressing a briefing at the USIA Center the other day, R. Perle, U.S. assistant defense secretary, touched on a "report" obviously leaked to the American press by the Pentagon itself concerning the testing of a new "heavy" Soviet ICBM. [paragraph continues]

Perle said in this connection: "The missile you are talking about, like the SS-24s and SS-25s, represents the fifth generation of missiles. The treaty renounced by the President has therefore proved to be totally ineffectual with regard to restraining the Soviet Union in its development of a fifth generation of ICBMs. Despite all the fuss in the USSR over the elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000, it is continuing its extremely active program to further develop [razrabotka] and deploy [razvertyvaniye] its own nuclear ballistic missiles."

PRAVDA requested Army General Yu. P. Maksimov, commander in chief of Strategic Missile Forces, to comment on the American allegations. This is what he said:

Mr Perle's statement is absolutely groundless and is intended for laymen unfamiliar with the basic provision of the SALT II treaty. His fantasy about a new Soviet "heavy" missile is nothing but more lies.

We are developing [razrabatyvayem] no new "heavy" missile. It is clear that Mr Perle would like to make out that some work we are doing on our missiles on stand-by alert, which are known as SS-18s in the West, is actually the creation [sozdaniye] of a new "heavy" missile. This is not true, however, as the work being done has a quite different purpose -- to maintain the necessary degree of readiness in these missiles -- and is being carried out while taking existing accords strictly into account.

Naturally any arms, including strategic arms, eventually become obsolete and their use can no longer be guaranteed. They have to be replaced. This applies equally to Soviet and American arms. Replacing arms means they have to be tested -- and this is what is being done.

It is important to note in this respect -- a point Mr Perle preferred not to emphasize in his speech -- that the SALT II treaty stipulates a definite procedure for this kind of replacement, which sets clear-cut limits for possible modernization. The USSR has never exceeded these limits when replacing its strategic arms. And, in our current replacement process, we continue to adhere to the provisions of this important document, as stated by the Soviet Government on 5 December 1986.

The Soviet Union has created [sozdana] one light ICBM permitted by the SALT II treaty, which is known as the SS-24 in the West. This is a counterstep in response to the United States' creation [sozdaniye] and deployment [razvertyvaniye] of a new MX first-strike missile. We have modernized — also in keeping with the provisions of the SALT II treaty — a missile which went into commission about 15 years ago. It has been replaced by the missile known as the SS-25 in the West. All these measures are therefore within the bounds of the SALT II treaty.

What, however, is the real aim of statements like this by representatives of the U.S. Administration? It is quite obvious.

First and foremost — to justify the unseemly action of the United States — an action in fact condemned throughout the world — in violating agreements on strategic arms limitation and presenting the SALT II treaty as allegedly ineffectual in restraining the buildup of Soviet strategic arms. In actual fact, the time-honored method of diverting attention from the United States' own actions to gain strategic superiority is once again being used.

The United States has stepped up work to increase its nuclear potential: the deployment [razvertyvaniye] of new MX ICBMs, Trident-2 SLBMs, and B-1B heavy bombers, the creation [sozdaniye] of a new type of mobile "Midgetmen" ICBM, the massive deployment [razvertyvaniye] of long-range cruise missiles, and the encirclement of USSR territory with forward-based nuclear weapons. In order to clear the way for these arms and justify the increase in its budget allocations for them, Washington has had to renounce the SALT II treaty. The U.S. Administration would very much like to blame the USSR for the undermining of the SALT accords and the buildup of strategic arms.

But these attempts are in vain! Those across the ocean cannot fail to realize that this kind of provocative -- in the literal sense of the word -- action by the Washington administration, which opens the floodgates for an unlimited strategic nuclear arms race, is causing justified alarm among all honest people of the world. And so Washington is stooping to this kind of juggling with the facts in order to distract the world public from condemnation of the present U.S. course aimed at revising the Reykjavik results and eroding the accords achieved there.

The Soviet Union believes, however, that there is still sufficient political wisdom both in the United States and outside it, as well as simply a sense of self-preservation, not to allow anyone to wreck the entire structure of strategic arms limitation accords which has existed for 15 years now. The greatness of a state, particularly a big one, now lies not in demonstrating its ability to endlessly augment and support the military machine or to chase after the specter of military superiority but in finding the possibility of living together with others.

At a meeting in the Kremlin with American Senator Gary Hart, M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, stressed that talks with any administration on the problems of ending the arms race have a future only in the context of moving on from Reykjavik. Rejecting Reykjavik is tantamount to rejecting the policy of disarmament.

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CSO: 5200/1233

SALT/START ISSUES

USSR: MISSILE FORCES POLITICAL CHIEF ON CURRENT CONCERNS

PM201613 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Nov 86 First Edition p 2

[Article by Colonel General V. Rodin, member of the Military Council and chief of the Strategic Missile Forces Political Directorate: "The Fatherland's Reliable Shield"]

[Excerpt] In recognition of artillerymen's services in combat the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decreed in 1944 that an annual holiday—Artillery Day—should be marked on 19 November, the day of the historic artillery barrage at Stalingrad in 1942 which heralded the beginning of our counteroffensive on the banks of the Volga.

Since 1964, 19 November has been celebrated as Missile Troop and Artillery Day. The holiday's change of name reflected the radical qualitative changes which had taken place in the Army and Navy in the postwar years and the creation of a new branch of the Soviet Armed Forces—the Strategic Missile Troops—as a countermeasure to the threat by the aggressive forces of imperialism to unleash a nuclear missile war against our country.

The creation of a nuclear missile shield was an outstanding achievement by the Soviet people. It demonstrated socialism's inexhaustible potential. Our enemies had banked on the USSR being unable, in the very difficult postwar years, when the economy in many regions had to be revived and the after-effects of the war against fascism eliminated, to find a swift and fitting response to the transatlantic atomic blackmail. However, Soviet people, under the leadership of the Communist Party, successfully resolved that task and cooled down those reckless fomentors of a new world war.

This year the traditional missile- and artillerymen's holiday takes on special features and has a special point. It is being marked at a time of dramatic change in Soviet society's life—change initiated and directed by the party on the basis of the 27th CPSU Congress' program directives. The party's course of speeding up the country's socioeconomic development and its call for a radical restructuring of all our work have roused Soviet people.

The Communist Party and the Soviet state are consistently and persistently pursuing their foreign policy course, distinguished by its scale, sober

realism, bold political thinking, and readiness to seek mutually acceptable decisions in the interests of ensuring peace and improving the international situation. The Soviet Union's principled stand and proposals at the Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik are a convincing expression of this.

Now, then, does the United States respond to this? It does so with the notorious SDI program. But that is not all. The other day the press published a report that four MX first-strike ICBM's had been installed on launchpads at the USAF's Warren base and made combat-ready. It is reported that a further 6 such missiles will be deployed in December and that the total will reach 50 by the end of next year.

But those who suppose it possible to dictate their will to the Soviet Union are grievously in error. And it is appropriate to remind today's aspirants to world domination of the lessons of history, which indicate that attempts to speak to us from a position of strength are doomed to failure. "The Soviet Union," M. S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, observed, "has the means to meet any challenge if need be. Soviet people know it, the whole world should know it."

In single combat formation with the Soviet Armed Forces, the Strategic Missile Forces and artillery servicemen mount vigilant and reliable guard over their people's peaceful labor. Today the units and subunits of the Strategic Missile Forces are equipped with the most sophisticated weapons and combat equipment, whose potential to destroy targets is virtually limitless in range and power. Together with the strategic forces of the Navy and Air Force, they form the basis of the USSR Armed Forces' combat might and are a powerful factor in curbing the aggressive aspirations of reaction and a reliable means for preserving peace on our planet.

Missilemen and artillerymen are hailing their holiday with new successes in improving combat training. The units and subunits in which A. Vasilyev, V. Gornostayev, I. Molozhayev, Yu. Novoseltsev, A. Perminov and other officers serve have achieved high indicators.

But it is not in the nature of missilemen and artillerymen to rest on their laurels. They realize that the process of enhancing combat readiness is an ongoing one. Demands are increasing today, particularly as the danger of imperialist wars and military conflicts being launched is entirely realistic.

Being on standby alert is basic to a missileman's service. It is a task of state importance. The whole system of his training and education and the whole of party political work are geared to ensuring that it is performed to a high standard. As always, the leading questions relate to inculcating in crew members high moral and combat qualities, martial skills, and a thorough appreciation of the responsibility vested in missilemen for the fatherland's security and of the need to show the highest vigilance and combat readiness in conditions of a growing military threat from imperialism.

We have evolved a system of work here which has stood the test of time. Life does not stand still, however, and we are therefore constantly seeking out

more effective forms and methods of influencing people. Constant liaison between commanders and political workers and those at combat posts is characteristic here. The individual approach makes it possible to develop in a serviceman in the most expedient way possible the very highest degree of inner discipline and readiness to act swiftly, competently, and skillfully in conditions of maximum physical, moral, and psychological pressure.

As is well known, firm military discipline is a very important element of combat readiness. The whole system of political, military, and moral education and legal propaganda, the daily activity of commanders, party, and komsomol organizations in introducing the requirements of the law and military regulations into the personnel's duty, life and daily round, and the efforts of the army community are directed toward strengthening it. We attach particular importance to the role of officers, to ensuring that they set an example and step up their organizational and educational work.

We cannot claim today that all the tasks facing us are being resolved as we would wish. We are particularly disturbed by the fact that a number of party organizations are proving slow to restructure their work and its effectiveness in improving the qualities of combat and political training and strengthening order and discipline is slight. The party report and election meetings now taking place in units and subunits confirm that a lot of hard work lies ahead of us.

What is at issue here is the restructuring of military cadres' psychology and thinking in the spirit of the new approaches formulated at the congress and the jettisoning of outmoded stereotypes. We are seeking to ensure that every serviceman, from private to general, really grasps the essence of the innovatory proposals put forward by the party and under no circumstances allows any disparity to occur between word and action. We are seeking to work on people's awareness and make them active and receptive to new ideas, and thereby raise the level of their intellectual activity even more.

An atmosphere of rigorous exactingness and more stringent criteria in assessing what has been achieved in being established with increasing determination in units and subunits.

We have also been governed by these criteria in drawing up the annual results. Some people were surprised and some aggrieved by this: Certain military collectives' results were below the level they had pledged. But, on the other hand, this is promoting a professional attitude: People are becoming ever more deeply aware that strict exactingness and an uncompromising approach to shortcomings are the norm and law of our life. And if people are held strictly accountable, that means that others have confidence in them.

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SALT/START ISSUES

FRG EDITORIAL REACTION TO U.S. VIOLATION OF SALT II LIMITS

Little Change Seen

Bonn DIE WELT in German 3 Dec 86 p 2

[Article by Fritz Wirth: "Artificial SALT-Commotion"]

[Text] There are affairs in politics which owe their existence to the desire for contradiction. The present lamentation over SALT II, this problem child of the detente era, is one of them. For this agreement--a fiction as a treaty since it never received the blessing of ratification by the American Senate--has become a barometer of the East-West climate: Don't rattle it, the needle could slide to an absolute low.

In other words, what we have here is a non-treaty, whose non-existence ended officially in December 1985. This was the agreement reached by President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev in November 1974. The paradox: As long as the non-treaty officially led an empty life, it was intensively violated by the Soviets. In which there is, after all, a certain logic. They did not violate a valid law, they violated a gentlemen's agreement. Tough security policy, in the Soviet view, was never a matter of and for gentlemen.

Nevertheless, when the non-treaty had ended its empty life and during the past week was now for the first time violated--openly and with precise indication of the time--by the United States, the great public lamentation over the American spoil-sports ensued. And thus, to bring the paradox to its crowning conclusion, on the stage of world politics the Soviets stand as the SALT-gentlemen and the USA as the scoundrels.

SALT II was a well-intentioned but not a good treaty. It was well-intentioned because it sought to set limits to the nuclear arms race. It was not good because its terminology was imprecise. Thus, for example, it limited rocket launchers, but not the rockets. Moreover, the limitation of warheads set forth in this treaty is not verifiable. Finally, it permits the development of a new rocket type, without precisely establishing the criteria for determining when a rocket is new and when it is merely a development of an existing rocket.

During the past years, the Soviets have made calculated use of the gaps and imprecisions of this treaty. In addition to the new, permitted rocket, the SS-24, they built a second new rocket type, the SS-25, and called it simply the further

development of their old SS-13. In addition, in violation of the treaty, they encoded their telemetric signals during rocket tests, which made the verification of these tests impossible. All of this had been known for years. Nevertheless, hardly anyone among today's Reagan-critics breathed a word. They wanted to maintain the fiction.

Only the undemanding formula "better something than nothing" occurred to the former secretary of state, Alexander Haig, in 1982 in defense of this treaty. But precisely here lies the misunderstanding of the Reagan-critics. They insinuate that Reagan sacrificed this something in the way of a disarmament agreement to a new unrestricted rocket armament. It so beautifully confirms their "Rambo"-picture of this President. In actual fact, the only signal he sent out with his SALT-decision reads: This treaty is useless. We need a new and better one.

It is therefore time to conduct the SALT-debate more calmly and free of ideology-saturated and election-oriented polemics. For the foreseeable future, Reagan's decision will neither result in a dramatic increase of the American nuclear potential nor induce the Soviets to a new armament-orgy. During the past few decades they have always done what they regarded as necessary in terms of security policy--with and without SALT.

There remains the argument that Reagan's abrogation is a serious setback to the Geneva disarmament negotiations. The facts, however, speak against this. One recalls the fact that the decision is not of recent vintage, but was in principle already announced on 27 May of this year. Until that 27 May nothing decisive had happened in the Geneva disarmament negotiations. During the preceding 14 months, little more than hot air had been contributed to these negotiations. Notably, however, all relevant Soviet disarmament proposals came after the SALT-decision of 27 May. It did not discourage the Soviets, rather, in the words of Max Kampelman, the U.S. chief negotiator, it was "exceedingly helpful for the further course of our talks."

Whether coincidence or higher Kremlin-strategy: This past Tuesday, 4 days after the first official American contravention of SALT, American and Soviet disarmament negotiators met in Geneva for unscheduled disarmament talks. It may be assumed that Karpov lodged an official protest, as he did after 27 May as well, and then got down to business. Max Kampelman, an American Democrat, who can hardly be given the Rambo-label and who like hardly anyone else knows the motives and strategies of Soviet disarmament negotiators, declared recently: "The chief goal of our SALT-decision is to make it clear to the Soviets how serious we are about a useful and durable disarmament agreement. I believe they got the message."

Kampelman, furthermore, is the author of the maxim: "I have ceased to judge the Soviets on the basis of their words. Only their actions count for me." Those who at present are so intensively concerned about the wrath and the further goodwill of the Soviets, should comprehend their outraged words as what they are meant to be--as remote weapons without telemetric code, as propaganda.

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS REPORTS 16 JANUARY FIRE AT TEST MONITORING SITE

LD221523 Moscow TASS in English 1428 GMT 22 Jan 87

[Text] Moscow January 22 TASS -- On the night of January 16-17 severe cold caused a short circuit that started a fire at one of the three stations monitoring the non-conduct of nuclear explosions in Bayan-Aul (Kazakhstan), carried out within the framework of the joint Soviet-American experiment.

The fire destroyed the auxiliary premises in which the instruments recording data of equipment monitoring the non-conduct of nuclear explosions were kept, a briefing today was told by a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman. The servicing personnel also used these premises but there was no loss of life. The equipment installed in shafts is intact. To continue the experiment it is necessary to replace the recording instruments.

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CSO: 5200/1247

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

SOVIET DAILY LAUDS STEP TOWARD NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE IN SCANDANAVIA

Moscow SHELKAYA GAZETA in Russian 23 Sep 86 p 3

[Article by Ivan Beydin: "A Reasonable Approach"]

[Text] The movement toward creation of nuclear-free zones in different regions of the world occupies an important place in the struggle to eliminate the hazard of war and elimination of nuclear weapons. It has acquired an especially broad scope in northern Europe. It is in this part of the continent that a number of practical steps have been undertaken to create such a zone.

Specifically, it was decided in mid-August at a conference of the heads of the governments of Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway and Iceland, held in the Danish city of Slingsdal, to organize a working group at the government level of the mentioned countries to study all aspects related to creation of a nuclear-free zone. This question will be considered at the next meeting of the foreign ministers of the northern countries at the beginning of next year in Reykjavik, Iceland.

Yet another practical step was undertaken somewhat later toward creation of a nuclear-free zone in the European Arctic. We have in mind the formation of a parliamentary committee of Arctic countries. This committee was established at a meeting of the parliaments of five countries in Copenhagen. It included representatives of 17 political parties who are members of the parliaments. The social democrats were the initiator of creating the committee, but it included representatives of other parties as well—from communists to conservative leaders.

The chairman of the Social Democratic Party and the former Prime Minister of Denmark Anker Jorgensen, in estimating the significance of creating the committee, noted that this decision was adopted unanimously. He called on all parties who have not defined their positions to join the committee.

Creation of a committee for a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe was approved by the broad public. Specifically, delegates of a conference of the Social Democratic Party and trade unions of Sweden at Goteburg specifically supported it. At the beginning of November, parliamentarians of the five northern countries will again meet in Copenhagen to work out a specific plan of action.

The public of the northern countries rightfully feels that creation of a nuclear-free zone in their region would be an appreciable contribution in the struggle for nuclear disarmament on the European continent.

The new decision of the Soviet government to extend the moratorium on nuclear testing is serious support to those struggling for a nuclear-free European Arctic. Of course, there are many obstacles in the path of creating such a zone. Reactionary forces in these countries are opposed to the antinuclear movement. The ruling circles of the United States and their allies throughout NATO are also decisively opposed to this.

With regard to the socialist countries, they all decisively support the efforts of the northern countries and wish them success in their actions against the nuclear threat.

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

BRIEFS

TASS: SPANISH NFZ URGED--Madrid, 14 January (TASS)--Spain's Communist Party has urged parliament (Les Cortes Generales) to elaborate provisions on Spain's nuclear-free status and sign them into law, Enrique Curiel, deputy general secretary of Spain's Communist Party, who represents the united left coalition in parliament, told a news conference in Madrid. Spain's Communist Party demands that the U.S. military bases in Spain be dismantled, the respective Spanish-U.S. treaty be denounced and Spain be withdrawn from the NATO military committee, Curiel stressed. [Text]
[Moscow TASS in English 1800 GMT 14 Jan 87 LD] /12858

CSO: 5200/1247

RELATED ISSUES

USSR'S PETROVSKIY PARIS CONSULTATIONS ON DISARMAMENT

7 Jan News Conference

LD080853 Moscow TASS in English 0806 GMT 8 Jan 87

[Text] Paris January 8 TASS -- Vladimir Petrovskiy, deputy foreign minister of the USSR, now here for political consultations with the Foreign Ministry of France, held a press conference here on Wednesday.

In his introductory statement V. Petrovskiy stressed that his stay on French soil coincided with the eve of the first anniversary of Mikhail Gorbachev's statement of January 15, 1986 when the Soviet Union came out with large-scale peace initiatives opening prospects for delivering our planet from nuclear, chemical and other lethal threats before the end of this century.

The past year was marked by persistent struggle by the Soviet Union for the realization of these proposals and implementation of practical direct steps towards a nuclear-free world. Its unilateral moratorium on nuclear weapon tests was a concrete expression of the Soviet Union's determination to relieve this planet from nuclear fear. This moratorium was recently prolonged again, for the fifth time, and will remain in force in the current year unless the United States holds nuclear tests.

A maximum of goodwill and the desire to take account of the legitimate interests and positions of other countries were invested in the package of agreements which the Soviet Union put on the table at the Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik. That was a moment when mankind glimpsed, as it were, beyond the horizon and saw that prospects of a world free from the nuclear threat are not a utopia, but quite a feasible goal.

At the same time, the reaction of many politicians to the Reykjavik meeting showed how strong the stereotypes of old thinking still are in the minds of politicians and with what difficulty the new approach is asserting itself, an approach based on the conviction that it is not force but the triumph of reason that must become the basis of international intercourse. But the efforts of the Soviet Union and all realistically-minded forces of the world were not in vain.

The Stockholm accords, the Vienna convention on the safe development of nuclear-power engineering, the Delhi declaration, and the results of the 41st U.N. General Assembly session are all convincing evidence of the fact that the new notion on the frontiers of the necessary, realistic and possible in conditions of the nuclear-space age is forcing its way. [sentence as received]

Carrying out the decisions of the 27th Congress of the CPSU on the establishment of an all-embracing security system, the Soviet Union comes out with constructive initiatives for restructuring international relations in all spheres.

There were no international talks or forums in 1986 at which the Soviet Union would not make concrete practical proposals on disarmament, for unblocking conflict and crisis situations, ensuring economic security, solving problems of human rights, international terrorism, etc.

We continue to keep the door open to a dialogue and talks in all directions leading to eradication of militarism in its nuclear, chemical or other clothing and improving the international situation, V. Petrovskiy said. We believe that one must not indifferently watch any longer the rate of military preparations outpacing diplomatic efforts to curb the arms race. Such an indifference threatens with death.

The Soviet Union attaches great importance to the state of affairs in Europe and strives for lowering the level of military confrontation on the continent, reducing considerably armed forces and armaments, freeing Europe from nuclear and chemical weapons and developing active cooperation in the political, economic and humanitarian fields. Europe whose culture has been asserting, in the course of many centuries, faith in man's reason, should be, today too, a powerful generator of the movement for a better, more secure and just world, V. Petrovskiy said in conclusion.

Consultations Reported

LD082250 Moscow TASS in English 2241 GMT 8 Jan 87

[Text] Paris January 9 TASS — Soviet-French political consultations have been held here. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Vladimir Petrovskiy took part in them.

In the course of the consultations there was an indepth exchange of views on the question of banning chemical weapons and concluding a relevant convention already in 1987. Also discussed were some other problems of disarmament and developing cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space and nuclear energy. The question of putting into action the preparatory mechanism of an international conference on the Middle East settlement was studied. A meeting was held with the French Foreign Minister Jean-Bernard Raimond.

The USSR Ambassador in France Yakov Ryabov took part in the consultations and conversations.

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CSO: 5200/1252

RELATED ISSUES

MOSCOW: KRASNAYA ZVEZDA ON DISARMAMENT EFFORTS IN 1986

PM151619 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Jan 87 First Edition p 1

[Editorial: "In the Interests of All the Peoples"]

[Text] A year ago, on 15 January 1986, the entire planet heard M.S. Gorbachev's statement which outlined the program for creating a nuclear-free world and eliminating all kinds of mass destruction weaponry, including chemical weapons, by the end of the century. The appearance of this most important document of our day was dictated as new political thinking based on the prime importance of common human values and the need to pool efforts in building a world free of violence, suspicion, and fear.

The Soviet Union made this initiative -- unprecedented in terms of its scale and aims -- at the very time the acute question of mankind's survival was being placed on the agenda. So much nuclear explosive has been accumulated on the planet there is enough to kill everyone on earth several times over. Nonetheless, the arms race continues through the fault of the United States. Furthermore, it threatens to move into space, which will create an unforeseeable situation. Under these circumstances our country, relying on the support of all peace-loving forces, has conducted a resolute offensive against the threat of nuclear war.

During the past year the Soviet Union fleshed out its program, reinforcing it with practical steps. The most important of these is the unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions. Striving to erect an effective barrier in the way of the nuclear arms race, the Soviet Union has repeatedly extended its moratorium. Concern for a nuclear-free world also dictated the USSR's latest decision -- to extend the moratorium after 1 January 1987 until the first U.S. explosion.

The proposal advanced by the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact states for comprehensive and deep cuts in conventional arms and armed forces in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals gained the progressive public's broad support. It cuts the ground from under the feet of the opponents of nuclear disarmament, who have stated that the elimination of nuclear arsenals would allegedly ensure Soviet superiority in the sphere of conventional arms and armed forces.

In the chronicle of events since the 15 January 1986 statement a special place goes to the Soviet-U.S. Reykjavik summit. It was aimed at determining a way out of the vicious circle of the accelerating arms race. Owing to Washington's obstructionist position the meeting did not lead to any practical results. Nonetheless, real prospects for a nuclear-free world opened up before mankind thanks to the meeting.

A portentous landmark on the road of ridding the planet of mass destruction weaponry was the Delhi Declaration on the principles of a nonviolent world free from nuclear weapons, which was signed during the Soviet-Indian meeting. It is in line with the conditions of the nuclear and space ages and reflects the interests of the entire world community and the hopes and aspirations of all the peoples.

The Land of the Soviets firmly defends the cause of peace in the international arena. The Soviet Union supported the "Harare Appeal," which voiced the Nonaligned Movement's call for an end to the arms race and the abolition of nuclear weapons. It also responded with complete understanding and readiness for practical action to the appeal from the "six states on four continents" which advocated a speedy end to the nuclear arms race and the prevention of weapons being launched into space. The USSR actively supported a whole series of proposals for reducing the level of military confrontation in certain parts of Europe and put forward its own large-scale initiatives for ensuring lasting peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. The Soviet Union was one of the socialist countries which put forward the concept of a comprehensive international security system for discussion at the 41st UN General Assembly session...

M.S. Gorbachev's message to UN Secretary General J. Perez de Cuellar was a new boost to the practical action to ensure that peace is everlasting. It reaffirms our country's commitment to saving mankind from the threat of nuclear war and creating the foundations of comprehensive security equal for all. At the same time the message is also an impassioned appeal for exceptional effort leading to the implementation of real measures to limit and end the arms race.

The desperate opposition to the cause of peace and detente on the part of the U.S. military-industrial complex and the other aggressive forces of international imperialism stood out sharply against the background of the Soviet Union's untiring desire to do everything possible to prevent a nuclear catastrophe. The erosion and subversion of existing agreements limiting nuclear arsenals — including the SALT II treaty — and the attempts to wreck strategic stability and attain military superiority continue. The West strives to present Soviet peace initiatives as a kind of socialist weakness and to prove that if just a little more pressure were applied the Soviet Union would fold and be forced to concede its positions.

The attempts and hopes of the supporters of the arms race are in vain. The USSR's love of peace has nothing to do with weakness. The peaceful labor of the Soviet people and their friends and allies is reliably defended. The mighty USSR Armed Forces, equipped with everything they need, stand guard over socialist gains.

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CSO: 5200/1252

RELATED ISSUES

PRAVDA ON REYKJAVIK RESULTS, PACIFIC SECURITY, NFZ

PM061445 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Jan 87 First Edition p 4

[Vsevolod Ovchinnikov International Review]

[Excerpts] The Reykjavik Achievements [subhead]

We have entered the year of the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution, the 70th anniversary of Lenin's Decree on Peace. At the present crucial historical stage the role of the first socialist country as the advocate and defender of general human interests and values stands out particularly visibly.

When the world was faced with the choice between mankind's destruction of nuclear weapons or mankind's destruction by nuclear weapons, it was the motherland of the October Revolution which showed the way to resolve this dilemma. On 15 January last year the Soviet program for freeing the world from nuclear weapons before the end of this century was announced. It was that concrete plan of action which predetermined the irresistible force of the Soviet proposals in Reykjavik. Those proposals, as the New Year address to the Soviet people said, enabled mankind to look beyond the horizon and see the outlines of a nuclear-free world.

Of course, turning the prospect into a reality will not be easy. You can hardly predict how much actual progress will be made toward that goal this year. But one thing is in no doubt: Moscow would like to overcome the state of fruitlessness and inertia existing in the Soviet-U.S. talks and give them real dynamism. As M.S. Gorbachev stated replying to a U.S. journalist recently, that is what we worked for in Reykjavik and we shall work even more energetically for it in 1987.

The New Year statement of the "Delhi Six" says that the USSR and U.S. leaders were very close to agreements which could pave the way to the elimination of all nuclear armaments. It is gratifying that the proposals put forward in the Icelandic capital remain in force. For that very reason, the "Six" believe, 1987 offers the USSR and the United States an opportunity to reach agreement on a number of important measures in the disarmament sphere including considerable reductions in the nuclear arsenals.

In the words of the Indian, Argentine, Mexican, Greek, Tanzanian, and Swedish leaders, their appeals for a rapid ending of nuclear tests and the prevention of the arms race in space have now acquired even greater topicality. [paragraph continues]

The statement's authors again urged the United States to call off the Soviet moratorium. The "Delhi Six" urged Washington and Moscow to resume all-embracing talks as quickly as possible so as to achieve their declared aim: to prevent the arms race in space, to end it on earth, and ultimately to eliminate nuclear weapons everywhere.

On New Year's Eve, U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger was asked how he saw the effect of the "Star Wars" program on the problem of arms control as the result of the Reykjavik meeting.

"In my opinion, nothing happened in Reykjavik," the Pentagon chief stated bluntly. "The SDI program is taking its own course and should in no way be linked with arms reduction. It is important to implement the strategic defense program come what may and will remain one of the President's paramount tasks come what may..."

Thus the stumbling block is to remain. Consequently, this is the range of positions: There is the voice of reason resounding from Moscow; the authoritative opinion of the "Delhi Six"; and the obdurate obstinacy of Washington. This contrast shows that the struggle for a nuclear-free world and mankind's survival can and must be waged on the basis of the achievements in Reykjavik. But it will not be easy.

The Truth Behind the "Doctrine" (subhead)

From the very first days of the new year in Tokyo a new trend has appeared in Japan's foreign policy efforts. Foreign minister Kuranari decided to open his diplomatic calendar with a visit to Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, and Papua New Guinea. Initially it was supposed that after the regular Japanese-Australian consultations Kuranari would set off for Washington so as to somehow ease the high feelings concerning the growing imbalance in bilateral trade (in 1985 Japanese exports to the United States exceeded imports by \$50 billion and in 1986, by all accounts, that figure will increase to \$70 billion). It transpires, however, that the "Irangate" scandal has for the moment pushed this problem into the background and that the White House is in no mood to receive guests from Tokyo now.

Why it was announced that the Japanese foreign minister intends to begin his year-long visit to countries in the South Pacific, and to announce Tokyo's "Pacific Doctrine" during this tour since this region has unexpectedly assumed special importance for Japan's national security.

The truth behind the doctrine is revealed by MAINICHI. According to that newspaper the ANZUS treaty has virtually ceased to be operative in the South Pacific because the New Zealand Government has decided not to allow U.S. ships carrying nuclear weapons to visit its ports. On the other hand, the Soviet Union recently concluded fishing agreements with the Pacific Ocean island states of Kiribati and Vanuatu and established contacts with Fiji. All this, MAINICHI notes, is extremely worrisome to Washington. Thus Japan must comprehensively step up its ties with the South Pacific states so as to "block Soviet penetration and keep the region in the orbit of Western influence."

The hysteria about "Soviet expansion" was of course not caused by the appearance of our tuna ships off the shores of Kiribati or Vanuatu. As London's THE ECONOMIST puts it, the Americans are trying to check the spread of the "nuclear allergy." They are alarmed by the influence of New Zealand's example on the public of the Philippines, Japan, and South Korea. They do not like the karotonga Treaty on the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific. Now Japan has been set the task of pressuring the region using the neocolonialist range of economic and financial levers. It has been decided to double Japanese credits and subsidies to Oceania. Nine small island states will soon be visited by a specially formed group of representatives of Japanese state institutions and private firm.

RELATED ISSUES

MOSCOW ASSAILS U.S. SALT, MORATORIUM STANCE

LD092127 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 9 Jan 87

[From the "Vremya" newscast; commentary by political observer Valentin Zorin]

[Text] A new bout of militarist fever in Washington — that's the theme of the commentary by central television political observer Valentin Zorin.

[Begin recording; video shows Zorin in studio] Hello comrades. In medicine there is a method of treatment which is resorted to in particularly dangerous cases and which is called shock therapy. One has the impression that the Washington administration, finding itself, in connection with the scandal which has received the name Irangate, in an extremely difficult situation that threatens everyone in the current presidency, has now gone for precisely this sort of shock therapy. Unable to justify the serious violation of laws committed not just anywhere, but in the White House, and having become entangled in lies and sinking deeper and deeper in the quagmire of the growing scandal, Washington's ruling clique is trying to save itself by banking on a new outburst of jingoism and creating an atmosphere of military hysteria in the country.

Here are events of only the last few days: Once again the SALT II treaty has been deliberately violated — already the second heavy B-52 bomber equipped with cruise missiles above the limit allowed by the treaty has been brought into operation. With deliberate, broad publicity it has been announced that a new batch of MX strategic offensive missiles have been deployed on their launch sites. The launch of the "Tennessee" nuclear submarine vessel, equipped with missiles, has been publicized just as deliberately. Stirring up tension in the American public, the Pentagon is organizing a deliberate leak of information about preparations at the Nevada test site for a whole series of nuclear tests. Finally, in the last few days, the President has sent Congress a draft budget for the next financial year in which military allocations, compared to current level, are increased at a stroke by \$23 billion.

Washington has not for a long time experienced such a concentrated, whipped up military fever. All this is taking place against the background of a broad program for strengthening peace and security put forward by the Soviet Union. Implementing its militarist campaign, which it is difficult to qualify as anything other than provocative, the Washington leadership is apparently pursuing two aims: first, by expressly whipping up tension, to divert the attention of the American public from the scandalous political failure of the Republican administration and try to extricate itself from the situation in which it has found itself; second, by throwing a bone to the military-industrial concerns, to strengthen its political base and liven up, in a moment of difficulty, their by no means disinterested support.

However, the matter is far from being as simple as some of the inhabitants of the White House think. There is not only indignation growing in the country over the political scandal, but also protest against the administration's course. How this develops will be seen in the not-so-distant future. [end recording]

RELATED ISSUES

USSR'S SOKOLOV ON NUCLEAR SECURITY, INF. TESTING

LE MONDE Account

PM211000 Paris LE MONDE in French 20 Jan 87 p 3

[Article b. Soviet Defense Minister Sergey Sokolov: "The USSR's Initiatives for Nuclear Disarmament"]

[Text] The Soviet Union thinks competition in the arms race -- both in respect to quantity and quality -- and the desire to achieve military superiority will not result in a political or military advantage in the nuclear and space age. The path leading to security requires the lowering of the level of military confrontation by the reduction and subsequent complete liquidation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Military potential must be reduced to a level which corresponds to defense requirements alone. This is not a very easy task.

The situation is the following: On the one hand the U.S. President signs a political statement proclaiming there must be no nuclear war, that there would be no victors in such a war, and that his country will not try to achieve military superiority, and, on the other hand, he signs the Pentagon's programs which aim to prepare for global and "limited" wars against the USSR and the other socialist countries in the hope of winning.

The United States is going ahead with preparations for military operations from space, which present a threat to all states and to mankind as a whole. At the same time competition is being revived in the sphere of chemical weapons and arms which use new physical principles and provide a qualitative leap forward compared with so-called conventional weapons.

Why are the U.S. and NATO leaders refusing to bring together the Warsaw Pact general staffs and the general staffs of the NATO forces in Europe? Such meetings would make it possible to clarify the military situation in Europe. Why did they not agree to the Warsaw Pact countries' proposal for a meeting between the two organizations' general secretaries? The West also refused to convene the working groups of experts -- which exist in the two organizations -- to examine the problems of reducing armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe.

What are we to think of this lack of interest in such contacts? It clearly reflects either an error of judgment (namely the Warsaw Pact has greater need of a normal military and political climate), or the illusion that NATO could achieve the military supremacy it seeks, and could impose its law on the USSR and its allies "from positions of strength."

In my capacity as a soldier informed of the potential of modern weapons, I can merely make the following observation: The sooner illusions about strength are abandoned, the better it will be. Better for everybody.

The Soviet Union is prepared to structure its defense without relying on nuclear weapons and other kinds of weapons of mass destruction. We agree to immediately reorganize our entire military system in accordance with denuclearization, provided all other nuclear powers do likewise. The Soviet Union thinks that nuclear disarmament ought to be accompanied by a considerable reduction in conventional weapons, on the basis of reciprocity.

The Idea of a Nuclear-Free World [subhead]

At present the USSR is not merely calling for a reasonable reorganization of the world. As far as the situation allows, we are taking practical initiatives to improve the international situation, even when there is no reciprocity. The USSR pledged unilaterally not to be the first to resort to nuclear weapons. This decision is an inviolable law for the Soviet armed forces.

The Soviet Union has not conducted any nuclear tests for 18 months. It has unilaterally suspended the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe and has withdrawn some of them from service. We have frozen work in antisatellite weapons and so forth.

The positions adopted by the USSR during the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik embody the idea of a nuclear-free world by the year 2000 — an idea put forward by Mr Gorbachev. The major compromises we proposed in Iceland on a whole series of points relating to nuclear and space weapons created a favorable climate for historic progress toward freeing mankind from the nuclear threat. The U.S. policy of "positions of strength" created an obstacle to a nuclear-free world and the U.S. "Star Wars" program scuttled the signing of an agreement.

It is an illusion to chase after the specter of military superiority, to try and guarantee your own security at the expense of other people's security, and to cherish the vain hope of creating the "ultimate weapon" in the framework of "Star Wars" — a weapon designed to prevent any retaliation in the case of a nuclear war. No such weapon exists, and we are prepared to prove this by asymmetrical measures. Is it necessary to adopt such extreme measures? Would it not be more reasonable to act on the basis of political agreements?

Our program is constructive and it takes into consideration the interests of all states, primarily the European states. Parity would be maintained at all stages of its implementation, and no state would see its security undermined. It makes provision for the liquidation not only of nuclear weapons, but of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction, particularly chemical weapons.

This program has been complemented in an integrated way by the Warsaw Pact member states which have proposed considerable reductions in the armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals. If the NATO states were willing to agree, the level of military confrontation between the two groups would be reduced by more than 1 million men by the early eighties.

The Soviet leaders are aware of the complexity of the problem presented by the denuclearization of our planet. They are also aware of the fact the continuation of the arms race brings the world ever closer to nuclear disaster. Unless measures are taken now, man is likely to lose control over events. The USSR thinks it has a duty to make every effort to protect the future of our planet from a catastrophe.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Account

PM221701 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Jan 87 First Edition p 3

[Article by Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Sokolov, USSR minister of defense: "Security: Problems and Potential"; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] The French newspaper LE MONDE asked the USSR defense minister to write an article in connection with the anniversary of M.S. Gorbachev's 15 January 1986 statement.

The article was published 20 January 1987 in considerably abbreviated form, which gives readers an incomplete impression of its content. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA publishes the full text of the USSR defense minister's article.

Maybe never before has the world community's attention been concentrated to such an extent on vital questions of war and peace. This is understandable since never before has civilization been subjected to dangers comparable with those of the present, never has the threat of the destruction of life on earth been so real [aktualnyy] by virtue of the existence of arms systems capable of destroying the planet's vital nerve. Mankind's future is inextricably linked with the prevention of war and consequently with the ending of the arms race, the achievement of equal and universal security for all countries, and the exclusion of violence from international relations. Each country has the right to live in the way it considers necessary. This is the basis of interstate relations in a civilized world. Nobody has the right to dictate to others. Is this achievable, and how?

We in the Soviet Union proceed from the premise that in the nuclear and space age rivalry in the quantity and quality of arms and an aspiration for military superiority does not yield anybody political or military gains. The path to security lies through the reduction of the level of military confrontation and the reduction and ultimate complete elimination of nuclear and all other types of mass destruction weapons. Military potentials must be reduced to limit essential only for defense.

This is an extremely difficult task. It is no secret that after World War II many states' armed forces were not brought into line with peacetime conditions. The "cold war," the brinkmanship doctrine, the use of the arms race as a means of economic attrition and pressure on other countries -- these and other attributes of Washington's course aimed at world hegemony gave rise to a situation in which the peoples were unable to fully taste the fruits of the rout of fascism and militarism and were compelled to switch an inordinately large proportion of their resources to the armed forces.

But be that as it may, the arms race has now reached a point where the weapons, irrespective of how sophisticated or numerous they might be, cannot be utilized in practice. The end no longer justifies the means. Not now, nor especially in the foreseeable future. Given their use on a massive scale, the means will destroy everything, including the end. "It has now become most clear to everyone," M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, notes, "that the old notions of war as a means of achieving political ends are outdated. In the nuclear age these obsolete dogmas fuel a policy which could lead to a universal conflagration."

Is this understood in the West? I doubt it. Despite statements by individual leaders of Western countries about their commitment to nuclear disarmament, U.S. and NATO military strategy and military planning, the development of the armed forces, and the regulations of the categories of troops continue to be based on the utilization of nuclear weapons — and moreover, on their first use, regardless of what attempts are made to claim the opposite. Even very recently it has been possible to hear the U.S. and NATO armed forces are not ready to resolve the tasks they face without nuclear weapons, now and for the indefinite future. This spawns arguments in favor of improving nuclear weapons, creating new types and models of such weapons, and continuing nuclear tests.

This is what happens. With one hand the U.S. President signs a political statement there must be no nuclear war, there can be no winners, and his country will not strive for military superiority. With the other hand he sanctions Pentagon programs geared to preparations for waging global and "limited" nuclear wars against the USSR and the other socialist countries calculated to achieve success in such wars. Preparations for conducting U.S. military actions from space, actions which threaten all states and all mankind, are under way. At the same time rivalry is heightened in the sphere of military chemistry, of weapons based on new physical principles, and of ensuring a qualitative leap forward in so-called "conventional" arms.

The U.S. military-industrial complex is a state within a state and gambles on violence, strong-arm confrontation, and subordinating policy, diplomacy, and even trade to the cult of force. The impression is that Washington is almost stuck on militarism. If so, this is a dangerous atavism. It is all the more dangerous since it is backed up by immense destructive potential and a total lack of constructive initiative in the approach to disarmament and security problems.

U.S. and NATO leaders refused to hold a meeting between the commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces and the commander in chief of NATO Armed Forces, Europe. Such a meeting could have discussed the situation in the military sphere in Europe. They also rejected the Warsaw Pact countries' proposal to hold a meeting between the general secretary of the Warsaw Pact Organization and the NATO secretary general. The West also avoided holding a meeting between expert working groups set up within the framework of the Warsaw Pact and NATO on questions of armed forces and conventional arms reductions in Europe.

How is the lack of interest in such contacts to be evaluated? Obviously, as evidence either of the delusion that we need a normal military-political climate more than the Western countries, or of the illusion that it is worth tightening up a bit and NATO will ultimately acquire the military superiority it is seeking and be able to dictate its demands to the Soviet Union from a 'position of strength.' The age of world wars is gone forever, but some people would like to believe the final battle honors lie ahead. As a military man who knows the potential of modern weapons, I can state one thing: The sooner we put an end to strong-arm superstition, the better. The better it will be for us all.

Unlike the United States and the other NATO countries, the Soviet Union is prepared to build its defense without relying on nuclear and other types of mass destruction weaponry. We have agreed to embark immediately on reorganizing our entire military machine along nonnuclear lines if the other nuclear powers take this route too. The Soviet side adheres to the view that nuclear disarmament ought to be accompanied by significant armed forces and conventional arms reductions on a reciprocal basis.

The explanation for that is simple: There are no social groups or castes in the USSR which could live of an arms race or be interested in continuing one. There are no circles in our country which lean toward aggressive policies. The Soviet Armed Forces, as a part of the Soviet people, are interested in military detente. The Soviet Armed Forces' main professional task is to ensure the USSR's security and protect the positions of our country and our friends from foreign threats. We have no other aims or tasks. We have no predatory designs on any state, either in Europe or elsewhere. We are prepared to resolve all questions of building the Armed Forces and reducing them only on the basis of the principle of equality and identical security. The USSR makes no claim for greater security for itself but, understandably, nor will it agree to any less security.

There is no ambiguity here, there is no divergence between political declarations and military doctrine. The Soviet military doctrine is in organic unity with the USSR's peace-loving foreign policy course. For the Soviet Union war has always been only a response forced upon us to repulse aggression and defend its independence. Always -- from the first days of the existence of Soviet power, ever since October 1917.

The Soviet people have had many occasions to repulse strikes by hordes of foreign interventionists. They drained the bitter cup of World War II, having borne its main burden and having paid the highest price for victory over fascism -- the lives of more than 20 million of their sons and daughters. I deem it necessary to emphasize that the Soviet and French people were together in that cruel struggle. During the last war, too, the Soviet state fought not for world domination but for lasting stable peace on earth.

The USSR does not limit itself to just calls for a reasonable restructuring of the world. To the extent the situation allows, and even in the absence of reciprocity, we take specific steps for the benefit of the improvement of the world situation. The USSR pledged unilaterally not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. This decision is an immutable law governing the life and activity of the Soviet Armed Forces. It is being applied in the practical training of troops and staffs, in the more rigid control measures precluding the unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, and so on. The Pentagon strategists pretend to disregard this Soviet pledge. In actual fact, however, the USSR's pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons is taken into account by them when planning the building of U.S. Armed forces and developing the latest military concepts.

For 18 months now the Soviet Union has not conducted any nuclear tests. The deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe has been unilaterally suspended, and some of them have been downgraded from standby alert status. We have frozen work on antisatellite weapons, and so on.

The ideas of building a nuclear-free world by the year 2000 contained in M.S. Gorbachev's statement were embodied in the USSR's positions at the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik. Thanks to our major compromise proposals on the entire package of questions concerning nuclear and space weapons, foundations were laid in Iceland for a historic step toward freeing mankind from the nuclear threat. The peoples were given an opportunity to look beyond the horizon and to see the real outlines of a world without nuclear weapons, a world of mutual respect, trust, and good neighborliness. The obstacle along the way to it was provided by the U.S. "position of strength" policy, while the U.S. "Star Wars" program provided the means by which accord was thwarted.

The Soviet proposals put forward in Reykjavik and the basic provisions of the Delhi declaration on the principles of a nonviolent world free of nuclear weapons -- all this constitutes a creative development of the proposals to eliminate nuclear and other types of mass destruction weapons by the end of this century. Our proposals are not a slogan. They are a program which fuses together the philosophy of shaping a safe world in the nuclear and space age with a platform of specific actions according to a strictly calculated timetable. This is the central orientation of the Soviet Union's foreign policy.

Western propaganda declares the nuclear disarmament program to be a utopia, a fantasy. I must say that what is a utopia today, and an evil and perfidious one at that, is the pursuit of the specter of military superiority, the desire to ensure your own security at other peoples' expense, and futile hopes of creating some kind of "ultimate weapon" within the framework of "Star Wars," which is supposed to help avoid retribution in a nuclear conflict. [paragraph continues]

There is no reasonable alternative to the elimination of nuclear weapons except through political accords.

The realistic nature of the Soviet program for the elimination of nuclear weapons is demonstrated by Reykjavik. There, the Soviet proposals made it possible to bring the American side to the point of accords on strategic offensive arms reduction, the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe, and then the elimination of the sides' nuclear potentials as a whole. Through the fault of the United States, an agreement was not reached. Nonetheless the possibility of accord was convincingly demonstrated.

Our program is realistic because it is concrete. It defines the timing, stages, volumes, and order of reduction of nuclear weapons. The USSR and the United States have experience in drawing up procedures for the elimination of nuclear weapons. We proposed strict, effective verification -- national and international, in all appropriate forms, including on-site inspection.

Our program is constructive, it takes account of the interests of all states, and above all the European states. At every stage of its implementation parity would be preserved and no states' security interests would be damaged. Provision is made for the elimination not only of nuclear weapons, but all types of weapons of mass destruction, above all chemical weapons. It is organically supplemented by the proposal of the Warsaw Pact states on a significant reduction of armed forces and conventional arms in Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals. Given a corresponding willingness on the part of the NATO countries, in the early nineties the opposing groupings of armed forces would be reduced by more than 1 million people.

The realistic nature of the Soviet program is also indicated by the very broad response to it in the majority of states of the world.

Of course, the Soviet leadership is aware of the complexity of resolving the problem of ridding our planet of nuclear weapons. It is equally well aware the continuing arms race is pushing the world ever closer to nuclear catastrophe. If measures are not taken now, if the nuclear arms race is not stopped, the turn of events could go out of man's control. The USSR considers it its lofty duty to do everything in its power to safeguard the planet's future, together with all states, for the sake of all peoples of the world.

RELATED ISSUES

SOVIET MARSHAL ON PERILS OF NUCLEAR WAR, SDI, MORATORIUM

PM080905 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 25 Dec 86 p 1

["Authoritative Opinion" by Twice Hero of the Soviet Union Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Savitskiy: "To Struggle for Peace, for Mankind's Survival"]

[Text] People say that there can be no future without a past. This would appear to be true. If so, however, we must not only remember and be familiar with the past, it is also incumbent upon us to learn to draw the necessary conclusions from it.

World War I cost 10 million human lives, World War II -- more than 50 million. How many lives will a third world war take? Can mankind let itself continue to keep up this fatal historical reckoning? Such questions can be heard from television screens, they can be read in newspaper headlines, they reverberate in our homes, our squares, and our streets....

Is there an answer to these questions?

War, in the words of General Koumanakos, the famous Greek public figure, is on trial today. Indeed, it is on trial for mankind. Let me add: about time, too. Anyone who has seen for himself even a small explosion of a nuclear charge and its consequences -- and I am one of those who have -- would understand what I have in mind. War in our nuclear age is equivalent to the self-destruction of civilization. Were it to flare up, life on earth would end....

But this does not at all mean that our profession has lost its meaning, that we are "idling our lives away" in vain or are being maintained to no purpose. Peace needs to be protected more than ever before. Unfortunately, for the time being it is impossible to protect it from the threat of war without a well organized and reliable defense. Such a defense constitutes an inevitable response to the intrigues by those who are still playing with fire, striving to intimidate mankind and simultaneously impose their will on it.

The Soviet Government's decision to terminate the unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests if the United States conducts another nuclear explosion next year is nothing but a response, a forced but necessary response. Soviet nuclear testing ranges have been silent for more than 500 days now, but the Washington leadership has not joined the USSR initiative which offers tremendous opportunities. The security interests of our country and its allies do not allow us to extend the moratorium again. Even so, we are prepared not to resume testing provided common sense finally gains the upper hand in Washington.

Today's world, in which everything is interconnected and interdependent, is entering a most crucial stage. If the notorious Strategic Defense Initiative announced by President Reagan gets going, it will most likely prove to be the last "initiative" of all mankind. If SDI, or the "Star Wars" programs as it has been styled in America, were to be implemented, it would inevitably bring about unpredictable military-political consequences.

This is well understood all over the world. It is also known in the United States. Much has been and is being said there about SDI and the catastrophic consequences of a nuclear war. Those who have taken the course of embarking on a new round of the arms race are being warned by the military, by politicians, and by scientists. [paragraph continues]

Speaking on the day marking the 41st anniversary of the dropping of the atom bomb on Hiroshima, Linus Pauling, twice Nobel Prize winner and member of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, declared that the total destructive yield of 60,000 megatons available to the two major nuclear powers does not leave even the slightest doubt that our civilization will not survive a third world war.

Those who believe that a nuclear war could possibly be survived in underground bunkers or somewhere in a faraway corner of the earth are mistaken — this was said in support of Pauling by Gilbert White, another member of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, who spent 3 years studying the possible environmental consequences of a nuclear war together with scientists from 30 countries. Up to 150 million metric tons of dust and soot would be released into the atmosphere in the event of nuclear strikes, he warns. This means that only 1 percent of the sun's energy would reach the earth, and the difference between night and day would disappear. All inhabitants of the planet would die — it would be just a question of time and painful suffering....

There would seem to be just one possible conclusion from all this has been said: Only a madman is capable of unleashing nuclear weapons. But this conclusion would be mistaken. Unfortunately, matters are completely different. A nuclear conflagration could turn the earth to dust even without interference by unhinged persons.

U.S. Navy Commander, Retired, J. Busch, speaking like Pauling in Japan — the country which survived the atom bomb — announced that U.S. submarines are not fitted with systems precluding the possibility of accidentally launching the missiles with nuclear warheads they carry.

There is no reason to disbelieve the words of the U.S. Navy commander who is no longer on active service. Especially in view of the fact that, before getting out of uniform, he himself commanded one of those submarines. His fears are shared on a broader scale by former U.S. Secretary of Defense R. McNamara, the man who was directly responsible for the country's military strategy during the Kennedy and Johnson Presidencies. "The majority of Americans and, I believe, the majority of Japanese are simply unaware that the West's strategy calls for early first use of nuclear weapons in a conflict with the Soviet Union," he declared in his speech at a seminar held in the Japanese city of Osaka soon after the Reykjavik summit meeting. "They would be shocked to learn that they are mistaken. They would be terrified to learn that the top brass themselves consider that the implementation of our present strategy would lead to our society's destruction."

All this applies to conventional nuclear missile weapons — if one can use the expression — and to U.S. military preparations concerning, so to speak, yesterday and today. So, what can be said of SDI, a system which is planned to be controlled by computers? How can anyone seriously speak about control if the planet's fate is to be made dependent on machine error or technical breakdown....

It is, however, well known that there are still quite a few excessively ardent champions of SDI in the United States. Who are they? "The champions of SDI," according to W. Fulbright, the eminent U.S. politician and public figure who for years headed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "are the incumbent administration and what people call the military-industrial complex."

It cannot be put more clearly.

There is perhaps just one more point to be added. Those who persevere in their attempts to gain military superiority in order to dictate their conditions to the world perceive SDI not so much as a means of defense as a means of attack. Not a shield but a sword.

Former U.S. Secretary of Defense R. McNamara declared bluntly that the real objective of SDI is to paralyze the Soviet Union's strategic forces and to guarantee the possibility of an unpunished nuclear strike against the USSR.

This, as people say, dots all the i's.

But such calculations are totally senseless. Surely people in the United States do not really expect us to stand idly by! There are numerous methods to neutralize SDI and render it militarily useless. I have no intention of listing them — this has already been discussed repeatedly and with sufficient clarity.

Those who represent the military-industrial complex are perfectly well aware that SDI will not protect the world from a nuclear catastrophe. But this does not worry them. For then SDI, just as all other large-scale military programs, primarily means profits in the billions. Enormous, fabulous sums of money. To abandon SDI for them means abandoning this money. But why, for whose sake? The prevailing balance of fear, they reason, prevents war. It has prevented it so far; please God, it will continue to prevent it. In this sense the implementation of SDI will change nothing. If SDI fails to produce the desired result and fails to create a reliable shield above America, the balance of fear will remain in existence. Meanwhile, billions and trillions of dollars will have found their way into the concerns' safes, and the Russians will have become more obliging. To put it succinctly, the profits are secure one way or another. But even if the Russians did create [sozdayut] their own program in response to SDI, this will also be no cause for alarm. The chances are balanced again, and the balance of fear reappears.

Our country will respond if SDI materializes. Parity will certainly be maintained. But the arms race will reach a level at which it will be exceptionally difficult, if at all possible, to halt it.

Modern science and technology demand all of us people inhabiting the earth a new approach toward matters, a new awareness of events, and, ultimately, new thinking and a new policy. But the new does not appear automatically, a struggle must be waged for it, its path must be cleared. It was not in vain that even the great Einstein, one of

the first to map the path to the peaceful use of the atom and to warn against its use for military purposes, claimed that everything has changed in the nuclear age apart from man's thinking. History has proved him only partially right. Everything seems to have really remained the same for those who are accustomed to making fortunes out of war. But the new thinking — in line with the times and based not on temporary advantage or narrow national interests but on a global approach toward the questions of war and peace on earth — is forging ahead with growing persistence and captivating minds on an increasingly broad scale. Soviet Communists have set an example for all mankind.

Mutual deterrence, equality of threat, parity of fear.... All these fossils of the "cold war" times are hopelessly outdated. Outdated, but at the same time even more dangerous. Fear is not at all the force to stop mankind on the brink of the abyss. Even the fear of universal and hundredfold assured self-destruction. People get used to fear. Like, let us say, each and every one of us gets used to the idea of the inevitability of old age or death. The world has gotten used -- or almost used -- to the idea of nuclear bombs. In any case, people have learned to live as if they were altogether nonexistent.

But they do exist, these bombs: An unimaginably monstrous destructive force of 60,000 megatons does exist! In order to halt at the brink of the abyss, in order to survive and preserve a future for itself and its offspring, mankind--yes, mankind, and not just parts of it--must bring its thinking into line with the realities of the nuclear age. This is what our party and government are aiming for. The task of the Soviet Armed Forces, as I understand it, is to ensure the necessary historical time period for this difficult and complex process.

It is now, today, that we people on earth are bound to do everything to ensure mankind's survival and lay the foundations of a future world without wars.

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CSO: 5200/1252

RELATED ISSUES

MOSCOW PANEL SHOW ON SDI, SALT, MORATORIUM

LD100010 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1430 GMT 9 Jan 87

["International Situation: Questions and Answers" program presented by All-Union Radio foreign political commentator Andrey Ptashnikov with Vladimir N. Chernyshev, TASS military observer; Aleksey M. Vasilyev, doctor of historical science; and Viktor Levin, commentator]

[Excerpts] [Ptashnikov] First of all I would like to dwell on the letters from our listeners that voice righteous indignation over the aggressive militarist course of the U.S. Administration in the international arena. [Passage omitted on letters of named listeners cited on struggle for peace and U.S. insistence on SDI and Ptashnikov emphasizing that the United States is still testing nuclear weapons and breaching SALT II, and introducing Vladimir Nikolayevich Chernyshev]

[Chernyshev] The general secretary's statement propounded a specific and well-developed plan of purposeful action to remove the most serious threat looming over mankind today, the danger of nuclear war. [Passage omitted on details of Gorbachev's proposals of 15 January 1986]

[Ptashnikov] A year has already elapsed since this program was announced. The United States and its NATO allies, however, have undertaken no practical action in the way of movement toward a nuclear-free world. What is the efficacy of our program today?

[Chernyshev] Now that a year has passed, the grandeur and significance of the comprehensive Soviet plan can be seen even more sharply and clearly. First of all, the whole world can now see that it presents a tangible strategy for movement toward a nuclear-free world, a strategy which makes it possible to clearly see the prospects and the final goal, and thus to manifest tactical flexibility along the path to that goal.

It is precisely the existence of this plan, drafted in detail, which made possible the breadth, scope, boldness, and constructive nature that characterized the actions of the Soviet representatives at the summit meeting in Reykjavik. Thanks to the Soviet proposals, and their convincing nature the sides found themselves close to adopting historic decisions. Unfortunately, the U.S. representatives lacked the courage, responsibility, and political resolve, and there was no success in sealing coordinated accords.

The barrier on the way to a nuclear-free world is the U.S. Star Wars program.

Nonetheless, the year that has elapsed since the announcement of the Soviet program has brought a great deal. Let us remember how some people in the West tried to present the Soviet program as a fantasy, an illusion, propaganda; tried to divide the world into the gullible and the sceptical. But now everything has changed. There has been a sharp change in man's thinking, in its view of what is possible and what is not, of what can be achieved and what cannot.

The planet has learned that the removal of the threat of nuclear destruction is something real, and it can now be said with assurance that the world has been divided, but not into the gullible and the sceptics, but into the supporters and opponents of nuclear disarmament. The overwhelming majority of the population of our planet, having recognized that there is a real opportunity to destroy the nuclear sword which threatens the very existence of civilization, supports the Soviet program and demands that it be implemented.

Thus, in my view, the main achievement of the past year is that at last the world has come to believe this, and believe it seriously; and once the belief is there, the forces rising to struggle against the arms race, against the threat of nuclear disaster, swell and gather strength.

[Ptashnikov] Vladimir Nikolayevich, while speaking of the comprehensive Soviet nuclear-disarmament program, you mentioned an accord on ending all nuclear blasts as one of its component parts. Could you perhaps enlarge upon this matter?

[Chernyshev] It is now perfectly plain to all that a reduction in nuclear arsenals alone, without any ban on the testing of nuclear weapons, will not provide a way out of the dilemma of the nuclear threat, as the remaining part of the nuclear arsenals is modernized and the possibility remains of creating increasingly refined and deadly nuclear weapons and of testing new types on the testing grounds. Therefore, an end to testing is a practical step toward ending the arms race.

For a year and half, silence has reigned over the Soviet nuclear testing grounds. Our country has extended its unilateral moratorium five times. But the last time the Soviet Union did this it extended its moratorium until the first U.S. nuclear explosion of 1987, since, as before, there are no indications that the United States is prepared to follow the example of the USSR and renounce nuclear testing.

What is more, Washington has already given preliminary notice that the next nuclear device will be detonated on 29 January. At a time when the United States is stubbornly continuing to implement its program of nuclear tests, with the aim of creating new nuclear weapons and stockpiling them, of course the Soviet Union cannot go on displaying endless unilateral restraint.

A situation has arisen, which, if it persists, threatens to seriously damage the security of the Soviet Union and its allies.

I would note one more factor of outstanding importance: In defending their specific interests, the leaders of the capitalist world cannot close their eyes to the significance of public opinion in drafting political decisions. That is why they try to manipulate public opinion. It is possible to draw up a genealogical chain of such motives: the unilateral moratorium, extended five times by the Soviet Union, resulting in the undermining, to a large extent, of the myths about the Soviet military menace

and the propaganda nature of the foreign-policy initiatives of the Soviet Union. Hence the shift in public opinion in the United States and the other NATO countries; a certain divergence between the United States and a number of its allies on the possibility of compromise with the Soviet Union, and some movement in the positions of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives on questions relating to negotiation with the USSR, including negotiation on ending nuclear tests.

Unfortunately, the final link is still missing in this chain -- a change, as a result of the factors enumerated, in the position of the U.S. Administration itself. But it seems to me that we may conclude that, regardless of whether it rises to the proposals of the USSR on banning all nuclear explosions, the U.S. Administration's room to maneuver is already more restricted than it was. I would say that the very refusal by the U.S. Administration to end tests of nuclear weapons refutes more convincingly than any logical process of deduction the thesis propounded in official Washington policy, that the United States is striving to rid mankind of nuclear weapons. [passage omitted on Ptashnikov on the nature of the U.S. military-industrial complex, the corporations involved in it, and what they stand to gain from government arms contracts]

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CSO: 5200/1252

RELATED ISSUES

GORBACHEV MESSAGE TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR ON NST, CSCE, NFZ

PM121200 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Jan 87 First Edition p 1

[Text of message from CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev to UN Secretary General J. Perez De Cuellar on 10 January 1987]

[Text] To UN Secretary General J Perez De Cuellar.

Esteemed Mr Secretary General,

The year 1986, proclaimed the International Year of Peace by the United Nations, is over. That decision of the United Nations reflected mankind's interest in breaking the chain of years gripped by the accelerating arms race.

Was that goal achieved? Regrettably, it was not, because not all the member states of the United Nations were seeking an end to the arms build-up in deed rather than in words.

We are far from thinking, however, that 1986 failed to live up to its political symbolism. Perhaps, never before had the attention of the world community been concentrated to such an extent on the vital problems of war and peace.

One idea comes to mind in this context: Now that the International Year of Peace is becoming history, should it not be the duty of every state to submit, in response to the unanimously adopted UN resolution, an account to the world community on what it did not ensure that the year of peace lived up to its name? Anyway, we for our part consider it our duty to report to the United Nations cumulatively through you, if only in a general outline, on what the Soviet Union did concretely in 1986 for that year to justify the hopes pinned on it.

To begin with, in the very first month of the International Year of Peace, on 15 January, the Soviet Union put forward an initiative of unprecedented scope and goals by formulating a program for building a nuclear-free world and eliminating weapons of mass annihilation of every type, including chemical weapons, by the end of the current century. Throughout the year we were concretizing that program in individual areas and backing it with practical deeds.

When the Soviet Union entered the year of peace, its nuclear test sites have been quiet already for five months. We kept extending our moratorium on nuclear explosions throughout the year, although other parties continue to upgrade the deadly weapons, devastating as they are. The Soviet Union's extension of its moratorium beyond 1 January 1987, till the first American explosion, offers another chance to raise an effective barrier in the way of the nuclear arms race.

Developments last year were such that extraordinary efforts had to be made to break the vicious circle of the accelerating arms race. Being aware of this, we put all business aside and had a meeting with the U.S. President in the situation in the key problems of the nuclear-space complex. The results of that meeting are public knowledge. The hopes that it would lead to practical results are well substantiated.

The Reykjavik meeting, however, led the world to a high plateau, which offered a view of fresh horizons. Looking into those newly-opened horizons is our aim now. We are going to achieve radical reductions in and the eventual total elimination of our arms weapons will at long last yield positive result.

The Soviet Union for its part repeatedly reaffirmed and is reiterating anew its desire to follow that road.

Regrettably, our negotiating partners do not show readiness to find accords effectively to contain the arms race. Moreover, they are chipping away at and subverting the existing agreements which put limits on the nuclear arms arsenals, including the SALT II treaty, seeking to undermine strategic stability, building up nuclear weapons in excess of the ceilings agreed upon earlier and heading for the introduction of weapons into outer space.

The opponents of nuclear disarmament often claim that the Soviet Union is advocating the abolition of the nuclear arms arsenals in order to secure superiority in conventional armaments and armed forces. These claims are nothing short of a political ploy. Together with our allies in the Warsaw Treaty organisation, we put forward at a conference in Budapest in June 1986 a proposal on comprehensive and deep cuts in the armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. Yet the NATO countries have not yet agreed to discuss our proposals in detail.

We are prepared to advance in every area toward real measures to limit and stop the arms race. We consider it essential to have at every stage and in every area strict verification of accords to the point of on-site inspection. Yet measures of most thorough and dependable verification, just like disarmament measures, should be reciprocal -- but here, regrettably, we do not have a proper response from the other side. Recently we made proposals on adequate verification of the termination of nuclear tests, a ban on chemical weapons, reductions in conventional armaments and the non-militarization of space. We are prepared to open our laboratories -- but all this should be on a reciprocal basis. Meanwhile, we do not have a positive response from those who not so long ago stridently clamored for the strictest verification.

Along with verification, an important concomitant measure of the process of arms limitation and disarmament should be the utilization of funds saved in this way to meet the needs of socio-economic development.

The Soviet Union is prepared to cooperate in every way with all the states advocating stronger international peace and security. It responded positively to the Harare appeal, in which the Nonaligned Movement urged firmly and strongly an end to the arms race, the abolition of nuclear weapons and firm linkage between the problems of disarmament and development. It also responded with full understanding and readiness for practical steps to the appeal of the six states of four continents for early end to the nuclear arms race and the prevention of the introduction of arms in space.

The Delhi Declaration on principles for a nuclear weapons-free and non-violent world was signed at the Soviet-Indian summit meeting in November 1986. It is a document of new political thinking, a document proceeding from the priority importance of common human values and the need to pool efforts to build a world that would be free from nuclear weapons, violence, hatred, suspicion and fear.

The Soviet Union's constructive cooperation with the other participants in the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe contributed to the successful completion of that conference. We have strongly called and continue to call for the results achieved in Stockholm to be developed in Vienna, at the regular meeting of representatives of the state participating in the European conference.

The Soviet Union vigorously supported a number of proposals aimed to lower the level of military confrontation in individual parts of Europe, such as the initiative of Bulgaria and Romania for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans, the call of the GDR and Czechoslovakia for the abolition of chemical weapons in the center of the continent and Finland's initiative for a nuclear-free Nordic Europe.

The Soviet Union is known to be in favor of the proposal of the nonaligned countries on establishing a zone of lasting peace and cooperation in the Mediterranean. We for our part voiced a number of ideas, such as the withdrawal of the Soviet and U.S. navies from the Mediterranean.

Last year we kept working vigorously for the early implementation of the UN declaration on turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace and for the immediate convocation of an international conference for this purpose. New Soviet initiatives call for a substantial reduction in the naval activity in the Indian Ocean, the application of confidence-building measures and guarantees for the safety of sea and air communications in that region.

A series of major initiatives were put forward by us to achieve security in such an important part of the world as Asia and the Pacific. We consider that more dynamic bilateral relations, the settlement of the existing regional problems and a lower level of military activity offer a sure way to the development of an atmosphere which will eventually make it possible to convene a conference like the Helsinki one and work out a complex of dependable measures on security and peaceful cooperation in Asia and the Pacific.

Concerned over the growing militarization of the southern part of the Korean Peninsula, the Soviet Union resolutely voiced support for the efforts of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the peaceful reunification of the country and its proposals for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the whole of the Korean Peninsula.

We are trying to do whatever we can to deblock crisis situations, which generate tension in the world, and to avert new conflicts.

To break the deadlock over Middle East settlement, we proposed that a preparatory committee be established with the participation of all the permanent members of the security Council to convene a peace conference. The Soviet Union stands for an end to the senseless Iranian-Iraqi war and for an early solution to the Cyprus problem. The Soviet Union is seeking an immediate settlement of the situation related to Afghanistan

and is strongly demanding an early termination and prevention of outside interference, which would expedite the return home of the Soviet troops staying in that country at the request of its government. It is fully supporting the efforts made by the leadership of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan to achieve national reconciliation.

The Soviet Union is prepared to contribute in practice to the development of favorable conditions for a fair political settlement in Central America. We are in solidarity with the settlement made by the foreign ministers of the Contadora Group and the Contadora support group on 1 October 1986, that peace in Central America was possible but that it called first and foremost for the termination of interference in the affairs of the sovereign states of the region and for practical respect for their right independently to choose their roads of development. We also are in favor of Brazil's proposal for the establishment of a zone of peace and cooperation in the South Atlantic.

The Soviet Union supported the idea of a number of Pacific states on the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific and signed protocols 2 and 3 to the Rarotonga treaty.

The Soviet Union stands for the earliest possible implementation of the UN resolution on granting genuine independence to the people of Namibia and on the abolition of the racist system of apartheid in South Africa. We are in solidarity with the fight waged by the "Frontline States" against the aggressive actions of the Pretoria regime and fully support the demands for the application by the Security Council of sanctions against South Africa in full volume.

As you know, Mr Secretary General, the Soviet Union stands for a higher role and efficiency of the United Nations, for the broad application of the methods of settling disputes by peaceful means in accordance with the UN Charter, for a better use of the potentialities of the Security Council and the UN General assembly, and for your efforts of mediation.

We note with satisfaction that awareness is growing all over the world of the need to settle disputes and conflicts by political means, with unconditional respect for the right of every people to an independent road of development. This is forcefully illustrated by worldwide outrage over the barbarous U.S. attack on Libya last April. It was condemned everywhere, including at the UN General Assembly.

We fully support the efforts of the United Nations to ensure peaceful uses of nuclear energy and outer space and environmental protection. We support the just demands of the Group-77 of developing countries for a new international economic order, including the solution of the problem of foreign indebtedness, which has both economic and political consequences. We for our part proposed the convocation of a world congress on economic security, which could discuss all the problems of world economic contacts in their entirety. Two conventions laying the foundations of an international regime for the safe and stable development of nuclear power engineering were concluded on our initiative in the International Atomic Energy Agency.

We stand for dragged-out humanitarian problems being resolved in a humane way, in a truly humanitarian spirit. To this end we proposed that a representative conference on the development of humanitarian cooperation be convened in Moscow within the framework of the all-European process. We are prepared to discuss on a serious and sound basis every aspect of human rights and basic freedoms. The Soviet Union firmly stands for guaranteeing man the right to life, to work and to equality before law.

We support the efforts of the United Nations and progressive international organizations against racial or any other discrimination, against the excessive enrichment of some at the expense of the impoverishment of others, and for a fairer and more civilized world. We stand for practical efforts to eradicate such an abomination as international terrorism, which claims innocent lives and mars relations among nations.

It can be said without exaggeration that the approval by the General Assembly of the concept of a comprehensive system of international security, proposed by a group of socialist countries, a concept covering every sphere, including military, political, economic and humanitarian, constitutes an important step towards the consolidation of the foundations of peace with regard to the United Nations. A framework has thus been created for a broad and constructive dialogue on the nature of a new philosophy of security in the nuclear-space age and practical ways of restructuring international relations on its basis.

Support from such a large number of countries for the idea of establishing security for all shows that a new mode of thinking and actions of states and a tendency for the democratization of international relations are confidently gaining ground. We intend to continue constructive exchanges of opinion on a system of all-embracing security so as to have basically developed foundations of such a system ready for submission to the next session of the General Assembly.

Speaking in general on the recently closed 41st session of the UN General Assembly, we think we can draw the conclusion that its proceedings and the resolutions passed by it reflected the people's awareness of peace as the highest value to the whole of humanity and their striving to ensure that a new mode of political thinking, a new style and approach to the solution of international problems become asserted in the United Nations, which, under its charter, is a center coordinating the activities of states. Mankind is running out of time, and this was manifest in that the highest forum of the world community called for the dynamic development of international relations and for a search for new, fresh approaches.

The International Year of Peace was a difficult, involved year. An arduous road was covered. I started by commenting on the political symbolism of the International Year of Peace. But it also gave an impetus to practical action for ridng mankind of the threat of nuclear war and creating foundations of all-embracing security that would be equivalent to all. We intend to endeavor towards that goal, from the Reykjavik frontier, under the flag of openness and democratism so that peace should be eternal.

It is my conviction, Mr. Secretary General, that with your energetic participation, the possibilities of the United Nations will continue to be used efficiently under the humane motto of the International Year of Peace: "To safeguard peace and the future of humanity."

Please accept, Mr. Secretary General, the best wishes of success and well-being in the new year.

M. Gorbachev

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RELATED ISSUES

CORBACHEV INDIAN TRIP, DELHI DOCUMENT IMPORT TO ASIAN SECURITY

PM061400 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Jan 87 First Edition p 6

[Academician Ye. Primakov article: "A Big Step Forward: Thoughts Following M.S. Gorbachev's Visit to India"]

[Excerpts] Major international events never have one single effect over a strictly limited period. They are major and significant precisely by virtue of the fact that their influence extends over time and space; they affect the entire system of international relations and are taken into account when important decisions are taken. One such event was the recent visit to India by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

Security in Asia [subhead]

One of the most important results of the talks in Delhi was Prime Minister R. Gandhi's support for the idea of a comprehensive system of international security. Naturally, security in Asia is an integral part of this. At the same time this is probably the most difficult element of the system to construct. In Europe, in the military sphere, the matter amounts in practice to lowering the level of and lessening the confrontation between the two opposing alliances -- the Warsaw Pact and NATO. In the political sphere, it amounts to the elaboration of various measures capable of leading to detente and ensuring peaceful, multifaceted cooperation between states belonging to the two opposing systems -- socialist and capitalist.

Of course, all these tasks are not easy to resolve, even in Europe. But in Asia, in my view, it is still more difficult. [paragraph continues]

Here the military problems are not confined to confrontation between the USSR and the United States. Located within the Asian-Pacific region are the USSR, the United States, the PRC, India, Japan -- in other words, the "polycentrism" is more developed here than anywhere else. In Asia there are many conflicts in an acute state, originating from various causes -- the Near East conflict, Iran-Iraq, the conflicts around Cambodia and Afghanistan, and others. A whole series of Asian states have territorial claims against each other.

In these conditions, how can security be achieved in Asia? Even before M.S. Gorbachev's visit to India, items were published in Western newspapers and in certain Indian newspapers incompletely or incorrectly representing the Soviet position on this question. Some people tried to suggest that the USSR wants to transfer the "European

model" mechanically to Asia and immediately begin the process of convening a conference to create an all-Asian security system. As long ago as his Vladivostok speech the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee proposed measures which have absolutely nothing in common with that scenario. M.S. Gorbachev's speeches in India gave additional explanations, from which it is clear that the Soviet line consists of the following:

- without transferring European experience mechanically to Asia, to make use of everything in that experience which can usefully be adapted to Asian soil and promote the security of that continent's countries;
- to this end, to advance by every avenue, including bilateral accords, subregional agreements, and finally, if it proves possible in time, a regional agreement on security matters;
- to pay particular attention to the need to settle the existing conflicts in Asia, making use to that end of all the potential which exists, including the USSR's contacts with the United States;
- to strengthen military-political stability by reducing the numerical strength and limiting the activity of the USSR and U.S. naval forces in the region; to hold talks with the United States and interested Asian countries on confidence-building measures in the military sphere in relation to Asia and the adjacent sea areas of the Indian and Pacific Oceans;
- to hold multilateral talks on guaranteeing the security of maritime communications, as well as guaranteeing the sovereignty of the littoral states over their natural resources;
- to encourage and support movements to create peace zones, and in particular to turn the Indian Ocean into such a zone;
- to draw up an international convention on combating terrorism on maritime and air routes, and to take part in such a convention.

This list naturally does not exhaust all the measures for progressing toward a system of security in Asia, but at the present stage they are the most important, and there is every reason to suppose that India agrees with that assessment.

One of the most acute regional security problems for India is its relations with Pakistan. Justified concern is aroused in Delhi by the energetic U.S. activity in arming Pakistan with modern means of waging war. In these conditions the Soviet Union naturally understands the need to strengthen the defense capability of peace-loving India. At the same time, at the Delhi news conference M.S. Gorbachev stressed that the USSR advocates the political, peaceful settlement of all disputes between India and Pakistan. An important element of the new way of thinking which the USSR is introducing to interstate relations is the categorical renunciation of playing off one country against another and exploiting the contradictions between them, and of attempting to "catch fish by muddying the waters."

In general, it must be said that the Soviet Union -- and this position is, by all appearances, understood and accepted by India -- advocates that the development of its relations with any state should not be detrimental to others. [paragraph continues]

It is from this standpoint, for instance, that we approach the problem of the normalization and development of relations with China. The USSR's policy with regard to India is based on the same principle.

A Document of Global Significance [subhead]

The high point of the visit to India was the signing of the Delhi declaration, which proclaims the principles of a nonviolent world free from nuclear weapons. This document is very important, not only because it was signed by the leaders of two countries whose population amounts to a billion, that is, one-fifth of mankind. The Delhi declaration's significance is worldwide.

The 27th CPSU Congress proclaimed the need for new political thinking in our times, times which differ fundamentally from the past in that the constant improvement of weapons of mass destruction has faced mankind with a real problem of survival. The Delhi Declaration may be regarded as the practical implementation of the new political thinking.

We have many times witnessed the West putting forward versions of "crisis diplomacy" and "rules of behavior" when a conflict situation grows into a crisis threatening to involve the United States and the USSR. Perhaps there is some sense in these efforts. But it is far more urgent and vitally important to draw up "rules of behavior" for states with a view to preventing crisis, settling conflicts, and averting the slide toward the abyss of thermonuclear disaster. The Delhi declaration is such a document.

The 10 principles it sets forth are a detailed characterization of peaceful coexistence in our time.

The Delhi declaration stresses that peaceful coexistence must become the universal norm of international relations. This implies not simply the universal renunciation of war as a means of resolving disputes, but energetic activity with the aim of settling by political, not military, means all conflict situations regardless of the level at which they develop — global or regional.

In order to strengthen peaceful coexistence, all members of the world community must be confident of their security. This confidence is not created by the "equilibrium of fear" — the system on which security is in effect based at the global level today. The Delhi declaration proclaims as an urgent goal the creation of a comprehensive system of international security instead of the notorious "equilibrium of fear."

Irreversible peaceful coexistence can only be ensured in the conditions of a nonviolent world free from nuclear weapons. Such a world can only be attained through a system of concrete, urgent measures aimed at disarmament. The Delhi declaration proposes such measures.

Peaceful coexistence is not simply security, important as that is. The Delhi declaration focuses attention on the need to mobilize the material and intellectual potential of all mankind in order to resolve global problems: the food problem, the population problem, the elimination of illiteracy, environmental conservation, and the peaceful use of the world's oceans, the sea bed, and outer space.

Today, alongside the Soviet Union's signature on the Delhi declaration, there is the equally weighty signature of India. But time will pass, and other states will also subscribe to the principles of this historic document. It may be boldly said in this connection that the Delhi declaration is oriented toward the future.

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RELATED ISSUES

MOSCOW RADIO ON MORATORIUM ANNIVERSARY, SDI, ASIAN SECURITY

LD190845 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 18 Jan 87

["International Observers Roundtable" program with Yuriy Nikolayevich Bandura, deputy chief editor of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI; Viktor Aleksandrovich Tsoppi, member of the editorial board of NOVOYE VREMYA; Igor Pavlovich Charikov, All-Union Radio commentator on foreign politics]

[Text] [Charikov] Hello, esteemed comrades. The date 15 January 1986 has already entered the chronicle of the 20th century as an important, significant, and memorable date. On that day, on behalf of the Soviet Union, one of the leading world powers, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, made a statement which contained a most important foreign policy action, an action unprecedented in its scale, in its scope of problems and issues, and in the specificity of every proposed step: a program for the total elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world. The 20th century has given mankind the energy of the atom, but this energy, as became apparent 6 August 1945, can be used not for creation, but destruction, and now, with the existence of huge stocks of nuclear weapons, self-destruction as well. Prompted by this peril the Soviet Union appealed to the other states in possession of such weapons and to the people of all countries to support its wide-scale program to eliminate all types of such weapons stage by stage.

This program is the logical continuation, development, the culmination if you like, of our foreign policy, the aim of which is to avoid an armed confrontation between the two social-economic systems and to avoid the destruction of civilization. This program was coordinated -- and it could not have been otherwise -- with the interests of our allies in the countries of the socialist community. A year has passed since the memorable day when Mikhail Sergeyevich delivered this statement on Soviet television. Quite a few events of varying significance have taken place in international life, as well as quite a few events with a high degree of significance. First of all is the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik. Not one of these events has overshadowed 15 January; on the contrary, they have confirmed the urgency, the weight, the constructiveness, the breadth, and the mutually acceptable nature of the set of proposals contained in Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's statement. Indeed, great things are best seen from a distance, and although this distance is only 1 year, what was said in the seven points of the Soviet program has acquired even greater significance.

What reaction did this statement evoke in the United States of America? On the evidence of both the U.S. press and our journalist colleagues working in the United States, nobody in the U.S. administration expected such a bold, decisive, and constructive step. They simply were not ready for this. They were not ready,

generally speaking, because the United States' foreign policy concept is aimed at quite different tasks; it is aimed not at disarmament, but at the build-up and upgrading of arms; not at organizing peaceful mutual relations, but at stirring up local conflicts; and, in the final analysis, at achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union. This is why attempts were undertaken from the very start to fence off the new Soviet initiative from ordinary Americans, that is, to hush it up somehow, to refrain from replying to it, and, as far as possible, to distort its contents. The administration is unable to juxtapose anything to it. In the 6 years -- it's already the 7th year now -- in the 6 years the Reagan Administration has been in power, it has not come out with one sufficiently practical and constructive and sufficiently radical initiative aimed at settling the situation in the world.

The only thing the administration has engendered over these years is the Strategic Defense Initiative, the so-called Star Wars program, which has become the obstacle, as we know, on the path of the realization of the program of the state-by-stage elimination of nuclear weapons set forth in Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's statement. As the latest facts show, the administration adheres to its former concepts and holds the implementation of the Strategic Defense Initiative as its main task. In this context, I would like to quote one American politician, William Fulbright. In his book *THE ARROGANCE OF POWER* he writes: At the moment man is living for the first time in conditions where his existence is in peril. Other forms of life were imperiled or destroyed by changes in their natural environment. Man is threatened by a change in his environment; but he himself has engendered this threat, having created nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Our responsibilities for killing have become limitless, which creates a qualitatively new situation, and if we want to survive, we have to fundamentally change our attitude to opinions and advice, and their implementation, and to human and international relations in general. I remind you this was said by Fulbright exactly 20 years ago in 1967 in a book published in New York. Even if present politicians, those who are in the White House now, are familiar with it, I fear very much that they, on the whole, have not heeded the opinion of an adequately experienced politician.

[Tsoppi] Of course. What is happening in the world at the moment confirms Fulbright's correctness and the view of things that the world is divided by economic interests, various social systems, various ideas and aspirations, various standards of living and so on -- this world is nevertheless whole; it is a world in which everything is interconnected and interdependent. This is precisely why today one cannot think in the old ways, especially politicians, especially people vested with the authority of the state and a huge responsibility to their own people as well as all mankind. I think it is this feeling of responsibility that dictated the statement of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev on 15 January last year. Of course, the world has changed in the past year. It has changed, in my opinion, for the better and precisely as a result of the stance taken by our country a year ago, and as a result of all the subsequent actions by our party and state, actions which have to an enormous extent substantiated the tasks of antiwar activity posed in the 15 January statement.

A year ago we put forward a daring model of a new world -- a world without nuclear weapons, and so, without nuclear war. This gave rise to quite evident perplexity in many people -- I would even say, a sort of bafflement -- and prompted a conditioned reflex which has been instilled in human consciousness by decades of tense political confrontation. This confrontation threatens to reach the point of universal man-to-man fighting, with a deadly outcome for the whole universe. Many people said then, being at the mercy of this fear, many people said: Your program is too good to become a

reality. Without wasting any superfluous words -- far more were wasted earlier than need have been -- our country put on the negotiating table specific and practical proposals, proposals which, whatever else may have been said, were fully acceptable to the United States as well. What I have in mind is the proposals on strategic weapons, on medium-range missiles, and on issues of verifying [kontrol] the cessation of nuclear tests and the nonmilitarization of space. Let us recall no matter how mighty and invulnerable, it would seem, is Washington's immunity to the effect of common sense, even the U.S. President, confronted by our flexibility, good will, and quite well-thought and wise pliability, did not resist and comprehended -- unexpectedly, by the way, for many of his admirers and adversaries -- that the Soviet proposals could be accepted.

The program for a safe, nuclear-free world did not begin to be translated into purposeful actions only because its path was blocked by the Star Wars program. These are incompatible, mutually exclusive, and mutually severing concepts of the future of mankind. In compliance to what logic can one agree to the fact, having destroyed all lethal weapons on earth, hanging a yet more dangerous means of destroying the human race above the earth? After all, in essence the president, having rejected the plan for the nonmilitarization of space, confirmed he is both the hostage and the agent of the interests of the military-industrial complex, which takes on, so to speak, the contract of ensuring the United States' military superiority, whatever it costs mankind, whatever it costs mankind and howsoever it imperils it.

[Bandura] Evaluating the past year since the statement by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, one comes to feel that the potential of the aspirations for good will in the world proved to be so powerful that our statement, announced from Moscow, aroused enormous forces which are being channelled into specific initiatives, not only on the part of the Soviet Union, and I would even say, not only on the part of the socialist community. For example, I would like to cite such globally known documents announced last year -- which were powerfully, widely announced throughout the world -- as the Harare appeal. I think one could say a lot about this, but in it I can detect the desire by the greater, the overwhelming majority of the human race to secure peace, to secure it on the wave of enterprising policy which the Soviet Union is conducting.

[Tsoppi] Yes, the Harare appeal it is a very representative document.

[Bandura] As is known, taking part at Harare were the heads of states and governments of nonaligned states representing a most enormous part of the population of the globe, and the thoughts and currents which were laid down in this document, its appeals and concepts, are in accord with the foreign policy aims of the Soviet Union, and are in accord with the program proposed to the world on 15 January last year.

One gains from this the picture of a changing world, the picture of a world where new thinking and a new political philosophy are starting to become a reality, embracing the overwhelming, if not the absolute majority of humanity. Manifestations of this new philosophy, new political thinking which is brought about by the requirements of the missile and space age are evident everywhere. One of the latest of these, one of the most important and which attracts the greatest attention worldwide, was the announcement of the cease-fire starting at midnight on 15 January in Afghanistan, commencing a process capable of leading to nationwide reconciliation in Afghanistan.

[Tsoppi] You know, Yuriy Nikolayevich, I think one has to search for and find -- and it is becoming increasingly easy these days -- tangible symptoms of the new thinking among our political opponents in the West. For example I would like to cite the following fact. Recently, Felipe Gonzalez, the head of the Spanish Government, was asked what role Western Europe was able to play in a conflict between the East and the West. Having made the proviso that of course Europe and the United States are not only in the same alliance but also constitute an integrated cultural world, he stated all the same, truthfully speaking, there cannot be complete similarity -- this is just impossible from the point of view of political logic -- between European plans and the plans of the United States. Even in such spheres as security and defense, Europe should have its own position. Furthermore, in the view of Gonzalez, the West Europeans cannot build their strategy on the permanent basis of a fait accompli such as the American position may become. I think this is a manifestation of great political wisdom, and Felipe Gonzalez is not alone.

[Charikov] You know, Viktor Aleksandrovich, since you have been citing the comments of West European politicians, I would like to highlight the following issue here. Western Europe is currently confused in many ways, I would even say frightened and, is being sobered up, if you like, even if that sounds paradoxical, by the complete inconsistency in the foreign policy of the present administration of the United States and by whether or not such a thing actually exists at all. After all, recently and with increasing frequency, even in Washington itself, it is being said in Washington political circles that since 1980 there simply has been no foreign policy as such, in the classical sense, during the Reagan Administration. There has, in fact, been a certain series of separate acts, a series of various comments by individual politicians at one moment or other, or in one specific political situation or another. For this reason, the Western allies of the United States, in the NATO bloc in the first instance, are by and large unable to trace any logic and are unable to predict it. In what way are they then able to support this policy or follow its course? They are simply forced either to support or decline or abstain from supporting this or that specific action.

[Tsoppi] Sometimes they occupy a position which looks strange even against the backdrop of the United States' position. For example, in Reykjavik, agreement had practically been reached on the removal from Europe of medium-range missiles. Then suddenly, in Western Europe -- and even in the first instance in France, on whose territory these missiles are not positioned [raspolagatsya] and which has enough of its own missiles -- suddenly there was a wave of outrage at such an accord. Why? How is this possible? For example, French Defense Minister Andre Giraud was simply in a panic. He said: Is it possible to imagine Western Europe left to rely solely on the U.S. strategic weapons which would be kept only on the territory of the United States? The same position was adopted by the French foreign minister and by Prime Minister Jacques Chirac, who said with regard to the zero option -- and I will remind you that the zero option which was constantly being put forward by the United States was at that time very enthusiastically received in Western Europe...

[Charikov interrupting] Viktor Aleksandrovich, this was the only initiative of the Reagan Administration. When I was speaking about its political activity I forgot to mention this.

[Tsoppi] Yes, well, so when this initiative was put forward by the United States, everyone in France applauded. President Mitterrand said, yes, let the Soviet SS-20 and the U.S. Pershings disappear from the center of Europe. Now it all proves to be the

other way around, and, moreover, in her new military program France asserts she in absolutely no way wants to include her policy in the policy of disarmament, in a policy which would lead to ridding the whole of the European continent of nuclear weapons.

[Bandura] You know, here is the impression I am forming of the actions by the West in recent times. It seems to me that the effectiveness, the force, the attractiveness, reasonableness, and comprehensibility of the initiatives of the Soviet Union are exerting such a powerful influence on the frame of mind of ordinary inhabitants of the West, that they are starting to change their thinking and ideas about the Soviet Union and about the socialist system as a whole, but, neither the United States nor a part of the circles in the West which are closely linked with the United States wants to change its mind. At the same time, they don't want to permit their fellow citizens to deviate from the course which has been under construction for decades with respect to the Soviet Union and with respect to mutual relations between the East and West. In this situation, sometimes leaders of the Western world, many leaders -- far from all -- but many start and are obliged to acknowledge the effectiveness of Soviet foreign policy, of the directions laid down in the 15 January statement, which have been continued in specific initiatives by the Soviet Union.

They are starting to acknowledge the effectiveness of the Soviet initiatives. The way they attempt to turn this whole business upside down is shown by a comment I read in one recent American newspaper by -- this newspaper presents him as one of the most eminent U.S. experts on disarmament issues -- Scowcroft, a former presidential assistant on national security...

[Tsoppi, interrupting] Brent Scowcroft, the renowned politician, who goes back to the Nixon administration.

[Bandura] This is what he says -- I quote: The all-embracing nature and the boldness of the proposals put forward at Reykjavik have put into confusion the entire agenda for the sphere of arms control [kontrol and vooruzheniyami], and it will be difficult, almost impossible, to turn back and assemble the fragments into a whole. What is apparent from this? In my opinion it is evident that no one in the West, even the most outspoken supporters of continuing the arms race, has the power any longer to stand up against, has the power any longer to review the positions that we embarked upon in Reykjavik.

[Tsoppi] Today the Soviet threat has been transformed.

[Bandura] That is right.

[Tsoppi] It has become clear the Soviet Union is threatening the whole world with peace, and this has turned out to be very frightening.

[Bandura] One could talk about the Soviet peace threat.

[Charikov] Yuriy Nikolayevich, Brent Scowcroft is not the only U.S. politician who, no longer in office and retired, is criticizing the actions of the present administration. Why is it that only having become ex-holders of office, why is it that only having retired, do politicians begin saying really intelligent things? This question has always worried me. It seems to me that there is an answer to this. The answer is that while in service, while occupying an official post, as the saying goes, they are simply obliged, forced, to keep quiet, conceal their personal opinion, as they

are called upon to express someone else's opinions. When they are no longer in office, their tongues loosen, and they obtain freedom of speech, so to speak, in the full sense, and they begin to express the thoughts they were once forced to conceal. So, who is the person, or the group of people, so to speak, or the certain force, that has a hold on what they say while they are at the helm? What do you think, Viktor Aleksandrovich?

[Isoppi] I think the answer here is rather trite and rather simple. I think if one is talking about the present administration, then it would not be a startling revelation to say the United States, its foreign policy, is guided by the military-industrial complex. I think this complex today has exceedingly talented defenders, exceedingly dogged pursuers of its ideas. For example, I have in mind Caspar Weinberger, the secretary of defense. At the same time one should not think the people working in the administration are all crazy, that they are all candidates for suicide. They are searching for some kind of justification for the policy that seems murderous and suicidal to everyone.

[Charikov] Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's statement of 15 January, through its whole package of proposals, also applies to the peoples of other continents; not only Europe not only America, but also Asia and the Pacific Ocean region. Isn't that so, Yuriy Nikolayevich?

[Bandura] Of course. The propositions relating to Asian security expounded in the statement of 15 January were powerfully developed further in Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's speech in Vladivostok. One could name as an example the withdrawal of six of our regiments from Afghanistan, which demonstrates the readiness of the USSR to withdraw its troops from this country as soon as a political settlement for the situation regarding Afghanistan has been guaranteed. Unfortunately, one cannot say the new thinking is making ground widely on the Asian continent, to which ever increasing attention has been riveted in recent years.

I would like to dwell on one of the latest facts. In particular, just today, the trip to a number of countries in the Pacific Ocean region by Kuranari, the Japanese minister of Foreign Affairs, is coming to an end. He is putting forward the conception of Japan's mutual relations with countries in the Pacific Ocean region. If one tries to grasp attentively the propositions he is suggesting, it would seem nothing bad could be found in them. Japan is interested in peace, prosperity, stability in Asia and the Pacific. Japan is prepared to make its contribution. However, the phrase -- Japan is calling upon the countries of the Asian and Pacific region to counteract the USSR -- is being pronounced with perfect clarity between the lines and at times out in the open. It is, of course, impossible to understand what evidence Tokyo sees, as it calls it, the USSR's penetration into countries in the Pacific -- which it perceives to be a threat to its interests -- since the USSR has no such intentions.

A quite different option is visible here, namely, that in Tokyo, and in Washington as well, very serious misgivings are being expressed at those manifestations, those shoots of new thinking gaining ground in the Asian-Pacific countries, among others. It seems to me the predominant spectrum of the mood in Southeast Asia and in the Far East was expressed during the recent visit to China by Tarkeshita, secretary general of Japan's ruling party, who was told bluntly in Beijing that Tokyo's recently expressed intention to exceed its self-imposed limit on its military spending, set at 1 percent of the gross national product, is giving rise to the most serious fears in China. I think Japan's exceeding this limit, linked on a practical basis with the removal of all

barriers to the development of the military machine within Japan itself, cannot but evoke a reaction from the peoples of other countries as well, particularly because actions of this kind, however they are justified, run counter to the flow of new thinking which today embraces virtually the whole world.

[Tsoppi] Yes, I also think there are grounds for optimism. I would like, time permitting, to recall that it was precisely in Asia that the Delhi declaration, that has become world renowned, was signed, openly setting the practicable task of creating a world free from nuclear arms and the use of force. Considering the very broad response this document evoked not only in the countries of Asia, that the situation in this region should shift, should move away from the fatal path that it is being pushed along by the joint efforts of the United States and its ally Japan.

[Charikov] In my view, Viktor Aleksandrovich, this Delhi declaration follows in its spirit from the statement of 15 January.

[Tsoppi] Of course.

[Charikov] Well, esteemed comrades, our program's time is running out. Allow me to sum up succinctly the results of our conversation today. The past year has shown the whole permanent significance of the 15 January statement, its global scale, its truly global scale, the constructiveness of the proposals contained in it, and their practicabilities, with their topical and timely nature.

[Tsoppi] I would put it like this. This statement is working and working increasingly vigorously.

[Charikov] That is right. Furthermore it is not only working among the public and the politicians of America and Europe, but also, as we were saying today, among the public in other continents: Africa, Asia, the Pacific region. As a matter of fact this document has rocked the minds of all mankind. It would not be an exaggeration to say that today we have in the form of this statement a document of truly epoch-making significance.

Well, comrades, allow me on behalf of the participants in the program, to thank you for your attention, and to say goodbye. All the best to you.

/12858

CSO: 5200/1252

RELATED ISSUES

PRAVDA DISCUSSES ASIAN SECURITY PROBLEMS

PM141127 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Jan 86 p 4

[Article by Political Observer Vsevolod Ovchinnikov: "The Asian Aspect"]

[Text] The Soviet program for eliminating nuclear and chemical weapons by the end of this century is in tune with the feelings of the peoples of Asia, for whom problems of peace and security are no less acute than for the European peoples....The implementation of our program would fundamentally alter the situation in Asia, would rid the peoples of that part of the world also of fear of the nuclear and chemical threat, and would raise security in that region to a qualitatively new level.

These lines from the CPSU Central Committee general secretary's 15 January 1986 statement sound even more topical this year than when they were announced. Asia accounts for one-third of the world's dry land and over two-thirds of mankind. Five of the world's seven most populous countries are situated here: China, India, the USSR, Indonesia, and Japan. Neither the prospect of a nuclear-free world nor the assertion of an all-embracing international security system is conceivable without enlisting the Asian and Pacific region to this process.

As a state which has its own most extensive borders in Asia, the USSR is seeking to ensure that the Asian and Pacific region is not a source of tension or an arena of military confrontation. The course of events in this part of the world is of national and state interest for our country. This in no way implies claims to any privileges, the search for advantage to the detriment of others or attempts to strengthen our security at others' expense. We see our interest in pooling efforts, in cooperating with full respect for each people's right to live as it chooses.

The Soviet program for creating a nuclear-free world is particularly attuned to the feelings of the Asian peoples because it was precisely in that part of the world that the first U.S. atom bombs exploded, reducing Hiroshima and Nagasaki to dust. It is with Asia that the first plans for the use of U.S. nuclear weapons in "regional conflicts" against the Korean, Vietnamese, and Chinese people were linked. It was in Asia and the Pacific Ocean basin that the sinister consequences of the nuclear race were first felt, when Japanese fishermen suffered from the radioactive dust of the U.S. hydrogen bomb.

On numerous occasions in the postwar decades Asia has been the arena of imperialist piracy, which has now become the linchpin of the doctrine of "neoglobalism." It was in Asia that the U.S. military unleashed the two biggest wars since 1945: in Korea and Vietnam. Seeking to reverse history and to deprive the peoples of the right to

determine their own historical path, imperialism disdains nothing. There is the setting of some states against others, military actions, state terrorism against inconvenient regimes, the arming and financing of separatists and terrorists, economic blockade and debt slavery, and various acts of political subversion and intrigues.

The undeclared wars against Afghanistan and Kampuchea, support for the Punjab extremists, the Tamil problem which they also want to turn against India, the shameless annexation of Micronesia, interference in political processes in the Philippines, the pressure on New Zealand — such is neoglobalism in its unadulterated form. The tempo of the young states' development, their surmounting of the difficulties inherited from the past; depend largely on whether they will be able to offer proper resistance to neoglobalism — that main evil in the path of world progress. The solution of the truly global problem of disarmament and development will also depend on this.

Recently there has been a marked activation in the attempts of U.S. imperialist circles to use the Asian and Pacific region as one more arena of military-political confrontation with the USSR and the other socialist states and the national liberation forces. The Pentagon is seeking to turn the countries in Asia and the Pacific, where the eastern borders of world socialism pass, into a frontier for the deployment of forward-based nuclear weapons, such as West Europe and the adjacent Atlantic have already become.

As a whole the Asian and Pacific region has still not been militarized to the same degree as the European region. Since the latter half of the seventies the United States has intensively built up its military presence there. Although two out of the three Pacific Ocean states with nuclear weapons — the USSR and the PRC — have pledged not to make first use of them, the United States has deployed nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and nuclear warheads in a crisis zone — the south of the Korean peninsula.

Counter to the "three nonnuclear principles," U.S. fighter bombers designed to deliver nuclear strikes have been deployed on Japanese territory. Encouraging militarist tendencies in Japan, U.S. imperialism is seeking to turn it into a key link in the anti-Soviet, antisocialist "Eastern front." They want to enclose Washington's military links with Tokyo and Seoul in a triangle for the same purpose. In brief, we cannot fail to see that militarization and the buildup of the military threat in this part of the world are beginning to gather dangerous speed.

Peace and security cannot be ensured by a policy geared toward confrontation. The Asian and Pacific region can and must actively join in the general world process aimed at preventing a thermonuclear catastrophe. That is why the Soviet Union's appeal is so topical: to act together to seek ways toward the consolidation of peace, security, and cooperation in Asia and the Pacific Ocean basin. The peoples of this part of the world are interested in a coordinated approach toward regional problems. The Soviet Union proposes seeking a settlement of vexed questions through bilateral and multilateral consultations, strengthening mutual trust, and gradually creating the preconditions for holding a pan-Asian forum of the same type as the Helsinki conference to jointly engage in the search for constructive solutions.

The opponents of this idea claim the security formula elaborated in Europe is inapplicable to Asia. Of course, the specific features of the Asian and Pacific region cannot be ignored. Furthermore, the USSR has absolutely no desire to impose a ready-made formula for pan-Asian security on other states but calls on them to take part together in its elaboration. As the fruit of joint efforts, this formula should be acceptable to all and reflect each state's interests. It is a case not of the

mechanical transfer of European experience onto Asian soil but of considering Helsinki in giving practical embodiment to the principles once elaborated by the peoples of Asia themselves.

The concept of pan-Asian security does not come from the air. As the Indian prime minister has said, the principles of "Panch Shila," Bandung, and nonalignment to which the CPSU Central Committee general secretary referred in his speech in Vladivostok create the theoretical and political framework for analyzing the complex and unique problems of peace and stability in the Asian and Pacific region.

The Soviet-Indian summit talks in Delhi lent powerful impetus to the positive processes in Asia. Through the force of their example the USSR and India are promoting the assertion of the principles of peaceful coexistence, impeding the tendencies leading to nuclear catastrophe, and demonstrating the real possibility of opposing imperial ambitions and militarist diktat. The Delhi Declaration signed by the two countries' leaders embodies a graphic example of new political thinking.

A world free from nuclear weapons and violence, the Delhi Declaration says, requires specific and urgent measures. It is essential to totally destroy nuclear arsenals before the end of this century, to prevent any weapons from being put into space, to ban nuclear tests and the creation of new weapons of mass annihilation, to destroy chemical weapons stockpiles, and to lower the level of conventional armaments and armed forces.

It is not hard to see these aims coincide with the main provisions of the program for a nuclear-free world put forward in the 15 January statement accord with the idea of creating an all-embracing system of international security. The implementation of these Soviet initiatives and the realization of the principles of the Delhi Declaration would normalize the situation in the Asian and Pacific region. [paragraph continues]

Against the background of the gradual elimination of nuclear weapons it would also be possible to ensure the interest of the security of states which do not possess them. They would officially proclaim their adherence to the three nonnuclear principles: not to have or produce nuclear weapons or import them onto their territory. The nuclear powers would pledge on the basis of international law not to use nuclear weapons against the countries and regions of that part of the world which observe nuclear-free status.

With an agreement on the total elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of this century it would be immeasurably easier to agree also on other measures to strengthen peace and security in the Asian and Pacific region. If a nuclear-free world were to become a general political guideline, favorable preconditions would take shape for eliminating foreign military bases on the territories of the Asian states and in the Pacific and Indian Ocean basins.

The elaboration of the concept of pan-Asian security on the basis of nuclear disarmament is a long-term task which has to be resolved stage by stage, moving from the simple to the complex. Yet even the longest journey begins with the first step. In addition the development of the pan-Asian process is now favored by factors like the growth of the authority and positive role of the Nonaligned Movement, the upsurge in antimilitary, antinuclear feelings, the activation of the struggle for a new international economic order, and the marked improvement of Soviet-Chinese relations.

"The CPSU," its program states, "advocates the pooling of the efforts of all interested states with a view to ensuring security in Asia and their joint quest for the constructive solution of this problem."

RELATED ISSUES

TASS: HONECKER, NAKASONE DISCUSS ARMS ISSUES IN BERLIN

Militarization of Space

LD131819 Moscow TASS in English 1757 GMT 13 Jan 87

[Text] Berlin January 13 TASS -- Talks between General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, Chairman of the GDR Council of State Erich Honecker and Japan's Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, on an official visit in the GDR, were held here today.

Upholding and consolidating peace is the GDR's most important task now, the GDR leader said. There will be neither victors nor vanquished in the event of nuclear war. So this catastrophe must not be allowed, in the same way as no one should be allowed to be striving for the achievement of the military-strategic superiority. Nations ought to learn to coexist peacefully, since there is no reasonable alternative to this. The militarization of space presupposed by the U.S. "Star Wars" programme would mean the stepping up of the arms race to huge proportions and would simultaneously preclude any opportunity of getting it under control.

Erich Honecker insistently declared in favour of the United States joining in the Soviet Union's unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing and strictly observing the existing treaties on arms limitation, including the SALT-2 treaty. The proposals advanced by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavik suit the interests of entire humanity. The Reykjavik meeting again extended to peoples the hope for possibility of nuclear disarmament. This historic chance should be used, he said.

Supporting Erich Honecker's statement on the need for a political dialogue in the interests of peace and detente, Yasuhiro Nakasone said that it is important for Japan to conduct a dialogue with states with different social systems, striving for concrete results.

Touching upon the Soviet-U.S. Reykjavik summit, Japan's prime minister described it as a historic event. He positively assessed Mikhail Gorbachev's proposals and emphasized that because of the difference in the stands about SDI results were not achieved. He expressed the hope that the great powers can achieve agreement which is possible. Japan and the GDR which have no nuclear weapons must support the efforts of the sides, Yasuhiro Nakasone said.

Asian Security

LD132114 Moscow TASS in English 2034 GMT 13 Jan 87

[Text] Berlin January 13 TASS -- The Soviet Union's initiative for ridding the globe of all kinds of nuclear weapons by the year 2000 and proposals of the Warsaw Treaty countries for a reduction of conventional armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals mean a comprehensive peace programme, said general secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist State Unity Party of Germany, Chairman of the GDR Council of State Erich Honecker. Speaking today at a reception in honour of Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, on an official visit here, Erich Honecker emphasized that the GDR welcomes and supports the initiative Mikhail Gorbachev advanced in Vladivostok and all other proposals for the ensurance of security and peaceful cooperation in the Asian-Pacific region.

These constructive realistic ideas mean an important impetus to all who are striving for peaceful relations and fruitful cooperation in the area.

Speaking in reply, Japan's Prime Minister said that the demand of the time now is to be developing a political dialogue, contacts and talks with a view to achieving a turn from the arms race to disarmament, detente and cooperation. The constructive efforts of all states for the sake of world security are now needed as never before, he said.

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CSO: 5200/1252

RELATED ISSUES

TASS: NORWEGIAN DEFENSE MINISTER ON SDI, TESTING, INF, NFZ

LD092334 Moscow TASS in English 2309 GMT 9 Jan 87

[Text] Oslo January 10 TASS -- Norway is opposed to the U.S. "Strategic Defense Initiative" aimed at the development and deployment of space arms systems banned by the Soviet-American ABM Treaty.

This was stated by Johan Jorgen Holst, minister of defense of Norway. He addressed the trainees of the Military Academy of the Norwegian Armed Forces.

Expounding the position of his country's government on main disarmament problems, he pointed out that Norway supported the proposals on a complete ban on nuclear weapon tests, on a 50-percent reduction in strategic arms and also on a complete withdrawal from Europe of medium-range missiles with a simultaneous reduction in tactical nuclear weapons.

Holste also came out in favor of the establishment of a nuclear-free corridor in central Europe and of a nuclear-free zone in Nordic Europe.

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